The economic value of Albertine Rift Forests; applications in policy and programming by Bush, Glenn K
 The Economic Value of Albertine Rift Forests; 
Applications in Policy and Programming 
 
A thesis presented by 
 
Glenn K Bush 
to 
The Department of Economics 
for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in the subject of 
Economics 
 
University of Stirling 





In accordance with the regulations for Higher Degrees by Research, I hereby declare that this 
thesis submitted for the candidature of Doctor of Philosophy is a result of my own research 
and independent work except where reference is made to published literature. I hereby certify 
that the work embodied in this thesis has not already been submitted in candidature for any 
other institute of higher learning. 
 




Glenn K. Bush 











To Annabelle  
 
“Whatever fortune brings, don’t be afraid of doing things.” 
 




The objective of this thesis is to quantitatively understand the economic performance of 
protected area management strategies for forest and biodiversity conservation. Examples such 
as integrated conservation and development and eco tourism are assessed in terms of their 
ability to deliver on welfare benefits to local communities, and an assessment of the 
opportunity costs of forest conservation as a land use strategy.  In addition the contribution of 
forest conservation in protected areas can make to poverty alleviation and economic 
development is also examined.  The geographical focus of this study is the Albertine Rift 
region of East and Central Africa, stretching north from the southern end of Lake Tanganyika 
through the spine of Africa to the northern end of Lake Albert.  The Albertine Rift is one of 
Africa’s most important landscapes for the conservation of forests and biodiversity.  
 
The overarching objective is addressed using a series of case studies empirically valuing the 
opportunity costs of conserving forests in a selection of sites in the central part of the 
Albertine Rift. The success of conservation is most often measured against progress in 
reducing habitat or species loss and not often in terms of the contribution of the protected area 
to poverty alleviation and local economic development. Achieving improvements of 
conservation strategies in the social dimension requires objective evidence on their effects. 
Economic valuation of protected area resources provides a quantitative means of assessing the 
promise and performance of conservation policies in achieving welfare benefits to local 
communities.  
 
This thesis provides three case studies each addressing current valuation and social issues in 
conservation and sets them in a context of managing protected areas in the broad dynamic 
setting of poverty alleviation and economic growth from a developing economy perspective. 
In addition two of the empirical studies are as concerned with methodological enquiry and the 
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performance of novel environmental economic valuation techniques, such as the contingent 
valuation and choice modelling approaches, as the application of results to conservation 
questions.  
 
The empirical studies show that the benefits to local households and communities from their 
local forests may be greater than at first perceived. Across all protected area categories, 
biomes and income groups, households derived significant amounts of their overall income 
from their local protected area with large proportions of the value of goods harvested from 
forests being consumed in the home. Amongst income groups high income households often 
appropriated a greater share of the value of forest goods. There was no significant difference 
found between the household consumption and the sale of protected area products between 
income groups. The findings indicate that imposing reductions in forest use may increase 
poverty amongst local people whilst increasing household income will not necessarily reduce 
forest exploitation. This indicates that community conservation and integrated conservation 
and development programmes must target the poor forest adjacent households more actively 
to ensure poverty alleviation, whilst providing improved protection and law enforcement for 
effective conservation.  
 
It is also shown that biodiversity conservation can have an economic return through mountain 
gorilla eco-tourism. Findings show a disparity between what constitutes eco-tourism and the 
real values of tourists towards biodiversity conservation and local social benefits from 
protected areas.  Despite showing a high marginal utility for biodiversity conservation, 
consumers are unwilling to pay for local community benefits from tourism as part of the 
permit price to view gorillas.  Clearly the link between successful conservation and the 
welfare status of local communities is not sufficiently established in the minds of consumers 
to influence their spending decisions. 
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The challenges of effectively mobilising communities to protect biodiversity are discussed in 
the context of the variable impacts of integrated conservation and development programs over 
the last three decades. Direct payment payments for conservation services schemes are 
discussed as an innovative tool to add to the gamut of community approaches currently on 
offer. Payments for conservation schemes are viewed with cautious optimism in terms of their 
possibility for success. Despite their allure of being more economically and socially efficient 
at achieving welfare and conservation objectives, given the complex nature of any society, no 
less research in to social and economic dynamics of protected area use by local communities 
would be needed to ensure success of such schemes. However, the overwhelming majority of 
benefits form protected areas are tied up in ecosystem services values.  Mechanisms to 
generate funding and distribute payments for these benefits in terms of offsetting the local 
opportunity costs are essential to change local behaviour and reduce forest degradation and 
destruction. 
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Chapter 1.0:  
Introduction, objectives and structure of the thesis 
1.1 Introduction; the problem of forest and biodiversity loss 
The unprecedented rate of forest and biodiversity loss due to human impacts on the biosphere 
is well documented (Common & Stagl 2005; MEA 2005).  These ecosystems and their 
genetic material provide mankind with innumerable benefits from the sense of well-being and 
satisfaction. For example knowing that the mountain gorillas have a home in the wild,  to the 
more tangible benefits that tropical forests play in stabilising global climate and mitigating the 
effects of extreme weather events. More locally, the immediacy of the direct benefits such as 
fuel wood or bushmeat to park adjacent subsistence farming households should also be 
appreciated. The impacts of forest cover change and associated  biodiversity loss are 
beginning to be understood more widely by society in general as the real impacts of climate 
change are being felt globally (Stern 2006).  
 
The causes of forest and biodiversity loss are well documented (Barbier 2001; Common & 
Stagl 2005; MEA 2005). Typically there are three principal issues occasioning the loss of 
forests and biodiversity 1) changes in land use causing habitat loss; 2) global trade and 
imperfect market related factors; 3) invasive species (moved by mankind) that out compete 
native species in their natural environment (Kontoleon et al. 2007). It should be noted that 1 is 
often a result of issue 2. Fundamentally the drivers of land use change are perhaps the most 
important factors in the context of conserving forests and biodiversity in developing 
countries. Outside of protected areas conversion of natural habitats (with its loss of related 
biodiversity) to agricultural and pastoral resources for use by people under uncertain land 
tenure and market access arrangements is a fundamental threat to forest and biodiversity 
conservation. This is especially problematic in the context of growing populations of poor, 
subsistence, natural resource dependant households. Within protected areas the ability of 
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under resourced managers to stave off the relentless pressure from local communities for 
timber and non-timber forest products is severely challenged.  
1.2 Complex choices; resource scarcity and social preference 
Society has to make difficult choice over the allocation of resources.  Balancing the short-run 
and long-run costs and benefits at the local level and also at the national and international 
level is a complex and dynamic business. Economists continue to argue that resources are 
scarce.  This means there is a distinct opportunity cost involved in society’s choices over land 
use, to conserve or to farm? The indisputable argument that it is right to conserve forests and 
biodiversity is juxtaposed with poor people’s inalienable right to development. The fact that 
nature conservation agencies are often under funded points towards society’s choice over how 
to allocate funds towards activities considered in its best interest (Hanley & Shogren 2002). 
The current state of financing biodiversity conservation may mean that society does not really 
care enough despite the general rhetoric of biodiversity conservation (Pearce 2007).  
 
Unless society, form a local to global level,  is fully aware of the most pertinent facts 
regarding the costs and benefits of forest and biodiversity conservation it may continue to fail 
to make the optimal decisions over the amount of forest to conserve and the appropriate level 
of funding necessary to achieve this. It is for this reason that decisions over nature 
conservation using economic analysis will be better than those reached without (Hanley & 
Shogren 2002). Economics helps us to understand the allocative efficiency of resources and if 
any reallocation is actually desirable for society. As such it can pay a vital role for policy 
making and planning, to make objective and rational decisions about resource allocation for 
conservation at a national level and management decisions at the site level.  Can the gainers 
compensate losers and still be better off (Kaldor-Hicks optimality)?  In assessing such issues 
regarding biodiversity conservation, economists try to sum up the money equivalents of 
welfare changes across individuals. Welfare changes allow us to account for both the 
direction and intensity of preferences to allow some ranking of how to use scarce resources 
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through the comparison of the magnitude and distribution of costs and benefits both between 
and within different policy levels.  
1.3 Thesis objectives  
The objective of this thesis is to quantitatively understand the economic performance of 
protected area management strategies for forest and biodiversity conservation. Examples such 
as integrated conservation and development and eco tourism are assessed in terms of their 
ability to deliver on the welfare benefits to local communities. In addition this appreciates the 
contribution that forest conservation in protected areas can make to poverty alleviation and 
economic development.  The geographical focus of this study is the Albertine Rift region of 
East and Central Africa. Stretching north from the southern end of Lake Tanganyika through 
the spine of Africa to the northern end of Lake Albert, the Albertine Rift (Figure 1.1), is one 
of Africa’s most important landscapes for the conservation of forests and biodiversity. The 
overarching objective is addressed using a series of case studies empirically valuing the 
opportunity costs of conserving forests in a select of sites in the central part of the Albertine 
Rift. 
 
In the two case studies assessing the opportunity costs of conservation to local communities 
(Chapters 3 and 4), a quantitative assessment of living standards using market price and 
contingent valuation methods is made. This analysis is augmented by the use of explanatory 
variables to understand the determinants of protected area use a unique undertaking in the 
geographical context of the studies. In addition these variables are also used to understand the 
divergence in welfare estimates between approaches (Chapter 4).  International tourists’ 
willingness to pay for local social benefits from park based tourism is measured to assess the 
potential for eco-tourism to offset the local costs of conservation (Chapter 5). Finally results 
from the empirical studies presented in this thesis as well as secondary data from other studies 
are used to assess the economic costs and benefits of managing land as a protected area  





Figure 1.1 The geographical boundary of the Albertine Rift (©A. J. Plumptre) 
 
Much debate still exists on the applicability of many novel valuation techniques such as 
contingent valuation and choice experiments to answer resource management questions, 
particularly in developing countries.  There are a number of methodological issues related to 
their theoretical validity and contextual application. In addition to the applied nature of the 
work the empirical studies also cover discussions and tests of methodological issues. 
Specifically chapters 4 and 5 are as much about methodological enquiry in to the performance 




Importantly the lessons drawn from these studies are widely applicable throughout the 
Albertine Rift, both in terms of the issues tackled and the suitability of the valuation methods. 
Broadly these studies contribute novel quantitative information on how protected areas might 
actually contribute to poverty alleviation and economic growth. Specifically they contribute to 
the objective assessment of the economic performance of protected area management 
approaches in the context of protected areas management to conserve forests and biodiversity 
in the Albertine Rift region of central and Eastern Africa. 
1.4 The significance of forest and biodiversity conservation the 
Albertine Rift 
The Albertine Rift’s wide variety of habitats incorporate lowland forests and savannah, hot 
springs and active volcanoes through to mountain and alpine vegetation and ice fields and 
glaciers of the Ruwenzori Mountains. It is an area over 1,200km long and up to 300 km wide 
(about 1.5 times the size of the United Kingdom). It covers and altitudinal range of 600m in 
Semuliki, Uganda to the summit of Mt Stanley in the Ruwenzori at 5,125m (Plumptre et al. 
2003).  As a result of its wide variety of habitats the Albertine Rift is reputed for its richness 
in species and its high level of endemism. It is identified as a World Wildlife Fund ‘Eco 
Region’, an ‘Endemic Bird’ area by Birdlife International and a ‘Biodiversity Hotspot’ by 
Conservation International. 
 
Forests contain the greatest diversity of species of any terrestrial ecosystems (Stenger et al. 
2009) and those in the Albertine Rift are no exception. Forest areas form a large proportion of 
the natural ecosystems of the rift which contain many endangered species such as the 
mountain gorilla (Gorilla berengei berengei), birds such as the Grauers’ swamp warbler 
(Bradipterus graueri), as well as an incredible diversity of flora, much of which is not yet 
described by science. Plumptre et al (2003) identify 39% of all the species of mammals on the 
African continent occur in the Albertine Rift. In addition 52% of all African bird species are 
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also encountered there. Many of the resident species are also endemic to the Albertine Rift 
e.g. 34 species of mammal and 41 species of bird (Plumptre et al. 2003).  
1.5 The social and economic challenges for conservation in the 
Albertine Rift 
The Albertine Rift is bounded by six countries (Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zambia 
and Democratic Republic of Congo).  These are amongst the poorest nations on earth. Table 
1.1 below gives an over view of some key socio-economic and geographical indicators to 
compare the six countries of the Albertine Rift. GDP per capita (in $PPP1) terms range from 
only $300 (DRC) to $1300 (Tanzania and Zambia) straddling the sub Saharan African 
average of $450, and are 15 to 67 times below the European average of $20,320. 
 
The picture in general is of predominantly poor, rural societies, agriculturally dependant 
economies with approximately 35% to 86% of households living below the $1 per day income 
level. 60 to 90% of respective populations living rurally and up to 82% of GDP comes from 
agriculture. An exception is Zambia whose GDP is heavily reliant on the mining and minerals 
sector. These are country averages while the central regions within the Albertine Rift (south 
west Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi and the adjacent areas of DRC) contain some of the 
highest human population densities in Africa, with up to 600 to 700 people per km2 (Plumptre 
et al. 2004). 
 
The human dimension of conserving forests and biodiversity presents some particular 
challenges. Due to high levels of poverty and the intensity of farming in the region, the people 
living near protected areas in the central Albertine Rift make use of these forests to 
supplement their incomes from farming. They harvest fuel-wood, timber, non-timber forest 
products, water and bush-meat where they can, and often break the law in areas in which such 
                                                 
1 PPP – purchasing power parity 
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harvesting is banned. As a result, there has been friction between the people living adjacent to 
protected areas and the protected area authorities (Plumptre et al, 2004). 
Table 1.1 Social and economic indicators from the Albertine Rift nations 
Country 
 
Uganda Rwanda Burundi Tanzania Zambia Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
Indicator       
Population 31,367,97
2 




157 340 338 45 15 29 









GDP per capita 
($PPP) 
$900 $900 $400 $1,300 $1,300 $300 
%GDP form 
agriculture 
82% 36.9% 33.7% 42.8% 17.3% 55% 
Population below 
the poverty line 
(less than $1 per 
day) 
35% 60% 68% 36% 86% Not known 
Life expectancy 
at birth (years) 
52.34 49.76 51.71 51.45 38.59 53.98 
Rural population 84.7 93.4 90 64.6 59.7 67 
Population 
growth rate (% 
per annum) 
3.603% 3.579% 3.443% 2.072% 1.654% 3.236% 
Source: CIA world Fact Book, 2008 & IFAD Poverty Indicators 
The case studies presented in this thesis quantify the contribution of protected areas to this 
supplemental income and its significance in maintaining local living standards. Many of the 
micro and macro economic conditions that protected areas operate in throughout the Albertine 
Rift are very similar, although the degree that these impact at the site level may vary 
considerably. Thus whilst some of the general conclusion form this work are broadly 
applicable to protected areas in the Albertine Rift, at the site level there is still a great need to 
conduct specific research in order to assess the local opportunities and constraints for 
protected area management.   
1.6 Protected areas as a policy tool for forest and biodiversity 
conservation 
The role of protected areas in conserving forests and biodiversity is well established as an 
instrument for forest and biodiversity conservation. For millennia societies have desired to 
protected areas of environmental resources and ecosystems to prevent the destructive impacts 
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of humans, based on those areas intrinsic values (Holdgate 1999). For example in India, 
almost 2000 years ago, forest were protected as the dwelling places of local deities (van Dyke 
2008). The role of protected areas has continued to increase to date and by 2003 there were 
more than 100,000 protected areas globally, covering almost  a twelfth of the global land 
surface (Mulongoy & Chape 2004).  Protected areas as a tool for conservation thus seem to be 
indispensable. Indispensable as they may be, they still suffer from a lack of funding. 
 
The distribution of forests and biodiversity is not equal in geographical terms; species 
richness is correlated with latitude on account of solar radiation levels. At the same time gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita is inversely correlated with latitude if we exclude 
Australia (Common & Stagl 2005). Thus with the exception of Australia, wealthy northern 
countries are biodiversity poor and poor southern countries biodiversity rich. Considering the 
12 most mega-diverse2 countries in the world only one of them (Australia) is not a less 
developed country (LDC) economy.    Clearly protected area management to conserve forests 
and prevent species loss is most important in the world’s poorest countries at lower latitudes, 
yet in general these are the countries least able to afford the costs involved. 
 
For example the African continent contains many tropical ecosystems and protected areas 
occupy slightly over 2 million km2 or 7% of the continent’s 30 million km2. Figure 1.2 shows 
the proportion of different land cover types with the relative proportion under protection 
(UNEP 2008). Among the various eco-regions, biodiversity-rich tropical evergreen broadleaf 
forests comprise about 3 million km2 barren and sparsely vegetated lands comprise about 9.6 
million km2. Of the barren and sparsely vegetated lands, about 4 percent are protected.  
 
                                                 
2 Mega diverse countries are those with a very high national biodiversity index. The index is a composite of 
species richness and species endemism, so that if a country has many different species as well as many species 
that are not found anywhere else it will have a high index value. The index is then scaled so that the most mega-
diverse (Indonesia) has a value of 1 and the lowest (Greenland) a value of 0.113. 
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Figure 1.2 Proportion of land type with protected status in Africa. (Source; UNEP, 2008) 
 
 
Closed shrublands (savannah woodland) which are estimated to be over 700,000 sq km in 
extent, have the largest proportion of protected area, approximately 14 per cent. About 2 
million sq km, or about 8 per cent, of croplands and a mosaic of croplands mixed with natural 
vegetation are under protected status. Importantly, despite the existence of legal instruments 
to protect biodiversity those instruments are not uniformly applied or equally effective. 
 
Globally all protected areas are classified according to the six numerical International Union 
for the Conservation of Nature categories developed in 1994 (Mulongoy & Chape 2004), each 
category differing by degrees regarding the restrictions placed on human activities with the 
protected areas territory (Holdgate 1999).  Terms such as national parks and nature or forest 
reserves tend to be categories related to specific national institutional and organisational 
conditions for protected area management. For example in most of the Albertine Rift, national 
parks conform to the wilderness model, where there tends to be a strict non extractive use 
policy. By contrast in the United Kingdom there are few national parks that do not host 
permanent settlements and are a working rural landscape.  In Uganda for example national 
parks are under the management of the Ugandan Wildlife Authority, but nature reserves are 
under the management of the National Forest Authority although both the Ugandan categories 
have similar strict non extractive use policies.  
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The back bone of conserving biodiversity in the Albertine Rift is an ecologically diverse 
network of state protected areas, such as national parks, wildlife reserves and forest reserves 
with varying degrees of use arrangements, ranging from strict protection with no extractive 
uses allowed, to a restricted set of community use arrangements or commercial activities 
(Figure 1.3). However governments may be ineffective at protecting land if they lack the 
knowledge of how to use a resource properly or the funding to enforce policy (Bromley 1997; 
Pagiola et al. 2004). 
 
Figure 1.3 The protected areas of the central Albertine Rift (©A.J Plumptre) 
NP=National Park, FR=Forest reserve; WR- Wildlife reserve 
Conservation success depends on how effectively illegal or unsustainable use is controlled. 
Furthermore, such controls may cut off valuable sources of revenue for many communities, 
Pearce and Moran (1997) identify that exclusion strategies represent a "moral view", which 
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disinvests local value in biodiversity, taking away its economic value. There are countless 
examples of conflicts between protected areas and local development priorities, where 
bureaucratic land protection is not matched by enforcement in the relevant areas, particularly, 
but not exclusively in developing countries (Brown 2000; Smith et al. 1993; Stoll-Kleemann 
2001).   
 
Acknowledgement of such inequities in traditional conservation approaches has given rise to 
the community dimension in conservation where integrated conservation and development 
projects (ICDP) have become the accepted means of reconciling local development needs 
with biodiversity conservation objectives (Gihimire & Pimbert 1997; McShane & Wells 
2004; Salafsky & Margoluis 1999). Such schemes have a mixed reputation in terms of 
success in achieving either or both of the twin objectives (Horwich & Lyon 2007; Hulme & 
Murphee 2001b; Jones & Horwich 2005; Upton et al. 2008). Despite the variable 
effectiveness in achieving biodiversity conservation or human welfare benefits both protected 
areas and ICDP continue to be the main stays of conservation strategies in the region 
(Plumptre et al. 2004). These attempts have included: 
 supporting technical inputs and training to farmers adjacent to the national parks; 
 income generating and alternative livelihood strategies and the provision of micro-
credit; 
 establishing a community conservation department within the protected area 
authorities which meets regularly with the communities; 
 providing a trust-fund that supports the development of schools, clinics; 
 community projects and social infrastructure such as water points, clinic and 
school rehabilitation in the vicinity of protected areas; 
 allowing restricted access and use of certain forest products 
 
The success of conservation is most often measured against progress in reducing habitat or 
species loss and not often in terms of the contribution of the protected area to poverty 
alleviation and local economic development. Improving the economic and social performance 
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of conservation approaches is essential in terms of reconciling local human development 
needs with international demands for biodiversity conservation. Achieving improvements of 
conservation strategies in the social dimension requires objective evidence on their effects. 
Economic valuation of protected area resources provides a quantitative means of assessing the 
promise and performance of conservation policies in achieving welfare benefits to local 
communities. In addition the collection of socio-economic data alongside the economic 
valuation data provides an important means to assess the social and economic drivers of 
protected area use so that conservation efforts can be more economically efficient in meeting 
welfare needs. 
1.7 Thesis structure 
Considering the above issues and thesis objectives Chapter 2 provides a detailed theoretical 
and contextual background for the study, providing an economic framework to illustrate the 
complex nature of decision making over biodiversity conservation decisions. The chapter also 
develops the framework for forest and biodiversity conservation in the context of a 
developing country functioning in a global economy. In addition the opportunities and 
constraints of global and national forest conservation and biodiversity policies as well as local 
management programs for protected areas are discussed. 
 
Chapter 3 is the first of three empirical studies valuing opportunity costs from protected areas. 
This chapter utilises a household income study to estimate the non-timber and timber values 
of protected areas to local people, quantifying all ways in which local people derive economic 
benefits from forests (e.g. bushmeat, fuel wood). Physical quantities are valued using a market 
price method (MPM), and analysis focuses on both the mean and the variance of these flows. 
A socio economic picture of protected area adjacent households is developed and these factors 
are used to understand determinants of protected area use and the implications of these 
findings for ICDP approaches. This is a novel study in the context of protected area 
management in Uganda, providing rare and detailed insights in to forest use and evaluation 
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the opportunities and constraints for community conservation. This study draws on case 
studies from four different protected area sites of different bio types and represents not only a 
unique set of data in the context of protected area and forest management in Uganda, but an 
opportunity to draw generalised conclusions based on common factors or trends identified 
between sites of varied context, utilising data gathered in a systematic and directly 
comparable manner. The data used in this chapter were collected under an applied policy 
research program for the Ugandan National Forest Authority whilst the author worked for the 
Wildlife Conservation Society, Albertine Rift Program, Uganda. 
 
Chapter 4 aims to test a contingent valuation (CV) study with a provision point mechanism 
(PPM) in a novel setting (willingness to accept compensation) to assess its affect in reducing 
strategic bias to provide a more reliable estimate of household economic values. In addition 
the data is used to assess the local direct benefits of households living around protected area 
under different resource access arrangements and draw some conclusions about the potential 
performance of community conservation. Selected methodological issues in CV are discussed 
with the objective of setting up the theoretical framework for the choice of valuation approach 
and the application of a provision point mechanism. Key literature on the application of 
contingent valuation methods (CVM) is reviewed with the objective of understanding 
practicalities in the design and implementation of CVM in a developing country context. 
Finally in this chapter a case study is described with the objective of conveying the context 
background, methods, results and conclusion of the empirical research, focusing on testing the 
effects of the PPM and the application of the values to conservation management policies.  
The methodological components of this study have been developed in to paper co authored 
with Prof. Daniel Rondeau and Prof. Nick Hanley, currently in submission to Environment 
and Development Economics. The data were collected whilst the author lead a research 




Chapter 5 examines international tourists demand for different attributes of mountain gorilla 
tourism in Rwanda using a choice experiment (CE). Integrated Conservation and 
Development Projects (ICDP) have been put forward as a means of reconciling wildlife 
conservation in developing countries with improvements in community incomes, and as a 
way of promoting community participation in conservation. Responsibly managed tourism 
with the mountain gorillas in the Rwandan Volcanoes National Park, is widely regarded to be 
a success story of tourisms contribution to conservation. Eco-tourism’s twin goals of 
environmental and social responsibility fit well with ICDP philosophy; however, there is little 
evidence to suggest that tourists are interested in biodiversity conservation or community 
development per se.  Tourists’ variable motives for visiting primates in their natural habitat 
can make the reliance on eco-tourism for financing their conservation a risky venture if 
tourists are not particularly interested in either.   
 
A “cut-offs” choice experiment approach is used to investigate two issues that have troubled 
economists making use of stated preference approaches for environmental valuation; and 
which also pose problems for the application for the rational economic model of cost-benefit 
analysis to project/policy appraisal. These issues are (i) non-compensatory preferences and 
(ii) inconsistent behaviour. Non-compensatory preferences imply that consumers can no 
longer be assumed to have smooth, continuous indifference curves, such that any change in 
environmental quality (say) can be compensated for by a finite change in some numeraire 
good. Elements of chapter 5 form the basis of a paper recently accepted for publication in 
Environment and Resource Economics, co authored by Dr Sergio Colombo and Prof. Nick 
Hanley. The data were collected as part of a research project designed and implemented by 
the author whilst under contract to the Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund International. The project 
was funded by the US Fish and Wildlife Department’s, Great Ape Conservation Fund and the 
Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund International.  
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Chapter 6 presents a discussion about the use of the values derived in the empirical studies in 
chapters 3, 4 and 5 along with secondary data to develop a benefits transfer model to estimate 
the total economic value (TEV) of a protected area. Elements included in the model are the 
value of ecosystem services, the value of timber and non-timber outputs. Benefits are 
aggregated at different levels from local to global in order to assess the opportunity costs and 
the implications of the findings for policy analysis and management approaches. Using the 
TEV framework a cost benefit analysis of alternative land use options under different 
estimation procedures in presented. Finally conclusions form these findings are applied to 




Chapter 2:  
The conservation of forests and biodiversity; reconciling 
local costs and benefits with the global public good 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Forest and biodiversity conservation is often considered as a global public good (Common & 
Stagl 2005; Sander 2004). As a public good its use can be considered non exclusive and non 
rivalrous, where the consumption by one individual does not detract from the consumption of 
another. In the global sense, demand for forest conservation and biodiversity may not be 
compatible with demands on a national or local scale, especially where rural households in 
developing countries rely on the depletion of biodiversity (forest conversion, unsustainable 
harvesting practices) as a means to maintain their basic livelihoods.  
 
This highlights the complexity of the forest and biodiversity conservation problem in that 
benefits tend to accrue to those people far removed from the richest sources of forests, whilst 
poor forest adjacent households bear the brunt of costs from conservation i.e. opportunity cost 
from restrictive conservation policies or cost of crop raiding from animal conserved within 
protected areas. Thus externalities are created at different policy levels (local, national and 
global) arising from different consumption and demand priorities.  
 
This chapter examines the poverty, economic development and conservation debate from a 
theoretical and practical perspective applied to forests conservation in protected areas. It 
defines what needs to be valued and why and also what specific tools mechanisms are 
currently employed to address conservation needs in focal countries of the Albertine Rift.  
Section 2.2 develops the theoretical contextual framework for the valuation studies in the 
following chapters. In section 2.3 current examples of Ugandan and Rwandan national, as 
well as global, conservation and development process currently ongoing are used to illustrate 
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the opportunities and constraints of national and international approaches to conserve 
biodiversity in the Albertine Rift. The discussion and evidence will focus on in situ 
conservation and protected area management as the backbone of forest and biodiversity 
conservation in the region the rationale for which is detailed in the introduction in Chapter 1. 
 
As a reminder the objective of this thesis is to quantitatively understand the economic 
performance of protected area management strategies for forest and biodiversity conservation. 
Examples such as integrated conservation and development and eco tourism are assessed in 
terms of their ability to deliver on the welfare benefits to local communities. In addition this 
appreciates the contribution that forest conservation in protected areas can make to poverty 
alleviation and economic development.  The objective is addressed using a series of case 
studies empirically valuing the opportunity costs of conserving forests in a select of sites in 
the central part of the Albertine Rift.  
 
In the two case studies assessing the opportunity costs to local communities (Chapters 3 and 
4), a quantitative assessment of living standards using market price and contingent valuation 
methods is made. In addition these variables are also used to understand the divergence in 
welfare estimates between approaches (Chapter 4).  International tourists’ willingness to pay 
for local social benefits form park based tourism is measured to assess the potential for eco-
tourism to offset the local costs of conservation (Chapter 5). Finally results form the empirical 
studies presented in this thesis as well as secondary data form other studies are used to assess 
the economic costs and benefits of managing land as a protected area  versus conversion to 
subsistence agriculture (Chapter 6).   
 
This chapter thus provides a theoretical and practical framework to show where and how 
economic valuation including the work in this thesis can help to foster improved policies and 
practices in conservation and the implications for financing forest and biodiversity 
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conservation.  Explicit reference is made to the empirical case studies in following chapters 
specifically linking the type of information generated in this research to the background issues 
detailed in this chapter. 
2.2 The economic framework for forest and biodiversity 
conservation 
This section sets out an economic framework for forest and biodiversity conservation. It 
examines from a theoretical perspective definitions and values of biodiversity, and the 
organisational opportunities and constraints to achieve the goals we set. It demonstrates 
theoretically how environmental change and thus biodiversity conservation can only be made 
if it is in the private interest of those individuals who exert the greatest physical influence 
over environmental resources are accounted for.  It sets the theoretical scene for the practical 
role of environmental valuation in finding answers to complex management problems 
considering the needs for development and the needs to conserve ecosystems. 
 
Environmental economics as a discipline draws heavily on the principles of welfare 
economics and idealized market economy leading to the optimum allocation of resources 
(Bateman & Turner 1993; Hanley et al. 2007). Understanding the human welfare implications 
of policy towards biodiversity conservation is central to understanding the actual or potential 
human consequences of policy and management approaches. In reality various forms of 
market failure require the intervention of national or global state apparatus to correct for the 
distributional impacts of imperfect market conditions considered to be socially unacceptable 
i.e. the inequitable distribution of income, wealth or other resources. 
2.2.1 Market failure and the role of the state in protected area management 
Market failure is the less than optimal functioning of a market to provide goods or services 
over a given period. Two such sources of market failure occur firstly in the provision of 
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public goods and secondly in externalities.  Public goods have two attributes that discourage 
private markets because the supplier cannot appropriate profits and benefits: 
 
 Public goods are non excludable, in that once produced, non-paying consumers cannot 
be prevented from benefiting from using the goods. 
 Public goods are non rival in that the consumption of the public good by one 
individual does not diminish its supply to another 
 
Externalities in essence are when one economic agents actions affect the ability of another 
economic agents benefits (Hanley et al. 2007), such that the affected party nether receives 
compensation for any loss or pays for any benefit.  Externalities are a spill over effect on 
other individuals that are not fully reflected in the market price so that a good may be under or 
over provided on the market. This leads to the sub optimal allocation of resources and is the 
root of market failure. 
 
The ecosystem services provided by forests are a classic example of a public good. If an 
individual or group has ownership or control of a forest to exploit it, they are not easily able 
to realise in financial terms a return from the public goods that are provided by it. Hence there 
is no financial incentive to conserve natural forests to ensure the provision of the public 
goods. Pearce (2007) indicates that externalities are a fundamental reason why society as a 
whole, chooses to discount inappropriately when choosing between conversion or 
conservation of forests. Unless a more precise understanding in terms of the value of these 
externalities and where they accrue to is developed it is difficult to direct policy and 
management tools to correct them. 
 
Uganda for example has recently moved into a national fuel wood deficit and the 
geographical distribution of fuel wood scarcity is very uneven (Drichi 2003). In some districts 
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there is an acute shortage, and this has stimulated a market response in terms of increased 
prices. Deforestation causes increased fuel wood costs, both in terms of money and time spent 
in collection. When wood becomes scarce, prices typically increase and this can trigger more 
investments in tree growing. Wood supply can thus to a large extent be ensured by allowing 
markets to develop for wood from plantations and trees on-farm. Alternatively other 
unregulated or illegal natural timber harvesting may be a course of action to meet supply. The 
value to protected area adjacent households of forest resources such as timber may be much 
more than the current financial cost of a bundle of fuel wood access to protected areas also 
has a non marketed component in terms of the buffering that the resources give from 
imperfect markets.  
 
However, markets typically fail to respond to loss of environmental values (Hanley et al. 
2007; Pearce 2007). Deforestation also causes reduced supply of non-wood products, reduced 
environmental services such as watershed protection and soil protection, and reduced 
biodiversity. Market mechanisms alone are unlikely to save protected areas and the important 
social and environmental services they provide (Common & Stagl 2005). Clearance of land 
for agricultural development in the short term may be more profitable and locally socially 
desirable than conservation of protected areas or sustainable forest management. An 
underlying issue is the difference between financial and economic values attributed to 
protected areas and the need for individuals who use them to maximize short-term profit. 
Many economic values, which are public in nature, such as the ecosystem values of protected 
areas do not realise a tangible stream of financial benefits in the short term to individual users. 
2.2.3 Environmental values and sustainable development 
The debate about sustainable development has grown in recent years. There is firm consensus 
on sustainable development having to take account of three key factors, environment, society 
and economy. These are widely considered to be the ‘three legs’ of sustainability all of which 
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must be considered and developed in synchrony (Elliott 2006; Munasinghe & Cruz 1995). 
The theory and practice of environmental economics has developed dramatically in recent 
years to meet the challenge of putting the case forward for environmental management as a 
pillar of sustainability  (Hanley & Shogren 2002). However narrow assumptions regarding 
technological substitution to correct environmental losses have continued to drive economic 
development practice, resulting in a corresponding decline in environmental resources. An 
economy also reflects the choices of society over the way in which it uses its resources. The 
choice in resource use is laden with social values that have no market dimension and are 
difficult to quantify economically. Attention must be drawn to the role of the environment and 
society in a sustainable economy and the non-use values associated with their existence. Only 
by finding a common language with which to argue for the benefits and importance of 
conservation areas can their longevity be maintained. Therefore, putting economic values to 
environmental benefits helps to mainstream environmental considerations in the economic 
decision making frameworks of policy makers (Hanley & Shogren 2002).   
(Campbell & Luckert 2002) state that valuing non market goods and services from natural 
resources is of critical importance to Less Developed Countries’ (LDC) economies due to the 
dependence of the rural livelihoods on natural resources in general, and trees and forests in 
particular. This means that a great deal of goods and services from natural resources are 
effectively ‘un-priced’. Poor price information means that policy makers have little 
information available to make economic decisions about resource allocation which is critical 
in setting development priorities in an economic framework. Conservation areas are 
invariably major natural resources in LDC economies, enabling governments to make 
informed decisions about economically optimal strategies towards their conservation and 
management is a critical aspect of successful planning for their long-term preservation.  
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2.2.4 Total economic value  
An entry point to understanding the values of a protected area is to recognize and define the 
broad range of goods and services that can be obtained from forests and protected areas. The 
benefits of forest resources have historically been valued in terms of their direct benefits. 
Timber, tourism and other non-timber forest products are the visible focus of the economic 
activities of people.  However there is also a multitude of indirect, option and existence 
benefits as well (Table 5.1).  It is the sum of all these values that accrue at local, national and 
international levels that generates the total economic value (TEV) of a protected area. The 
TEV concept has been widely espoused as an analytical framework e.g. (Emerton 2001; 
Turner 1993),  the categories of benefit here are discussed in the context of forest and 
biodiversity conservation. 
2.2.4 a) Direct benefits 
The measurement of direct benefits is reasonably clear. Surveys of the use of forests by local 
people, estimates of the value of goods traded on markets, gate receipts and permits from 
tourists visiting forest parks can all be used to calculate financial values derived from the 
forests. Where goods are not marketed but consumed in the home, estimates of consumption 
can be made and appropriate market prices prescribed to value consumption (Mullan & 
Kontoleon 2008).  
2.2.4 b) Indirect benefits 
There is a hidden dimension to protected areas in that they have a wider role in the 
maintenance of environmental quality such as soil/ water conservation and carbon 
sequestration. It is the range of indirect benefits from environmental resources such as 
protected areas which points towards conservation being a rational land use option. Such 
hidden benefits are public goods that benefit many people at a local, national and international 
level.  Forests loss in many areas may often result in terrible environmental consequences in 
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terms of soil erosion, flash floods and the depletion of a global carbon sink. The consequences 
of environmental degradation and the loss of forests are varied in magnitude and the 
economic and social cost. In Mali for example soil erosion though deforestation, causes losses 
in agricultural production of about 0.2% of GDP (Pearce & Moran 1994). Yaron and Moyini 
(2003) also report on the cost of soil erosion; the value of soil nutrient loss caused by soil 
erosion itself (although largely the result of poor farming practices, including deforestation) is 
calculated to be approximately US$625million each year (in 2001/2 prices) in Uganda.  This 
is a truly enormous loss to the country – more than the entire value of manufacturing.  It 
corresponds to an 11% share of GDP3. Not only are there direct losses to productivity to 
consider. Ameliorating the effects of natural resource degradation costs the public money that 
may otherwise have been better invested. 
2.2.4 c) Option and Existence Values 
The last two groups of value are the option and existence  values (Turner 1993). Option 
values refer to any direct or indirect values that might be potentially used in the future. An 
example would be a national park where people who have no specific intention to visit it may 
still be willing to pay something in order to keep that option open in the future. In the context 
of ecosystems and their services, it is the value placed on maintaining ecosystems and their 
component species and habitats for possible future uses, some of which may not yet be known 
e.g. biomedical uses of plants not yet known. Option values can also be thought of as a form 
of insurance e.g. a natural forest may be regarded as a stock of resources to be used when 
times are difficult by local people.   
 
The existence values are derived simply from the knowledge that the natural environment is 
maintained. The first of the three is the bequest value, where individuals attach value from the 
fact that the ecosystem resource will be passed on to future generations. Secondly the 
altruistic value: is where individuals attach values to the availability of the ecosystem resource 
                                                 
3 Using a 2001/2 GDP figure of $5.7 Bn. 
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to others in the current generation and thirdly the existence value: derived from the existence 
of an ecosystem resource, even though an individual has no actual or planned use of it. For 
example, people are willing to pay for tropical forest conservation even if they never visit one. 
Non-use values are relatively challenging to capture since individuals find it difficult to price 
on such values as they are rarely required to do so. However, in some circumstances, nonuse 
value may be larger than use values.  
Table 2.1 Direct and indirect benefits that together provide the total economic value of forests 
Adapted from (Turner 1993) 
Total Economic Value 
Use Values Non Use values 
Direct Indirect Option Existence 
Directly consumed 
goods 
Functional services Future personal use and 
bequest to future 
generations 
Welfare derived from 















Park entry fees  
Guiding fees 
Gorilla permits 
Earnings by tour 
companies/hospitality 
industry 





Percolation into aquifer 




Health and hygiene 
Water related health 
issues (extra household 
expenditure on treatment, 
longer distance traveled 







Risk reduction in peasant 
farming systems 







Since the publication of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA 2005) much inertest 
has been raised in ecosystem services approaches to valuation which provides a broader 
temporal and spatial framework to understand the human welfare benefits generated from 
environmental or ecosystem goods (DEFRA 2007; Pagiola et al. 2004; Turner & Daly 2008). 
In addition the ecosystem services approach (Turner & Daly 2008) also identifies the property 
rights and institutional arrangements governing the system. The combined result is a 
biologically, socially and economically integrated framework to understand externalities in 
policy and management of natural capital.  
Essentially the MEA aggregates the different economic benefits from the ecosystem under 
categories of different socio-ecological functional roles (provisioning, regulating, cultural and 
supporting) identified in Table 2.2 below (DEFRA 2007). The socio-ecological categories 
then correspond directly to the TEV frameworks different economic categories of benefits 
illustrated in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 A comparison of the MEA and TEV frameworks 
MEA Framework TEV framework 
MEA 
Group 
Service Direct Use Indirect 
Use 
Option value Non-Use 
Value 
Provisioning Provisioning Includes: 





X  X  
Regulating Regulating Includes: air-
quality regulation; 




 X X  
Cultural Cultural Includes: 
cultural heritage; 
recreation and tourism; 
aesthetic values 
X  X X 
Supporting Supporting Includes: 
Primary production; 
nutrient cycling; soil 
formation 
Supporting services are valued through the other 
categories of ecosystem services 
Source: (DEFRA 2007) 
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The TEV framework is a useful way of categorizing different types of value as they accrue to 
human beings.  In the MEA context TEV is complementary as it presents categorizes 
ecosystem values at the critical end point in the broader ecological context. These are the final 
values which must be determined before other spatial and temporal scaling can be made upon 
which to assess the welfare impacts of ecosystem changes as a result of policy.  Importantly 
the TEV framework also helps valuation practitioners to define and categorise the appropriate 
valuation techniques to estimate the costs and benefits of ecosystem services (DEFRA 2007; 
Pagiola et al. 2004; Turner 1993). Few TEV studies have been conducted to date despite the 
length of time that the framework has enjoyed mainstream acceptance (Pagiola et al. 2004). 
This is perhaps because despite the frameworks elegance and simplicity as a means to 
comprehensively understand the complex array of values, obtaining robust estimates for each 
of the components is often difficult, technically and logistically to do e.g. requiring 
quantitative data on the stocks and flows and changes therein of environmental goods and 
services.  Chapter 6 of this thesis employs a TEV approach to understand present values of 
different land options (conservation vs conversion to local subsistence agriculture) of a 
protected area to understand the scope and nature of costs and benefits from local to global.  
2.2.4 Household decisions to conserve or use protected areas? 
The growing emphasis on communities and the role they play in the conservation of protected 
areas is driven not only by a concern for social justice, but a pragmatic assessment that it is 
these communities that have the greatest impact on the resources, either through direct 
unsustainable use from poorly enforced intuitional arrangement or through their collective 
voice to lobby governments to degazette land for development. It is these household level 
economic values that are of key importance (Hulme & Murphee 2001b). Lutz (1994) proposes 
that even when off farm effects are of primary concern considering the benefits and costs at 
the household level is appropriate because this is the level where conservation measure would 
in fact be implemented. 
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In a standard neo classical framework Larson (1994) depicts the trade off between the benefits 
to the conservation of forests and the marginal benefits to the conversion of forests. The 
argument developed can also be directly adapted to depict the marginal benefits of 
biodiversity conservation where the key threat is the loss of habitat. It yields an important 
insight in to the position that national governments should take when developing national 
polices on protected area management in an international framework.  Assuming that 
governments do indeed act in the best interest of their people, governments should at a 
minimum consider the costs and benefits to local people at the prices they face (Lutz , 1994). 
This is an important entry point as it was an early attempt to focus attention on individual 
farmers as the principle agents of change in forest conversion. 
 
MBCS= Marginal Benefit to Conservation; MBCV= Marginal Benefit to Conversion, DHH= Optimal level of land 
conversion for the household; DSP= Socially optimal balance between conservation and conversion; DCS= 
Optimal quantity of land to be conserved  












  b 














Adapted from Larson (1994) 
 42
In figure 2.2 the model depicts the marginal trade off in benefits between land under forest 
and land converted to other uses i.e. agriculture or grazing. On the X axis from left to right 
increasing quantity of land under conservation and from right to left and increase of land 
converted to other uses. The marginal benefits from conservation i.e. TEV from local to 
global scale, are denoted by MBCS at the aggregate level and benefits accruing at the local 
household level by MBCS-HH. Marginal benefits from forest conversion are denoted by the 
curve MBCV. From the conservation perspective the optimal quantity of land to be conserved 
is DCS.  
The optimal level of land conversion at the household level is DHH, and this is what local 
households will tend to without regulation and enforcement. The socially optimal balance 
between conservation and conversion is at DSP. The challenge for conservation is therefore to 
estimate the loss of benefits (shaded area in figure) to households from attaining a given level 
of biodiversity conservation and redress the difference in marginal benefits from a to b.  
Barbier (2005, 2007), develops further the economic model of forest clearance by individual 
farmers  focusing on the farm profitability motive. The model defines two key determinants of 
the profitability of farming, market access and agricultural prices. Incentives to clear forest 
will be inversely related to market access e.g. reduced incentive to clear as the marginal 
benefits of the products from the land will be lower the further form the market it is. However 
incentives to clear will be positively related to increases in prices for agricultural 
commodities. Under open access conditions the model stipulates that the farmer will convert 
forest up to a point where the total revenues gained per unit of land will be equal to the per 
unit cost of land clearance. Thus the amount of land cleared will increase with the price of 
output and better market access. 
These models’ described above have explicit assumptions that do not take in to account any 
opportunity costs of clearance as in benefits foregone by the household from timber and non 
timber forest products. In addition they assume open access to forest resources and that 
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decisions to clear forest are based on perfectly functioning input and output markets and that 
on farm and off farm labour are perfect substitutes. Firstly these facets of a peasant or 
subsistence farming households do not hold in the case studies presented later. Thus the 
models are relatively naïve in their assumptions and will theoretically underestimate of the 
values of forest and the point at which forest clearance becomes profitable. Secondly in the 
context of protected areas, they are not open access resources even though de facto open 
access arrangements may exist because of poor or no enforcement of the regulations. 
Estimating how much compensation is required to offset the costs of forgone forest access, or 
incentives to pursue other land use activities requires a thorough inventory of the costs and 
benefits from forests to adjacent households as well as alternative enterprises. Indeed Barbier 
(2007) emphasises the need for empirical studies to examine these issues. Chapters 3 and 4 of 
this thesis are just such empirical studies, developing a detailed understanding in financial and 
economic terms of the value of the benefits derived from protected area and apply this to 
answering questions about the efficacy of conservation management approaches to create 
incentives to mitigate the problems of illegal use. 
2.2.5 Protected areas and poverty alleviation 
Debate about the best approaches to conservation and the resulting social impact of in situ 
conservation is dynamic and polarised, with vigorous support for both the positive and 
negative impacts of protected areas on poverty at the local and national level (de Sherbinin 
2008; Hulme & Murphee 2001a; Upton et al. 2008). The end product of much of this debate 
is the need to integrate local communities in to conservation as direct beneficiaries and active 
participants in the management of natural resources. The approach to conservation involving 
communities is commonly called community conservation, a term used to broadly define a 
diverse assortment of activities. These activities range from those with an indirect impact on 
conservation such as local development activities to improve incomes and divert livelihoods 
 44
activities way from conservation areas to education and awareness about the importance of 
environmental resources. Community conservation activities may also include local direct 
involvement in resource management such as protection and monitoring. 
A particular prominent sub set of community conservation activities focuses on the 
development needs in communities adjacent to or within protected areas, which are dependent 
on the environmental resources there in. A broad assumption is that through addressing rural 
poverty and development needs, such communities may be less inclined to unsustainably or 
illegally use local environmental resources. Such activities are termed integrated conservation 
and development projects (ICDP) (Barrow & Murphee 2001; Hulme & Murphee 2001b; 
Newmark & Hough 2000). 
The performance of community conservation has been considered by some to be 
disappointing in its achievement of conservation and rural development goals,  in the last 3 
decades and there is renewed energy towards strictly protected parks in achieving the forest 
and biodiversity conservation objective (Hutton et al. 2005). Approaches to evaluating the 
social impacts of protected areas and their management approaches tend to range from 
acceptance of the base assumption that because ICDP approaches are adopted, local people’s 
needs are met, to the dismissal of the entire ICDP approach in achieving either conservation 
or local development goals. The general perception of failure is perhaps an example of 
received wisdom based on a narrow analysis of a restricted number of case studies  (Emerton 
2001; Gihimire & Pimbert 1997). 
Upton et al (2008) make a landscape level analysis of poverty, to understand the dynamics 
between national wealth, the area, number and type of protected area, and found few 
significant relationships between indicators of poverty and the extent of protected area at a 
national level.  They conclude that their findings have meaning for both positions in the 
debate on poverty and conservation. Critics of conservation generally, building upon local 
case studies of negative impacts to local communities, may be exaggerating the scope and 
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nature of the problem whilst conversely, conservation advocates need to temper their 
enthusiasm. Outcomes that achieve both poverty alleviation and conservation goals may be 
possible in certain circumstances, but generally choices or prioritisation between conservation 
and local livelihood goals must be made. 
Emerton (2001) sets out clearly, from an economic perspective, why community conservation 
may have underachieved in Africa where household economic benefit based approaches had 
been the crux of community conservation. The problem lies not in a benefits based approach, 
but in understanding the scope and nature and distribution of benefits. Ultimately generating 
broad development benefits does not ensure that the presence of protected area generates a 
local benefit and that this is not the same as providing a direct economic incentive for 
conservation. Again this has implications for both perspectives in the poverty conservation 
debate. 
Targeting community conservation efforts to those groups of people most negatively 
impacting the protected area is essential as well as developing a full economic and social 
understanding of the nature of the benefits they receive. Thus equity issues in conservation are 
as important at the local level as they are at the national or international level. Who wins and 
loses from biodiversity conservation must be a primary consideration in the design of 
effective conservation strategies involving communities. The question should then be by how 
much and in what way do different social and economic groups benefit in order to calculate 
their opportunity costs of different management approaches?  Chapters 3and 4 value just such 
opportunity costs and chapter 6 of this thesis puts those local level opportunity costs in a 
broader cost benefit analysis framework. 
2.2.6 Criteria for cost effective conservation 
Once decisions about what to value and how to value it have been made some analysis of 
what might make practical financial sense for forest and biodiversity conservation must be 
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made. Organizations (public and private) have limited resources relative to what is necessary 
to accomplish the task.  These groups must set priorities and make awkward choices(Hanley 
& Shogren 2002). Essentially conservation groups face the classic economic problem of 
allocating scarce resources.  For this reason economic analysis can play a more active and 
important role in biodiversity conservation.  
 
There are two basic challenges to prioritisation, firstly the challenge from a biological 
perspective is to decide on which biodiversity and ecosystems are the highest priority. 
Secondly facing the resource constraint to understand which biodiversity or ecosystem is most 
cost effective to conserve. Weitzman (1998) uses a neat analogy of a resource constrained 
Noah’s Ark, that is not big enough to fit all example of biodiversity on to. The conservation 
problem is to choose species survival probabilities to maximize expected utility from species 
conservation subject to a budget constraint. Weitzman firstly assumes that the cost of 
increasing survival probabilities is a linear function and secondly assumes that utility consists 
of the direct value from the existence of the species, and the “distinctiveness” value, which 
measures the difference between a species and its closest genetic neighbour.  Given these 
conditions, Weitzman proves that the optimal conservation policy is an “extreme policy” in 
which each species is either conserved to the maximum degree possible or not conserved at all 
(with the possible exception of a single fractionally conserved species).   
 
Weitzman’s conservation allocation rule, whilst providing an important entry point for 
considering criterion for cost effective conservation is in fact naïve in its assumptions froma 
biological perspective. Two key reasons why real conservation problems are not the same as 
the “Noah’s Ark Problem” are firstly no single species can survive outside of a habitat that is 
usually comprised of a multitude of other species? Economically this gives rise to a joint 
production function, giving rise to multi species survival simultaneously. Secondly the 
assumption of a linear function for the costs of increasing survival probabilities is 
unreasonable as there are normally critical sizes of habitat for a given marginal change in 
 47
probability of species survival i.e. if the change in habitat is below a critical size it will not 
yield a change in the probability of species survival.   
 
Polasky and Solow  (1995), also describe a model to select a cost effective conservation 
strategy. They adopt a maximal utility function, constrained by factors such as budget, 
biodiversity (species richness) and probable impacts of a conservation solution. This was a 
significant development in bio-economic modelling as it allowed for more complex measures 
of biodiversity and conservation strategies to be included in the utility function. However as 
Polasky and Solow  (1995) point out  such models are unlikely to give neat analytic solutions.  
Even when a measure of species diversity is used, as in Weitzman (1998), the conservation 
strategy is rarely specific to a single species.   
 
Conserving habitat, or protecting an ecosystem from invasion, typically provides protection 
for multiple species within an ecosystem (joint production).  What lands should be set aside as 
nature reserves to conserve biodiversity given the other pressing demands on land use is a 
classic economic problem.  It is also an is an outstanding example with which to explain basic 
economic concepts such as opportunity cost or the optimal allocating of scarce resources 
under a budget constraint to biologists and conservation managers who may be unaware of the 
relevance of economic tools. This thesis provides examples of some of the types of valuation 
techniques available, applied to pertinent conservation management questions and also an 
example of a cost benefit approach.  The empirical data presented in this thesis is precisely the 
sort of basic data that is required to apply to bio-economic models, to assist in objective 
decision making about protected area management and cost effective solutions to forest and 
biodiversity conservation at different spatial and temporal scales. 
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2.3 Integrating forest and biodiversity conservation with human 
welfare objectives 
 
This section furthers our understanding of contemporary approaches to conserving 
biodiversity from focusing on national policy and management practices, giving some 
background description and analysis of the key opportunities and constraints from an 
institutional and organisational perspective. Current and proposed mechanisms to address 
global externalities in the conservation of biodiversity are explored as well as local level 
issues in the poverty conservation paradigm; key operational entry points for the valuation of 
biodiversity are highlighted and their usefulness and limitations assessed.    
 
Biodiversity conservation as a priority in the context of human development has promoted 
contentious debate in the last decade, from extreme technological views to eco-centric 
concerns regarding the substitutability of biodiversity for technological solutions in human 
development (Neumayer 2003).  Rational policy debate has come to put biodiversity 
conservation as a central objective in acknowledgement of the dependence of many rural poor 
people on environmental resources and is thus essential in achieving the central development 
goal of poverty eradication (Adams et al. 2004; Balmford et al. 2002; Upton et al. 2008). As 
such, forest and biodiversity conservation objectives are often stated aims of many 
international, national and local level policies and approaches to human development (CBD 
2008; MEA 2005). International examples include the United Nations millennium 
development Goals and The Convention on Biological Diversity. National and locally policies 
to conserve forests and biodiversity are reflected in national government Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers, through government agencies such as national wildlife authorities and forest 
authorities and  local level district and regional government development plans incorporating 
environmental targets in to development plans.    Importantly the economic assessment of 
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their values and stocks and flows of the resources have been identified as being essential in 
effective conservation and management of biodiversity.  
 
However there remain large gaps in knowledge, for example, at a local and national scale, 
relatively limited information exists about the status of many ecosystem services and the 
economic value of non-marketed services. Moreover, the costs of the depletion of these 
services are rarely tracked in national economic accounts. Basic global data on the extent and 
trends in different types of ecosystems and land use are surprisingly scarce. Models used to 
project future environmental and economic conditions have limited capability for 
incorporating ecological “feedbacks,” including nonlinear changes in ecosystems, or 
behavioural feedbacks such as learning that may take place through adaptive management of 
ecosystems (MEA 2005). 
 
In the previous section economic theories on decision making over how much biodiversity to 
conserve and efficacy in achieving biodiversity conservation were discussed. In this section 
some of the most influential national policies and practices are discussed here with respect to 
how an economic understanding of the value of biodiversity helps to assess their implications 
in the management and protection of biodiversity in the Albertine Rift using case studies to 
illustrate the scope and nature of adoption and the strengths and weaknesses of the 
approaches.  
2.3.1 National Approaches 
2.3.1 a)  Biodiversity conservation in a developing economy context 
The 1st of the eight Millennium Development Goals is halving, between 1990 and 2015, the 
number of people whose income is less than $US one per day.  The World Bank Group and 
International Monetary Fund launched the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative 
in 1996 to provide debt relief to 41 heavily indebted poor countries, 32 of which are located in 
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sub-Saharan Africa, including Uganda and Rwanda. In September 1999 it was agreed that 
concessional lending and debt relief under the HIPC Initiative would be based on Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) (Swallow 2005). Since that time several multilateral and 
bilateral donors in addition to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund have 
indicated that they will only support activities that are clearly defined and given priority in the 
PRSP documents. PRSP have thus become among the most important documents for national 
planning and communicating priorities to development partners.  
 
The focus of the approach is to help recipient countries build more effective poverty reduction 
strategies through a participatory and inclusive process. These strategies are then expected to 
form the basis for a joint PRSP, which brings together the country's own strategy and 
multilateral donor assistance to the country. The PRSP is an effort to help mainstream poverty 
reduction in the recipient country's public policy, thus PRSP should start from existing 
government strategies and build on them. Ultimately this feeds in to sectoral plans i.e. 
forestry, conservation, environment, education, agriculture etc. which are then costed and 
consolidated into a national plan and corresponding budget (medium term expenditure 
framework). 
 
All of the countries of the Albertine Rift qualify for HIPIC relief and thus produce PRSP. In 
the case of Uganda such a strategy had existed for several years. Uganda was one of the first 
low-income countries to prepare a comprehensive and participatory national strategy for 
poverty reduction. The formulation of Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) in 1996-97 
was an effort by the executive branch of the government to make this commitment and vision 
operational (Bush et al. 2004). The PEAP has guided the formulation of government policy 
since its inception in 1997, and is currently being revised. Under this plan, Uganda is being 
transformed into a modern economy in which people in all sectors can participate in economic 
growth. This implies a number of conditions: 
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Uganda’s Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) is established on four major pillars: 
 Creating a framework for economic growth and transformation 
 Ensuring good governance and security 
 Directly increasing the ability of the poor to raise their incomes 
     Directly increasing the quality of the life of the poor. 
The revision of the PEAP in 2000 drew on the progress made since 1997, including the 
development of sector-wide approaches, the participatory research carried out by the Uganda 
Participatory Poverty Assessment Project (UPPAP), the constraints identified in the Poverty 
Status Report, and the development of costing of public actions and indicators for monitoring 
in key, poverty-oriented sectors  (GOU 2005). 
 
Rwanda has also implemented policy and budgetary processes through the 2001 PRSP. In 
2004 a review was conducted to monitor public expenditure management and implementation 
of national strategies for poverty alleviation.  The new plan is called the Economic 
Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) (GOR 2007), reflecting the view that 
poverty alleviation cannot be achieved without economic development. 
 
Further to the medium term PRSP is the longer-term strategy Vision 2020 i.e. to be achieved 
by year 2020, which both countries have adopted. For example Rwanda sets out 6 main pillars 
and three cross cutting areas. Pillars are strategic objectives that the country wishes to attain 
as key to achieving sound economic development and poverty alleviation. Cross cutting areas 
are strategic issues of vital importance, without which it will be problematic or impossible to 
achieve the other strategic objectives, see example from Rwanda in Table 5.1 below. It is 
important to note that both Uganda and Rwanda have included environmental protection and 
sustainable natural resource management amongst their cross cutting areas. 
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Table 2.1 Rwanda’s Vision 2020 – Pillars and cross cutting areas (GOR, 2007) 
Pillars of the Vision 2020 Cross Cutting Areas 
1. Good governance and a capable state 
 
1. Gender equality 
 
2. Human resource development and a knowledge 
based economy 
2. Protection of environment and 
sustainable natural resource 
management 
3. A private sector-led economy 3. Science and technology, 
including ICT 
4. Infrastructure development  
5. Productive and Market Oriented Agriculture  
6. Regional and International Economic integration  
 
The PRSP is both an important tools and an approach, through which environmental issues 
can be mainstreamed into national plans for development at the highest policy level. 
Recognition that a healthy environment underpins all efforts to alleviate poverty and develop 
the economy is included in the plans for Rwanda and Uganda.  Critically the importance of 
the environment sector must be reflected in the national budget plans as multilateral and 
bilateral donors are increasingly coordinating their assistance with national government plans 
through 'basket'4 funding approaches. Unless the environment sector and biodiversity 
conservation is illustrated as a priority issue in the national budget it will be difficult to secure 
national or international donor financing towards those sectors. 
 
Vision 2020 and the PRSP are however strategic policy pieces and do not elaborate on the 
operational issues to achieve targets. At the next level down and where we start to focus more 
on forest and biodiversity conservation, are sectoral strategy and action plans.  For example in 
Rwanda the ministry in charge of Lands, Resettlement and Environment  and the Ugandan 
ministry of Lands Water and Environment  have developed national Biodiversity strategy and 
action plans (BSAP), which form a more detailed outline of what is to be achieved by which 
organisations over a given time frame (GOU, 2002; GOR, 2003). Critically it was intended to 
give an indication of those costs which should feed into national budget planning, so that 
                                                 
4 ‘basket funding’ also known as budget support,  refers to giving international assistance directly to central 
government treasury to be administered through the recipient countries own structural financial systems and 
processes. Although given direct to treasury, funds are often restricted towards the donors preferred sectoral 
activities i.e. education, environment etc. 
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actions related to conservation of environment and biodiversity can be give proper scrutiny 
and prioritisation for funding. 
 
Herein lies an anomaly, in both Rwanda and Uganda the mandate for the conservation of 
biodiversity lies with the ministry in charge of environment, yet national parks and in 
Rwanda’s case forests come under the auspices of other ministries. In Rwanda national parks 
are part of the ministry for commerce (being the back bone of tourism) and forests are part of 
the ministry of agriculture. In Uganda national parks also come under the ministry of tourism, 
but forests lie with the environment ministry. There are obviously critical coordination issues 
in the development of BSAP and its implementation when in both countries the bulk of 
biodiversity lies in national parks, under the authority of different ministries. Such 
organisational complexity may give rise to tensions over lobbying and securing finance for 
biodiversity conservation in protected areas as well as questions regarding the ability of 
ministries charged with commerce and industry to be objective about the public goods aspects 
of forest and biodiversity conservation. 
 
The weakness of any planning process is that the plan can only be as good as the knowledge 
and information available to the experts formulating it. Early rounds of the PRSP for both 
Uganda and Rwanda left out issues to do with the environment and biodiversity. Not until 
economically important sectors such as tourism and forestry were better understood in 
economic terms e.g. contribution to GDP, were conservation issues more fully incorporated 
into national plans. For example in Uganda it was not until the PRSP review in 2004 that 
forests were specifically identified as an important sub sector of environment and natural 
resources (Falkenberg & Sepp 1999). Similarly the importance the environment was not 
included as a separate cross cutting issue in the Rwanda PRSP until the most recent review in 
2006. By that time a number of environmental disasters, with implications for the loss of 
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biodiversity with immediate economic impacts at a national level had occurred, that could 
have easily been averted (see text box below). 
National Economic impacts of environmental degradation in Rwanda 
 
The direct link to biodiversity conservation is the obvious loss of habitat, but the benefits that 
these ecosystems provided to the local and national economy were not readily understood. 
Fortunately for Rwanda these issues will be treated more cautiously given the invigorated 
 
Rwanda's has witnessed two major examples with immediate impacts on the economy from the disturbance of 
key environmental resources.  The two cases in point are: 
 
1. Forest Clearance at Gishwati Forest Reserve – 1996-1998 
2. Wetland drainage in Rugezi Swamp – 2003 
 
Both of these areas are or were home to rare and endangered species. For example the Golden Monkey 
(Cercopithecus, miitis kandtii) in Gishwati and the Grauers Swamp Warbler (Bradypterus graueri), both of 
which are Albertine Rift endemics. 
 
Forest Clearance and economic impacts in NW Rwanda 
Gishwati forest was a large area of tropical mountain forest in north west Rwanda providing almost the entire 
catchments for the Sebeya River flowing into Lake Kivu to it's west.  A World Bank sponsored agricultural 
project saw approximately 180 km2 converted to agriculture and livestock production in the 1980's and the 
remaining reserve was partially degazetted for resettlement post war during the mid 90's. However the 
resettlement was largely uncontrolled and although the nominal territory of the reserve is 40km2 only 7km2 of 
disturbed natural forest remains. 
 
Impacts on the local economy range from reduced agricultural outputs due to soil erosion and loss of property 
and death of people and livestock due to a prevalence of flash flooding and landslides after the loss of forest. 
Siltation in the Sebeya River has also had dramatic effects on the volume and cost of power and potable water 
from Electrogaz and caused and increase in production costs at the Bralirwa brewery. Estimates from a GEF 
sponsored study (Bush 2004) indicate that annual financial losses to Eloctragz alone are in the region of $350, 
000 per annum as a result of the marginal increases in the down time at plants for cleaning out sediment. 
 
Wetland drainage and the national energy crisis 
Rugezi Swamp is a tropical highland swamp, located in central northern Rwanda and runs north to south for 
approximately 40 km, between Ruhengeri and Byumba Provinces. It is a major part of the catchments for lake 
Bulera, into which Rugezi drains, and lake Ruhondo (into which lake Bulera drains) in northern Rwanda. The 
swamp acts a giant 'sponge' during the wet season and continues to release water slowly into Lake Bulera 
during the dry season, helping to maintain the dry season level of the lake.   
 
A hydropower production plant is located in the channel between lakes Bulera and Ruhondo and was 
responsible for approximately 40% of national electricity production. In 2003 a local project was undertaken 
to drain Rugezi swamp to allow for agricultural production. The subsequent drainage system over a large part 
of Rugezi terminally disrupted the holding capacity of the swamp as a dry season reservoir for lake Bulera. As 
a result dry season flows into lake Bulera dramatically reduced, which saw the level of the lake drop by 3-4 
meters the following dry season. The off take of water to the fixed infrastructure of the power plant was 
greatly reduced causing the largest part of a massive drop in output caused by only intermittent production 
when water levels allow. This has been the major factor in the power deficit in Rwanda. To cope with the 
power shortage, Rwanda has had to import diesel generators and the price of electricity has more than 
doubled. This undoubtedly has had huge impacts on economic development in the service and industrial 
sector as businesses were initially crippled by lack of power and are now facing higher production costs 
because of the price increase. 
(Source: own research) 
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national interest in the environment as result of these tragic experiences and the development 
of the Rwandan Environmental Management Authority. 
2.3.1 b) Rural development policy and decentralization 
ICDP are the main approach to mitigate the conflicts between human development and 
conservation (Hulme & Murphee 2001b; McShane & Wells 2004; Wells & Brandon 1992). 
Most ICDP represent some form of rural development project designed to have conservation 
impacts. Typically the money and resources available nationally and internationally for rural 
development are much greater than those for conservation.  Therefore conservation may look 
towards this sector for partnerships that might have considerable beneficial outcomes towards 
the implementation of development projects that also meet conservation objectives.  
 
Both Rwanda and Uganda have pursued policies of decentralization in the last decade. 
Decentralization involves two processes, de-concentration and devolution (Carney and 
Farrington, 1998). De-concentration is the transfer of administration and organization away 
from central government and into local government units. Devolution is the development of 
real decision-making and legal power to local government units i.e. to be able to pass by laws 
about local issues as well as raise and spend local taxes.   
 
In Rwanda for example, the common development fund5  was established to strengthen the 
poverty reduction strategy and empowerment of the population by providing them, through 
the decentralized local government structure, with financial support to implement 
development projects, a similar structure exists in Uganda. The specific principle challenges 
for the environment sector are how to ensure that conservation concerns and laws are 
addressed through the decentralized network and that sufficient finance and human resources 
are available to address key issues. Importantly there lies an institutional opportunity to 
mainstream conservation (ICDP approaches) through this structural financial mechanism. 
                                                 
5 The CDF in Rwanda is a structural financial instrument through which to central government funds are 
channelled to the decentralized network of government 
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Already common development fund has a policy that 5% of finance must be spent on projects 
that directly address environmental issues. This, for instance, could be spent on labour-
intensive public works to address public environmental concerns such as tree planting on 
public land or public tree nurseries to alleviate pressure on wood resources in protected area.  
 
It is this policy on decentralization that also brings into focus the need for valuation 
information by protected area and environmental managers, in order to make rational decision 
at the level of the site about planning expenditure and which activities may result in the 
biggest welfare and conservation impacts. Disaggregated information from living standards 
studies such as those in chapters 3 and 4 may yield important information at a community 
level regarding which communities are highest forest users and can help better target the 
expenditure of scarce finances on community conservation activities.  
2.3.1 c) National laws and policies in support of Community Conservation 
The community development and poverty centred approach to national development has not 
been overlooked by ministries and agencies responsible for the management of biodiversity in 
Rwanda and Uganda. Both countries clearly acknowledge the central role that communities 
play in conserving biodiversity within protected areas with the development of several laws 
and statutes identifying the role that communities can play in conservation (see text box 
below).  
 
Such laws and polices obviously demonstrate an active interest in ensuring equity at the 
lowest level in the management of environmental resources. However there are always 
institutional and organisational challenges that arise in the implementation of new policies 
and the development of novel instruments.  
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Uganda’s policy and legal instuments for community conservation 
 
For example the importance of Uganda’s forests for biodiversity conservation should not be 
under looked. Almost 1/3 of the entire forest estate is under the network of reserves managed 
by the National Forest Authority (NFA), including many species rich tropical high forests and 
afromontane forests within Uganda’s section of the Albertine Rift.  In addition the NFA 
together with the District Forest Service (DFS) are responsible for the management of certain 
forest laws governing natural forest and plantation on private land.   
 
In 1998 a National Forest Plan (Uganda) was produced which identified the need to reform 
the Forest Department, and to give the new NFA the autonomy and management freedoms 
 
The policy and legal framework for the management of environmental resources in Uganda places significant 
emphasis on  sharing of the costs and benefits of conservation. 
  
The Uganda Wildlife Statute (1996) recognises the importance of increasing benefits to local communities 
from protected areas as a means to improve relationships and thereby foster positive attitudes to conservation 
at community level.  Specifically this Statute includes a provision for sharing of tourism revenues with 
communities adjacent to protected areas.  More recently the Uganda Wildlife Authority has developed 
policies on community conservation and collaborative management that provide for other measures to share 
benefits, and reduce costs of crop damage by wildlife.  However there is little information on the extent to 
which these measures are actually changing the balance of costs and benefits at local level, and thus the 
extent to which the benefit sharing provisions are adequate to achieve the desired result.   
 
The Environment Statute (1997) established the National Environment Management Agency (NEMA).  
While the mandate for management of environment and natural resources still rests largely with the centre, 
collaboration between NEMA and the Local Government Development Programme supports increased 
transfer of resources, power and decision-making to locally elected councils at district and sub county levels, 
and the mainstreaming of environment into local government planning processes.  This project will generate 
new information on the contribution of protected areas to poverty reduction that is key to efforts to 
mainstream conservation within broader planning processes. 
 
The Uganda Land Act (1998) transforms land tenure policy in Uganda, giving full legal recognition to 
customary land tenure systems. Furthermore this act reinforces provisions of the constitution relating to 
protected areas such as forest reserves which states that such reserved lands are “trust lands” belonging to the 
people of Uganda, to be managed by government in a manner that serves the best interests of the people of 
Uganda.  This key principle is receiving increasing attention as civil society groups raise concerns over 
equity in balancing local and national interests. 
 
The Forest Policy and Forest Act (2003)  provides for substantial devolution of authority to the local level.  
The Act promotes Collaborative Forest Management (CFM) which is defined as follows: “Communities are 
genuinely involved in the management of the forest resource through a negotiated process in which rights, 
roles, responsibilities and returns for sustainable management of such forest resources are shared”.  
Guidelines have now been developed to guide the CFM process and attention is being focused on how the 
process can ensure equity in sharing of rights, responsibilities and returns so that CFM provides adequate 
incentives for effective and sustainable community participation.   
(Source: Phil Franks, Care Inetrnatoinal  Poverty, Environemnt and Climate Change Network) 
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required to achieve clearly defined objectives. The new Forestry Policy passed by the Cabinet 
in March 2001 reflected this situation, stating that the institutional framework for the forest 
sector will be strengthened and that the Government is committed to the transformation of the 
present Forestry Department into an autonomous authority. The approval to prepare the 
legislation to create the NFA was given by Cabinet in October 2001. A National Forestry and 
Tree Planting Act gazetted in August 2003 provided the enabling clauses for the National 
Forest Authority. 
 
The new NFA is organised as a parastatal6, which will supervise the portfolio of central forest 
reserves and the District Forest Services will manage local forest reserves and provide support 
to private forest owners. It was assumed that the delivery of public goods, such as 
environmental services and community benefits, will be improved under the NFA 
management, which will operate with freedoms and planning horizons that the Forestry 
Department did not have. As a government-owned organisation, the NFA Performance 
Contract will specify the balance it must achieve between income generation and the delivery 
of public goods and services. 
 
Despite the policy level acknowledgement of the importance of biodiversity and the role it 
can play in poverty alleviation and economic growth, it is a message that is still not clearly 
understood much less acted upon. The appropriate incentive for the government to maintain the 
focus on public goods may not be evident unless the full economic benefits from forests are 
properly quantified. By 2005 the newly formed NFA was in dire financial trouble as the 
scheduled central government finances were not disbursed (Bush et al, 2004).  Clearly the focus 
of the Treasury in the creation of a parastatal agency was to divest itself of the financial burden 
                                                 
6 A parasatal is term used widely in development for former government departments operating in a liberalised 
manner i.e. government executive agencies with a degree of autonomy over the raising and utilisation of own of 
finances through market based activities. Similar in institutional form to a quasi government organisation in the 
UK i.e. Environmental Protection Agency  or Agricultural and Rural Development Agency PA  
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of managing Uganda’s forest estate. This situation was finally resolved with a financial support 
package from the international donor community. 
 
In additon in Uganda in 2007 President Museveni attempted to overule parliament to 
degazette  Mabira Forest Reserve in Central Uganda to make way for sugar cane plantation. 
Assuming transparent governanace,  this was clearly a decison made on the perceived 
economc importance of investment in economic development, and is also an  example of 
putting short run benefits before long run costs. A clear illustration of the need for thorough 
economic valuation of the TEV, such as the exampel of chapter 6,  of forests in protected 
areas and importantly the right sort of lobbying and exposure of the findings to the relavent 
authorities and the general public. 
2.3.1 d) National coordination of policies on the environment and biodiversity 
conservation 
Clearly there are many challenging coordination issues in the management and development 
of polices towards biodiversity conservation in the complex national institutional and 
organizational policy environment. The PRSP provides the principal inter-ministerial platform 
for policy coordination across all sectors. As such it is the fundamental tool to mainstream 
environmental issues in other sector policies. Currently the finance ministries in Rwanda and 
Uganda oversee the coordination of PRSP M&E system. This is done in conjunction with its 
stakeholders by issuing guidelines and preparing consolidated reports on macroeconomic and 
growth policies, annual budget execution and an annual PRSP implementation progress 
report.  
 
A key challenge will be to address the interface between PRSP information needs, 
information needed for sector strategy formulation and implementation, and monitoring of 
district development plans. To supplement information produced through MINECOFIN7and 
the sector ministries’ administrative systems, a wide range of studies are regularly conducted 
                                                 
7 MINECOFIN – Rwandan Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning; 
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in the area of tracking public funds. These range from the central level to frontline service 
providers as well as the assessment of performances of those agencies in producing services 
accessible to the population. A citizen report card technique is being developed in Rwanda to 
measure the level of satisfaction and public services users’ perceptions. This will feed into the 
policy design and implementation process. However in addition to such qualitative measures 
there is need for quantitative social, economic and environmental data on indicators of policy 
success. At present little elaboration of the indicators and mechanisms are available and the 
current focus for developing environmental indicators lies on issues to do with industrial and 
economic development and less on biodiversity (Bush et al 2005). This is clearly an 
opportunity of economic valuation studies to better inform policy processes at the national 
level e.g. the values of protected areas to adjacent communities in chapters 3 and 4. 
 
Both Rwanda and Uganda rely heavily on international donor assistance in the financing of 
public sector activities.  Both governments have in recent years stated a preference for 
predictable budget support as the primary mode of assistance. It is believed by both recipients 
and donors that clear budget support, when accompanied with accountable and transparent 
institutions, will deliver superior results compared to the traditional project approach. Budget 
support approaches offer some key opportunities for mainstreaming forest and biodiversity 
conservation in development planning and management. On one hand there is a common 
platform for lobbying both government and the donor communities about the economic 
importance of biodiversity conservation, assuming the empirical information on which to base 
the lobbying is available. On the other hand if conservation groups are unable to interface 
with these harmonized approaches to financing development it is likely that they will lose out 
on the option of wider development financing for biodiversity conservation, as it is unlikely to 
receive the prioritisation it deserves in strategic financial planning at the national level the 
TEV study in chapter 6 is an example where economic information can be used to promote 
rational argument for conservation of forests and biodiversity in this context. 
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Importantly economic indicators on biodiversity and forest conservation should be developed 
to provide quantifiable measures of success in policy implementation.  Creating “green” 
national accounts to appreciate the value of natural capital has been discussed for some time 
now e.g. Pearce and Atkinson (1993), Solow (1986).  The World Bank report  “Where is the 
Wealth of Nations” (World Bank 2006), brings the natural capital accounting issue in to sharp 
focus indicating that natural capital accounts for almost a quarter of total wealth in low 
income countries, greater than the chare of produced wealth. To date few less developed 
economies globally have produced such green accounts despite the methods being 
theoretically uncomplicated  (Hartwick & Olweiler 1998). The valuation studies on local uses 
of protected area resources are just the type of valuation exercise on which to build an 
aggregate estimate of the worth a nations forest stock. However the practical reality of 
developing estimates is practically more challenging and costly e.g. how to get reasonably 
accurate estimates of forest and biodiversity resources, in terms of survey work, on which to 
base estimates. To date none of the countries in the Albertine Rift have produced ‘green’ 
national accounts. 
2.4 Conservation Management Approaches 
2.4.1 Trans-boundary protected area management 
Further to the model of protected area management as a foundation of conservation described 
in chapter 1 a slightly more complex situation exists whe ecosystems straddle international 
boundaries. The Albertine Rift is a region defined by ecological and physical geographical 
parameters and as such encompasses several different sovereign states. Several of the 
protected areas within the Albertine Rift have a border shared by a neighbouring protected 
area in another country, thus the protected area boundary is also an international boundary.  
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Perhaps the most iconic example of a trans-boundary park is the Masai Mara Reserve (Kenya) 
and Serengeti National Park (Tanzania), forming a contiguous ecosystem, where the annual 
migration of wildebeest and zebra transfer across an international boarder in search of 
seasonal grazing. Several trans-boundary conservation areas exist i.e. Nyungwe National Park 
(Rwanda) and Kabira Forest Reserve (Burundi), Queen Elizabeth National Park (Uganda) and 
Virunga National Park- northern sector (DRC). Conservation management practices in one 
park can have implications for the neighbouring park so some coordination of activities, laws 
and policies on wildlife management are essential for effective species conservation.  
 
An example of particular interest with an active trans-boundary management process is the 
Virunga Volcanoes protected area, the home of the endangered mountain gorilla (Gorilla 
berengei berengei). This trans-boundary conservation area comprised of three national parks 
in neighbouring countries, Volcanoes National Park (Rwanda), Virunga National Park (DRC) 
and Mgahinga National Park, (Uganda).  Since 1991 the International Gorilla Conservation 
Program8 (IGCP) has been working on coordinating mountain gorilla park management 
practice and policies in the three range states. Its goal is to ensure the conservation of 
mountain gorillas and their regional afromontane forest habitats.  One of IGCP's main 
objectives is to increase collaboration between the protected area authorities and their partners 
in the region. The programme provides a mechanism for the respective countries to develop a 
regional approach to the conservation of a shared habitat 
 
IGCP worked with the authorities in all three of the range states to develop a plan for the 
creation of a Transfrontier Protected Area (TFPA). The three authorities subsequently 
presented a joint paper at a 1996 Peace Parks conference, outlining the potential for a 
collaboratively managed TFPA. This and subsequent work also involving the IUCN, led to all 
three protected area authorities signing a Tripartite Agreement in 2001. Further to this, in 
                                                 
8 IGCP is a program of a coalition of international conservation NGO; African Wildlife Foundation, World 
Wildlife Fund and Flora and Fauna International 
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2006 IGCP began to facilitate the development of a trans-boundary secretariat which 
institutionalised an organisation to develop and oversee the implementation of a trans 
boundary ten year strategic plan between the three range states, which was launched in 
February 2008. Financing for the initiative was provided by the Netherlands Government 
development program in the region.  
 
The objective of the secretariat provides the organisational structure to maintain regional 
collaboration and ensure a harmonious approach to protected area planning, management, 
financing and monitoring and evaluation. Technical advice is made available through 
committees for research, tourism, community conservation and law enforcement. 
Representatives of the key wildlife agencies and regional and international partner 
organisations sit on the committees, giving the opportunity to share regionally expertise in 
conservation. This is an important aspect as it is recognised within the strategic plan that 
capacities and the level of development of the protected area are different between states. 
 
A trans-boundary approach to conservation also needs to be informed by economic and social 
research on the opportunities and impacts of conservation approaches discussed in more detail 
below. Importantly this trans-boundary approach provides an opportunity to harmonise 
economic research methods between range states so that competitive assessments of the 
performance of trans-boundary policies can be made. One of the roles that IGCP has played in 
recent years is lobbying for harmonization between countries of the gorilla permit price. From 
an economic perspective this sort of price fixing may not lead to the optimal benefits for each 
range state from tourism, due to the relative comparative and competitive advantages of the 
tourism sector in each country, even if it leads to maximised revenue at the park level.  
 
For example Bush (2007) shows that price increases in 2006 led to a change in the 
consumption patterns of tourists coming to visit Rwanda with a clear shift away from Rwanda 
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as a focal destination to the gorilla park as a destination. Whilst this was good for the gorilla 
park in terms of increased revenue from permits, tourists were staying a shorter length of time 
and visiting fewer other locations within Rwanda; respondents tended to visit other countries 
in the region as well. This clearly has implications for the maximisation of benefits for the 
Rwandan private sector that had fewer opportunities to sell bed nights, car hire days, meals 
etc. per tourist visiting. In this respect such economic information could help sovereign states 
to make more informed decision about the policies that they wish to adopt and for 
international NGO to be clearer about the wider impacts of the advice they give. For example 
the work in chapter 5 on consumer values for mountain gorilla tourism could be repeated in 
the three different countries to get a detailed understanding of differences in consumption 
patterns and tourist’s demographics and behaviour, to set regionally prices for gorilla treks.  
In addition studies on forest adjacent households living standards and forest dependence e.g. 
chapters 3 and 4, could provide essential information to differentiate strategies between 
countries to mitigate the impacts of illegal use of protected areas.  
2.4.2 Integrated conservation and development approaches 
Much attention has been given in the last few decades by the conservationists to what has 
become known as the “integrated conservation and development” approach to conservation 
(Leach et al. 1999). Earlier (section 2.3.5) a brief description of ICDP was given to outline 
their place in the gamut of community conservation approaches and the link with the 
theoretical valuation frameworks being discussed. In this section we elaborate further the 
opportunities and constraints of the approach and how economic values can help to improve 
on their performance as a conservation and development tool. The precise nature of the 
activities undertaken under the ICDP approaches are varied but can be basically categorised 
as activities that couple local economic welfare to the use of the protected area or those that 




Many community-based protected area management programs try to meet at least two 
complex goals: conservation of nature, and economic empowerment of rural households. The 
underlying premise is that communities can profit from protected area if they are given 
sufficient authority and control over protected area resources. Thus, such programs invariably 
involve some devolution of state authority over wildlife management to either community or 
district government organizations, increased community involvement in protection of fauna 
and flora, new jobs created through increased tourism, protection, and benefits to rural 
households either directly or indirectly through community projects run by NGO (Kiss 2004; 
Newmark & Hough 2000; Romero & Andrade 2004)  
 
Coupled activities such as timber and non timber forest product harvesting from defined areas 
of a protected area are tough to manage as sustainability is a key concern. Once local people 
have legitimate access to a protected area it can be problematic to police who is there 
legitimately or not, in addition to the problem of verifying if they are harvesting only 
authorised quantities.  Decoupled activities such as the development of alternative livelihood 
options may be too indirect in targeting the conservation objective and the social, economic 
and technical conditions are often too challenging for them to be effective (Ferraro, 2001). 
However, the ability of such actions to effectively deal with the problems associated with, 
what are effectively, common property resources has resulted in limited success in achieving 
biodiversity conservation or sustainable resource use (Bowen–Jones & Pendry 1999; Ferraro 
& Kiss 2002; Hulme & Murphee 2001b). 
 
Struhsaker (1996) points towards ‘sustainable harvest’ from forests as a commonly 
misunderstood concept. Several key conservation failures in sustainable resource use are 
identified. Firstly he points to the general failure of sustainable harvest projects. Secondly, 
and very importantly, is that sustainable harvest is used a blinkered manner, as only those 
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species of interest (the harvest) are considered and this only represents a small proportion of 
the living organisms within the ecological community being exploited. For example timber 
extraction is not usually compatible with sustainable conservation of other non-harvested 
species. Intensively managed forests more closely resemble tree plantations than natural 
forest. The flora and fauna that follow heavy logging are usually fast colonising (weed) 
species and not those typically associated with old forest growth. In the context of direct use 
of protected area, the harvesting of timber and non-timber forest products must take into 
account the complex food webs that are found in an ecological environment, otherwise 
damage may be done to other vulnerable species. Thirdly, it is important to establish a 
reference point in order to be able to monitor the consequences of a course of action. Lastly, 
there is the temptation to increase yields above the sustainable level, under demand pressure 
from markets, society and politicians. 
 
Ferraro’s (2001) narrative on the difficulty and complexity of implementing effective ICDP 
identifies three principal problems associated with using development interventions to protect 
ecosystems. First, given the complexity of development interventions and the temporal and 
spatial scales at which conservation objectives must be achieved, field practitioners must 
spread their resources over a multitude of tasks that often have no effect on conservation-
related household behaviour. Second, when practitioners do manage to have a development 
effect, it is often an undesirable effect from a conservation perspective i.e. improved income 
means that poachers can afford guns instead of snares (Brown 2003). Third, even if 
practitioners generate a desirable effect, they often have difficulty sustaining it because the 
effect depends on market conditions that change frequently. This is one view and there are 
many other perspectives, but it does broadly illustrate the challenges faced in employing 
development approaches to conservation problems. 
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The general issues described above similarly affect many of the ICDP currently in operation 
in Uganda and Rwanda. For example an innovative strategy in the last decade has been 
tourism revenue sharing. The basic idea is to spread the benefits of tourism revenue from the 
national parks with local communities, so that the community values (obtains direct benefit 
from) the protected area and the wildlife within it. Developing a sense of community 
ownership of the resources and tangible economic benefits from their existence would 
hopefully mitigate any negative impacts of living next to the protected area (impacts of crop 
raiding or opportunity cost from loss of access to protected area resources) and assist in 
community protection of the resource. 
 
The study by Plumptre et al (2004) on socio-economic costs and benefits from protected areas 
in the Albertine Rift showed that tourism ranked very low as a benefit from the protected area 
surveyed. Tourism was mainly perceived as being useful at a national level. It is clear that 
most tourism revenue does not accrue at the local level (Grosspietch 2007; Sabuhoro 2006). 
Developing the link in people’s minds between tourism and other park benefits, especially 
revenue sharing, in all areas around the park should be part of the tourism development 
program. However the impact of tourism revenue sharing schemes in the community may be 
diluted due to the high population density relative to tourism revenue. 
 
In Rwanda the revenue sharing scheme has recently been introduced on the basis of 
experiences in Uganda. An explicit policy to share 5% of total gate receipts of the national 
parks was developed by Office Rwandaise du Tourisme et des Parks Natoinaux (ORTPN) in 
2002. By 2004 the system was operational with the first payments being disbursed in 2005. 
Typically the scheme disburses funds to communities through local government structures. 
Communities in this case are identified as those official administrative sectors adjacent to the 
national park.  Money goes to provide social infrastructure such as paying for community 
 68
water points, clinic and school improvements. The projects are identified through district 
development plans, and are implemented through the local government structures. 
 
Using the Volcanoes National Park (VNP), Rwanda as an example, an issue to be highlighted 
is access to water (Plumptre et al. 2004). The volcanic geology of the VNP area means that 
rain water either runs off rapidly or percolates quickly through fissures in the ground. During 
the drier months permanent water sources may only be found within the boundary of the 
national park as external ones dry up. Whilst the park authorities often grant permission for 
local people to access such water sources, this poses a conservation risk.  As people access the 
park their activities may not be restricted to the collection of water. It is difficult for the park 
authorities to monitor and control such activities given their limited resources. Attention 
focused on methods of supplying water to local communities from the permanent water found 
in the forest. However appropriate environmental impact assessment must be made to 
evaluate the risks associated with the supply of water from the park, particularly in terms of 
the biological impacts to wetland flora and fauna.   
 
Many revenue sharing water projects have been successfully completed, but to what human 
and conservation effect? Clearly many people benefit from such interventions and generally 
communities appreciate them (Sabuhoro 2006) however the impacts on conservation are 
unclear. Anti-poaching data from the national park show that in recent years there may have 
been little or no change in the incidence of illegal activities, including water illegal collection, 
in the park despite a corresponding increase in community conservation programs (Sabuhoro 
2006).   Many of the poorest households live close to the park boundary, whilst the wealthier 
households live close to or in the village centres. Usually community water infrastructure is 
commonly set up in village centres for logistical reasons i.e. the critical constraint being 
having a large enough roof of appropriate material as the rain water catchments, usually a 
public building. This means access to the infrastructure remains difficult for the poorest 
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people in the community, assuming they tend to live farthest from community centres. If 
access to developments in social infrastructure is no better for marginal groups who are high 
risk in terms of illegal use of protected area, then little impact on their behaviour towards 
protected area can be expected. 
2.4.3 Direct Payments for conservation 
(Ferraro & Kiss 2002) advocate more direct approaches to conservation. The failures to 
deliver either lasting local welfare benefits or conservation of the focal resources of traditional 
ICDPs have been well documented in the past decades (Gihimire & Pimbert 1997; Hulme & 
Murphee 2001b). ICDP approaches have been ignominiously termed ‘conservation through 
distraction’ (Ferraro & Simpson 2002) , this term captures the challenge of making rural 
people substitute one from of activity for another. The reality is that ceteris paribus new 
sources of income are more likely to be added to the suite of livelihoods options rather than 
substituted for old ones (Ferraro 2001).  Ferraro and Kiss (2002) discuss the relative benefits 
of more direct approaches to conservation though direct payments for conservation, in a 
similar vein to payments for ecosystem services.  
 
PES approaches incorporate both private property concepts and direct payments to households 
to encourage environmentally and socially desirable behaviour, e.g. forest conservation in 
upland areas to protect watersheds. PES approaches have been trialled in various countries, 
notably Costa Rica, where the government pays local residents $35 per ha annually to 
conserve natural forest on private land for water shed protection (Oritz & Kellenberg 2002). 
Generally PES approaches also generate biodiversity benefits as a side effect, yet few 
schemes have been applied directly as an instrument to explicitly conserve biodiversity 
(Ferraro & Kiss 2002)9.   
 
                                                 
9 Ferraro and Kiss (2002) do not classify biodiversity conservation as an ecosystem service in this paper,  i.e. 
watershed management, carbon sequestration, but more of a separate benefit in its own right. 
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For clarity, PES approaches applied to biodiversity conservation we will call a payment for 
conservation scheme (PCS). PCS pass the first hurdle of at least observing a basic rule of 
economic policy; there must be at least as many instruments specifically designed to meet an 
objective as there are objectives (Coleman & Young 1990). Invariably ICDP are focused on 
directly improving human welfare on the assumption that improving living standards also 
translate in to improving sustainability in resource use and therefore puts less pressure on 
protected areas.  ICDP require complex organisational and institutional infrastructure; Ferraro 
(2001) indicates that a PCS need not be as institutionally complex as an ICDP, but if the local 
institutional environment is able to support an ICDP then it can support a PCS.  
 
(Conrad & Ferraro 2001) state that overhead costs in direct payment approaches are the same 
or less than ICDP overheads, and that in any case PCS could be much more efficient. A case 
study in Madagascar (Conrad & Ferraro 2001) demonstrated that of the then $4 million 
available for conservation annually were invested in PCS,  about 80% of Madagascar’s 
existing forests could have been protected compared to the actual 12% that was being 
conserved. Rural residents could have received financial payments two times higher than the 
benefits generated through traditional ICDP income generating projects. Again, this is a 
fundamental principle of economic policy - the most cost effective way of getting what you 
want is paying for what you want (Coleman & Young 1990). 
 
The issue of the transaction costs of implementing PCS versus ICDP is an interesting one and 
presents several institutional and enforcement challenges. Most PES schemes have been 
focused towards forest stands on private land. Thus an area-based payment can be made to a 
person with a defined property right over an easily verifiable level of provision of an 
environmental resource (a stand of trees). The first challenge for delivering a PCS to 
individuals in a community is defining the community/beneficiaries for the scheme; secondly, 
the property right for the community over a defined sector of the protected area; thirdly, the 
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level and distribution of payments; fourthly, the establishment of monitoring indicators and 
the desired level of biodiversity in the protected area. 
 
From a conservation perspective the fourth aspect is technically challenging to implement. A 
great deal of biological information will be needed to evaluate the targets to be achieved and 
the minimum tolerances/threshold levels of biodiversity against which payments are to be 
made. Floral diversity is relatively static and easily measured, however the faunal diversity 
and density is more difficult to measure and typical estimates of mammal density and 
distributions have high margins of error (Fawcett 2008). Monitoring fauna from year to year 
will inevitably require high levels of increase or decline before change will be detected in a 
statistically significant manner. Linking payments to target levels of illegal activity detected 
in the protected area is another method of monitoring conservation impacts, e.g. numbers of 
snares retrieved from the protected area or numbers of poachers arrested. Measuring anti-
poaching and enforcement effectiveness is challenging due to fluctuations in level of effort 
and efficiency. Standardising measures and targets may prove to be difficult. Measuring flora 
as a proxy for faunal diversity is inadequate, as examples from central Africa have shown that 
large stands of seemingly pristine tropical forest are completely defaunated of mammals 
(Huijbregts et al. 2003). This means the financial cost of monitoring may be much greater 
than at first anticipated and certainly a good deal more technically challenging.  
 
Payments from PES/PCS schemes can be made directly to rural households and are a means 
of delivering defined welfare benefits under the direct control of households, a critical 
bottleneck in ICDP approaches.  It improves cash flows to peasant farmers which aids 
integration into the formal economy. It provides a fungible source of wealth, improving their 
ability to diversify their livelihoods options and to make their own decisions about best 
courses of action. It also helps to manage expectations and avoid local disappointment when 
either income generating projects or jobs in communities fail to materialise. Once again, 
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financial and economic analysis is essential in determining what level of payments should be 
made, to whom and on what basis. We cannot assume that all protected area adjacent 
households have similar social values or opportunity costs towards the protected area. 
Economic analysis has shown that higher income households showed a higher level of direct 
use and thus have thus have a higher opportunity costs than lower income households. 
Conversely higher income households also may be less dependant on protected area 
resources, and thus have lower social values attached to them (chapters 3 and 4).  This leaves 
a difficult question of which amount to compensate, the social a value or the opportunity cost 
value.  
 
Novel research by Groom and Palmer (2008) on the cost-effectiveness of direct payment 
approaches contests the findings of Ferraro and Simpson (2002) that they are in fact a superior 
alternative to indirect approaches e.g. ICDP.  Groom and Palmer (2008) argue that the Ferraro 
and Simpson (2002) conditions of perfect elasticity in supply or demand enabling agents to 
purchase profit maximizing quantities of inputs at prevailing market prices is unrealistic. They 
propose instead that inputs and outputs may in fact subject to quantity constraints or rationing, 
concluding that direct payments are not necessarily more cost effective then indirect payments 
and that there are instances where parties involved prefer indirect payment mechanisms e.g. 
development project approaches. Thus we see that in the choice of the most cost effective 
approach understanding the context is essential. This seems like a realistic proposition in the 
context of forest dependant households, in imperfect markets with low substitutability of 
money for alternatives to forest products; direct payments in practice may not in fact result in 
the optimal conservation and welfare outcome.  
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2.5 Conclusion; lessons from the economic and social theory 
2.5.1 Local to global interdependency 
Changes in forest cover or biodiversity loss from the action of local households has an impact 
on the global climate. The span of impact between policy levels is a clear example of 
interdependency as was noted earlier and requires governance responses at all levels 
simultaneously.  In addition environmental externalities such as forest and biodiversity 
conservation often have functional ties to other issues such as climate change at a local and 
international level. The governance solutions mooted in the Convention on Biological 
Diversity are justified in that although overlap exists as the achievement of both goals 
requires a range of direct interventions some of which will not achieve the goals of the other.  
 
Understanding the economic flow of benefits between the different policy levels and between 
actors will also help us to understand the source and nature of externalities and may be 
instrumental in planning for their mitigation. Becker and Ostrom (1995) stipulate the 
existence of several conditions for joint management of resources between government and 
communities to result in the sustainable use of environmental resources.10 Unless these 
conditions are present, externalities will still be manifest resulting in the unsustainable use of 
the resource. The failure of community management programmes can usually be attributed to 
the externalities caused by the failure of one or more of these conditions. Other reasons for the 
                                                 
10Conditions for sustainable resource use. 
 Accurate information on the resource condition and expected flow of benefits are available and at low cost. 
 Participants are relatively homogeneous in regard to asset structure, information and preferences. 
 Participants share a common understanding of potential benefits and risks associated with the continuance of 
the status quo in contrast to the changes that they could feasibly adopt. 
 Participants share generalised norms of reciprocity and trust that can be used as initial social capital.  
 The group using the resource is relatively small and stable 
 Participants do not discount the future at a high rate. 
 Participants have the authority to make their own operational rules, which if made legitimately, will be 
supported and potentially enforced by external authorities.  
 participants use collective choice rules that fall between the extremes of unanimity or control by a few  (or 
bare minority), and thus they avoid high transaction or deprivation costs 
 Participants can develop relatively accurate and low cost monitoring and sanctioning arrangements. 
(Becker and Ostrom, 1995) 
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shortcomings of community conservation projects revolve around a tendency for projects to 
be too short term and over reliant on expatriate expertise (Becker & Ostrom 1995; Western et 
al. 1994) and a tendency for beneficiaries to be treated as passive recipients of project 
activities with no sense of ownership (Pimbert & Pretty 1995).  
2.5.2 Direct and indirect conservation payment approaches  
Problems with ICDP may arise from the lack of clear specification of aims and objectives and 
as a result they have a mixed history of success.  If the aim of a project is to conserve a 
resource by community action what does this really imply, conservation of biodiversity or 
sustainable use of the resource? The activities that would be carried out under the two regimes 
would be very different. Community based tasks for biodiversity conservation may be 
protection/patrolling or tourism based, so as to be minimally invasive to the site. Under 
sustainable use this may imply agricultural development, forestry activities or hunting, which 
may do little to directly conserve biodiversity despite efforts to minimise their environmental 
impacts. 
 
Despite the primacy of targeting biodiversity conservation action at the household level 
(Larson, 1994) the previously discussed theory broadens the perspective of community based 
management of environmental resources, establishing that it is not only at the local level that 
appropriate forms of external intervention may be targeted. It can be seen that both macro and 
micro level institutions can affect social actors. Thus the project focus of community based 
natural resource management though community conservation or ICDP programs cannot be 
generalised, more effective forms of intervention at the national policy level must also be 
looked in to (Reed, 2004).  
 
Farrington and Boyd (1997) state that the implementation of improved natural resource 
management and its closer integration with agricultural improvement is not easy to implement 
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on any scale larger than a few villages. Thus to go beyond community level action will have 
to be based on multi-agency partnerships. Importantly at the international/global level, to 
correct for externalities, nations must adequately value their environmental resources. The 
challenge for conservationists is not just to rectify the past problems of protected area 
management and ICDP to achieve conservation goals, but to define the institutions and shape 
human behaviour towards biodiversity of which people are a part. Unless the stocks and flows 
of benefits at different policy levels are well understood the magnitude of externalities cannot 
be effectively factored into financing global initiatives and planning local level actions to 
mitigate them.  
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Chapter 3.0:  
Measuring the financial value of protected areas to local 
people; a case study of four protected areas in Uganda 
3.1 Introduction 
It is being increasingly recognized that greater consideration must be given to community 
involvement in resource management. Traditional techniques of protected areas management, 
sometimes referred to as the "fences and fines" approach, are sometimes viewed as having 
failed in their goals of preserving biological diversity in the tropics by some proponents 
(Barrett & Arcese 1995; Johannesen 2005). The importance of involving communities in 
achieving positive results in wildlife conservation and management has also been widely 
acknowledged (Andrade 2003; Berkes 2004; Johannesen 2004; Leach et al. 1997; Leach et al. 
1999; Naughton-Treves & Sanderson 1995; Noss 1997), although more recently the ways 
communities are being involved have come into question  (Berkes 2004; McShane & Wells 
2004).   
 
However, despite the recognition of this role that communities play in the use of forests, the 
practical implementation of community based conservation, integrated conservation and 
development projects or community based natural resource management initiatives have 
frequently fallen short of expectations (Barrett & Arcese 1995; Berkes 2004; Chapin 2004; 
Hackel 1999; Johannesen 2005; Leach et al. 1999; McShane & Wells 2004; Newmark & 
Hough 2000; Noss 1997; Salafsky & Margoluis 1999). One of the main reasons for this 
failure in project design has been the misidentification of the main social and economic 
parameters that drive local people to continue to 'illegally' use protected areas. There is thus a 
pressing need for quantitative information on the socio-economic value of protected areas to 
local communities, upon which to develop practical solutions to mitigate the conservation and 
development conflict that protected area managers are faced with.  
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This study applies a market price method to elicit quantitative economic data on the 
magnitude of forest income and understand the socio-economic determinants of household 
forest use. In addition the chapter gives insight into the distribution of forest income and 
consumption amongst different household income groups. Whilst several market price 
method studies have been carried out globally (Cavendish 1999a, 1999b; Godoy et al. 1995), 
the weight of evidence indicates that the issues determining use of forest resources in 
protected areas are often site specific (Vedeld et al. 2004), meaning it can be difficult to draw 
generalised conclusions about management practices from individual site case studies. This 
study draws on case studies from four different protected area sites of different bio types and 
represents not only a unique set of data in the context of protected area and forest 
management in Uganda, but an opportunity to draw generalised conclusions based on 
common factors or trends identified between sites of varied context, utilising data gathered in 
a systematic and directly comparable manner. 
 
Key findings in this study were that protected areas contribute substantially to local living 
standards suggesting that if strict non use policies were enforced, local poverty would be 
significantly exacerbated. The value of benefits from the protected areas varied greatly with 
living standards. Worryingly, as living standards improved so did the value of harvested 
protected area products. This undermines the basic assumption of many community 
conservation and integrated conservation and development programs that improving living 




3.2 Methodological issues in household income and market price 
surveys  
Arguably the market price method is the theoretically simplest of valuation methods, relying 
on market prices for a range of goods or services to be identified and valued. Many goods and 
services from tropical forests and other protected areas uses are traded, either in local markets 
or internationally, including wood products (timber, pulp and fuel), non-wood forest products 
(food, medicine and utensils), crops and livestock products, wildlife (meat and fish) and 
recreation. For those products that are commercially traded, market prices can be used to 
construct financial accounts to compare the costs and benefits of alternative protected area use 
options. Prices reflect the interaction of consumers and producers over the demand and supply 
of goods and services. In an “efficient” market, goods and services will be priced at their 
marginal value product and reflect the full opportunity costs of resource use.  
3.2.1 Which price to choose? 
For many NTFP, researchers are able to record prices in local or more distant markets. 
Despite questions regarding their efficiency, there is often little choice but to rely on actual 
market prices. When using market prices for the purpose of financial valuation it is important 
to determine the appropriate market price for the goods and services of interest. There may be 
a variety of ways to obtain the relevant market prices, including existing secondary data e.g. 
economic and social studies, published or privately held statistics, socio-economic surveys, or 
through consultation with key informants such as agricultural extension officers, forestry 
service personnel, government market specialists and statisticians. In many cases it will be 
necessary to carry out new market surveys to collect the prices of minor NTFP, which may be 
traded on a small scale or occasionally, and which are typically neglected by official 
economic statistics. It may also be necessary to take account of seasonal variations in demand 
or supply that lead to fluctuations in market prices. For those products that are not traded, 
traded infrequently, or bartered, respondents can be probed to understand what their exchange 
value would be. For example a unit of the non traded good (A) could be compared to a unit of 
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another good commonly traded of similar utility (B) and the respondent asked how many 
units of B they would be willing to accept for a unit of A. As the price of a unit of good B is 
known a quasi market price for good A can be established.  Alternatively in a large sample 
information may be available from another respondent on prices received for good A to 
impute a price.   
 
Using information derived from such sources it is possible to derive prices that reflect the 
prevailing market value of the goods and services of specific forest land uses. The farm gate 
price is the price without any transport, processing or marketing costs included. Domestic 
market prices will reflect any transport and marketing costs involved in getting the product to 
the local market and may also reflect the costs of processing the product before it reaches the 
market. Similarly, the border prices of traded goods will reflect additional transport, 
marketing and processing costs, and is given by the free-on-board price for exports and the 
(cost-insurance-freight) price for imports. The choice of which price to use in the analysis 
depends on whether the good is traded or non-traded, the level and type of analysis and the 
extent of activities included within the project (Bishop 2003; Crookes et al. 2005; Dixon et al. 
1994; Gittinger 1984; Sander 2004) 
 
As this study deals with rural, households in a subsistence mode of production, local 
market/farm gate prices were used. There was little record of cash crop production, mainly 
staple foods (maize, bananas, beans etc.), fruit and vegetables and occasionally livestock. 
Transport of goods to market for sale is mainly conducted by the individual using the foot or 
bicycle transport. This means that the cost of transport equates to the opportunity cost of own 
labour, which as discussed later in this chapter (section 3.3.4) is assumed to be very low or 
possibly zero. Thus local market prices closely approximate the farm gate prices.  
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3.2.2 The quality of survey data 
Gathering detailed household accounting data is a challenging task which can be subject to 
many sources of error. Good data collection relies on well prepared survey tools and thorough 
training of enumerators.  Typically the principal source of error is that of poor respondent 
recall. In contrast to agricultural products which are harvested at certain ties of the year, to 
which respondent might have a clear memory of the yield and prices; products from PA such 
as NTFP are often collected continuously throughout the year in variable quantities. Also, 
unusual climatic occurrences such as drought or too much rain can affect household 
production and consumption levels. Thus point estimates may be biased if they are 
extrapolated over an annual period. In general the shorter the recall period is, the more 
accurate and precise the reporting of income and consumption. Vedeld et al (2004) 
recommend that it is best practice to make visits once a quarter to a panel of households to 
build an accurate picture of income and consumption patterns. Whilst repeated visits are 
technically desirable, panel data collection is often prohibitively expensive and time 
consuming, constraints that are applicable to this study.  
 
Another source of inaccuracy can come from inconsistent measurement units. Quantities of 
good harvested from PA are often assessed in units such as headloads, pieces, tins, buckets, 
and sacs which are obviously imprecise and not standardised. This creates problems for the 
enumerators in data collection and the analyst in estimation of values, especially where 
collected units are different from units of sale. One means of resolving this issue relies on 
enumerator’s ingenuity in converting the volume or mass of a non standard unit in to a 
standardized one e.g. weighing the mass of product in a local tin or sac to estimate kg. 
 
Unfortunately enumerator bias can also cause significant error in the data. A key source of 
enumerator bias can be by the use of questions that lead to a particular answer e.g. questions 
are phrased to elicit a certain type of response. To control for enumerator bias, the survey 
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questionnaire was rigorously screened for leading questions, in order to make the language as 
neutral as possible. In addition enumerators went through a training program to clearly 
explain and test how they went about administering the survey. Respondent bias is more 
difficult to control for. Either a respondent may wish to conceal information e.g. cautiousness 
about revealing illegal activities, or for income tax purposes, or to misinform in the 
expectation of being able to receive benefits from rural development projects.  
 
To further control for bias a clear explanation of the purpose and objective of the survey must 
be delivered to each household before the interview. In addition discrete observations by 
enumerators of each household’s situation on approaching the home can help to provide 
objectivity on the results of a household interview. If enumerators clearly see discrepancies 
between what was reported and what could be observed then polite but probing questions can 
be made to elicit a realistic response e.g. if hunting apparatus is evident in the home and the 
respondent did not acknowledge hunting in the forest, the enumerator can politely ask who the 
hunting equipment actually belongs to.  
 
More difficult to control for is respondent strategic bias e.g. deliberately giving misleading 
answers in the hope of some beneficial outcome for the household or community. For 
example if a new development or poverty alleviation project is expected to come to the area, 
community members may underreport their income levels in order to create a picture far 





3.3 Estimating the local financial direct use values of protected 
areas in Uganda 
The objectives of the household survey described below are to quantify the contribution of 
forest products to living standards and qualify the role of forest products in living standards 
security and in the reduction of household vulnerability and to assess the contribution of 
quantitative and qualitative social and economic factors as drivers of forest use.  Drawing 
from the ICDP literature the key hypothesis to be tested is that increasing livings standards 
reduces use of protected areas. With a more detailed understanding of site specific issues over 
a range of sites it may be possible to draw some generalised conclusions about best practices 
to reduce unsustainable and illegal use of forest protected area resources. 
 
The terminology used to describe the interactions between people and forests can sometimes 
be confusing, arising from the integration of sometimes overlapping theoretical and 
conceptual approaches from rural sociology and economics.  It is important for a clear 
understanding what is meant by the four key terms often referred to in this chapter, namely 
livelihoods, living standards, forest use and dependency. 
 
A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (physical and social resources) and activities 
required for a means of living (Chambers & Conway 1992). The term ‘livelihood’ in the 
context of rural development in less developed countries was further developed conceptually 
during the 1990’s and is interwoven with concepts of sustainability in the development of  the 
sustainable livelihood s framework (Ashley & Carney 1999). The framework describes not 
only the resource base for a household (stocks of capital assets and flows of benefits), but also 
the institutional, organisational and environmental context in which they are found and the 
inter linkages and feedback loops influencing the choices they make and strategies for 
survival.   
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Living standards is a technical terms focusing on the measurement of the level of household 
economic welfare, which is typically a  measure of per capita household real income or 
consumption in  a given time period e.g. per year (Deaton 1998). Income is clearly an 
important part of a household’s livelihood and their measurement provides us with a means of 
estimating current living standards, tracking change over time and assessing the relative 
contribution of different resources to household income. This can also allow us to assess the 
impacts of changes in policy, institutional and organisational processes on different sections 
of society. Living standards then refer to the measurement of certain factors and functions, but 
are not a comprehensive measure, of a livelihood. 
 
In this chapter we will also discuss forest use and dependency issues. Forest use is a measure 
of household income from forest goods as a component of living standards. Forest 
dependency is a relative assessment of how loss of the forest income might affect household 
living standards due to the lack of alternative income generating or livelihood strategies 
(Masozera & Alvalapati 2004). Whilst there is currently no universally accepted definition of 
‘dependence’,  in this context the notion of ‘separability’ from the development economics 
literature is useful in understanding what is meant (Ellis 1998; Kay et al. 2000).  
‘Separability’ is when a households production and consumption decisions are discretely 
divisible (Singh et al. 1985; Vakis et al. 2004). This implies that production decisions are first 
seen through to their conclusion and the income is then independently committed to 
consumption decisions.  
 
For peasant farming households only partially integrated into the market economy, 
consumption and production decisions are often non-separable e.g. when the production 
decision are driven by the immediate consumption needs in subsistence agricultural 
production. Non-separability also relates to the concept of ‘bounded rationality’ (Ellis 1993) 
that conspire to keep peasant households livelihoods strategies constrained within a known set 
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of actions or responses to maintain their living standards (information asymmetries). This 
occurs when the household faces contextual constraints such as institutional or market failure 
resulting in the perceived misallocation of resource.  Such constraints create externalities such 
as unsustainable resource use which might also result in the creation of poverty traps. Thus 
dependence is characterised by the inability of rural households to adopt novel strategies to 
change their behaviour towards the national park without incurring a loss to their living 
standards. 
3.3.1 Market price studies on the direct use of protected area goods 
The market price method and the collection of household economic survey data is hardly a 
new phenomenon. For example Deaton (1997) illustrates that the National Sample Survey 
Organization of India has been collecting such data regularly since the 1940’s, as indeed have 
many other countries. Household surveys provide a rich source of economic data on economic 
behaviour (Campbell & Luckert 2002; Deaton 1998) but it is only relatively recently that the 
methods have been applied to specifically examine the links between poverty and the use and 
management of environmental resources such as protected areas and natural forests (Campbell 
& Luckert 2002; Godoy et al. 1995; Sander 2004; Vedeld et al. 2004). 
 
The market price method has been applied in many situations to value the direct use of forests 
by households living near them. Early studies such as Peters et al. (1989) analysed alternative 
forest uses in Mishana, Rio Nanay, Peru. They compared the financial benefits of maximum 
sustainable extraction of wild fruits and latex to the potential returns from forest conversion 
for timber. Similarly Godoy and Feaw (1989) presents a financial and economic CBA of 
smallholder rattan cultivation in Kalimantan, Indonesia, showing that economic returns to 
rattan production are less than financial (market) returns and also discuss per hectare returns 
to rattan compared with rubber, rice and seasonal tropical fruit. Campbell et al (1997) also 
value the local level benefits from savannah woodland in Zimbabwe. 
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Other studies have used the approach to evaluate the contribution of forests products in 
general to living standards through subsistence and commercial uses. Godoy et al (2002a) 
examined local financial benefits from the market price method to evaluate the contribution of 
NTFP to local living standards and poverty alleviation and Shackelton et al (1999; 2002) 
assessed the use patterns and values of savannah resources in rural South Africa. Other studies 
have taken a narrower perspective targeting a few specific forest products such as mushrooms 
(van Dijik et al. 2003) or medicinal plants (Balick & Mendelshon 1992; Brown 1992).  
 
Moving on from these important descriptive studies of how much local people use these 
resources are studies that also examine relationships between the levels of forest use and other 
social and economic factors to understand dependency. Cavendish (1999a, 1999b) examines 
the importance of the way in which multifarious environmental goods interact with the 
household’s other production and consumption decisions to characterize poverty-environment 
relationships in Zimbabwe. The study demonstrates that both environmental demands and 
environmental supplies are affected by a number of different factors, concluding that 
simplistic conceptions of the link between rural households and the environment will be quite 
wrong. Godoy et al (1995) investigated income effects on extraction of forest products as 
determinants of forest use as did (Masozera & Alvalapati 2004) in Rwanda.  Sander (2004) 
conducted a thorough and comprehensive study of forest values and dependency in 
Madagascar. The key message from these studies is that understanding the dependency issue 
is critical in designing effective community conservation programs. 
 
Vedeld at al (2004) also make a profound contribution to our knowledge in a meta analysis of 
several studies based on market price method data, highlighting the poverty environment 
relationship and determinants of use of environmental resources. Interestingly they illustrate 
the variability of environmental incomes between income groups, as well as demonstrating 
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great variability in use between sites. This highlights the site specific, uniqueness and 
complexity of such relationships. This is a significant indication that market price method 
studies, whilst very useful in understating local level issues related to forest use are, limited in 
terms of being able to make generalized conclusions regarding what management approaches 
might actually work in other contexts. In addition, few of these studies have gone further to 
understand how forest use compares to other land use options. A critical issue in 
consideration in the local or national conservation versus conversion might be an assessment 
of the opportunity cost of land use options, whilst not the principal focus of this chapter such 
an analysis is undertaken in chapter 6 of this thesis. Thus the key objectives of this chapter  
are to: 
 Gather quantitative economic data on household consumption of timber and non-
timber forest products 
 Assess the contribution of protected area goods to general living standards. 
 Qualify the role of forest products in livelihoods security and in the reduction of 
household vulnerability 
 Apply the findings to protected area management strategies 
3.3.2 Survey Sites 
Four forest sites were surveyed, representing the four predominant forest types in Uganda 
described in the Table 3.1 below. Understanding the values associated with different forest 
types can assist in developing more accurate estimate about the value of Uganda's forests to 
the economy. From recent forest biomass studies conducted by the Forest Department (Drichi 







Table 3.1. Sites and description of survey areas 
Forest Site Classification Area (ha) 
 
Status 
Budongo Medium Altitude THF 79,300a Forest Reserve11 
South of Bugoma THF on private land 128,804b Private Forest 
Kasagala Savannah Woodland 10,105 Forest Reserve 
Rwenzori Afromontane Forest 97,380 National Park12 
aTotal area of Central Forest Reserve (CFR) but only 42,800ha is THF 
bArea of THF in surrounding forest – not the area of Bugoma CFR itself  
THF=Tropical High Forest 
The target population was all forest users in a focal area.  We also assumed that beyond a 
certain distance from the forest in question households were unlikely to use it directly: for the 
purposes of this study we sampled within parishes (LCII) that bordered the forest.  Normally 
the furthest most point of a parish boundary was not more than 5km from the edge of the 
forest, thus this made a convenient boundary for the sample frame. 
3.3.3 Survey Design 
A structured household interview was used for eliciting socio-economic data on local forest 
values in this study. The survey was administered according to a multi-stage stratified random 
sample over a range of forest and household types in Uganda. The sample was organized into 
lists of parishes that directly bordered the case study forests, subdivided into villages within 
the parish, households within the village and households by wealth group.   
 
 A structured survey questionnaire (Appendix 1) was developed to obtain quantitative and 
qualitative data on the above-mentioned issues. This relied on people's own perceptions and 
reported values about household wealth and net income in their local context. Data were 
collected from November 2003 to January 2004. Financial information was collected in 
                                                 
11 A forest reserve is a protected area designation for the management forests, usually with strict use limitations 
such as controlled extraction of commercial trees. The land must be managed as a stand of forest e.g. cannot be 
converted to agricultural land, forest reserves are controlled by the Ugandan, National Forest Authority.  
12 A national park is a protected area designation primarily focused on wildlife and biodiversity conservation 
with strict normally non-extractive use policy, large expanses of forest and woodland are found within the 
network of Uganda’s national parks. National parks are under the control of the Uganda Wildlife Authority. 
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Ugandan shillings, but is presented here in United States Dollar equivalents for ease of 
reference based on an exchange rate of 1800 Ugandan Shillings to the US Dollar. 
 
Draft questionnaires were prepared in advance of an enumerator-training workshop. The 
method, background theory and questionnaires to be employed were reviewed with 
enumerators. Some role-playing exercises were used to familiarize the enumerators with the 
survey tools. A pre test was made on volunteers from the local rural community around the 
workshop site, to further test for problems with language and comprehension. This resulted in 
a questionnaire survey ready for further pre-testing. Further extensive pre-testing took place at 
Budongo Forest, Masindi District. This allowed enumerators to acquire additional familiarity 
with the survey tools as well as the chance to apply and review the method. As a result, 
additional changes were incorporated into the survey questionnaire. These addressed issues to 
do with enumerator ambiguity or poor comprehension of the questions and to address issues 
to do with respondent comprehension of questions. 
 
The data collected included household demography, capital assets, qualitative data about 
seasonal household needs and coping strategies and detailed household income and 
expenditure information. Whilst a participatory wealth ranking approach was used to identify 
the community wealth strata for the sample survey, due to time and resource constraints it was 
not possible to utilize participatory methods to define other qualitative issues to do with forest 
use and socio-economic conditions. Such techniques could have enabled the study to provide 
richer data on access and resource use, but given the financial constraints and the focus on 
quantitative household income data we decided not to attempt such enquiries at the time.  
Respondents were asked to provide price information about goods in the survey, as in general 
all the goods reported were traded in the locality, market prices could be established. 
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Once communities were selected, usually a visit was made in advance to alert the relevant 
authorities to the survey team’s arrival and to describe the process. Thus community members 
were alerted in advance to the possibility of being interviewed. On the day of the survey the 
team would arrive early in the morning or the evening before. After the wealth ranking 
exercise was conducted with the village elders, enumerators would then take a local guide to 
go in search of the randomly selected households. Household interviews were conducted with 
whoever was present or able to be interviewed in the home at the time (usually the household 
head or number two with other members present). If an interview was not possible an 
arrangement was made to return at a more suitable time, or failing that another household was 
selected at random from the list. Each household was given a gift of soap or tea (value not 
more than $1US) to thank them for their participation. Importantly respondents were ensured 
complete anonymity and no data that could identify the household was collected (names, 
exact locations etc.). 
 
In order to minimize strategic bias a concise briefing of the survey objectives was delivered to 
each respondent. In our case it was clear that this was policy level research, not directly 
related to any local level intervention.  In general therefore we feel that the data under 
estimates household income and consumption, because of recall problems, but it is difficult to 
know by how much. However we feel that any underestimation is probably evenly spread 
across all the household income data collected, therefore there will be little effect on the 
trends and patterns observed. Fortunately the seasons prior and during our data collection 
were not considered unusual. The data collection period corresponded with the end of the 
short rainy season and the beginning of the short dry season which continues until 
February/March. This corresponds to a period when food is relatively abundant, but the 
advent of Christmas and New Year holidays and festivities may put additional burdens on 
household’s incomes. The relative abundance of food may put a downward bias on the use of 
PA resources, with an upward bias for a short period around the middle of December to mid 
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January. The two effects may have the effect of cancelling one another out therefore results 
should be fairly representative of the true picture. 
3.3.4 Analyses 
A useful approach to the analysis of how forests contribute to living standards is through the 
analysis of the relative importance of forests to different income groups. This focus is useful 
in understanding issues of managing forests requires us to understand whether access to forest 
resources is disproportionately important to living standards amongst poorer households.   
 
Wealth groups were identified as a means of stratifying the community level sample. In each 
community in a participatory wealth ranking exercise13 was conducted with community 
leaders. The wealth ranking exercise involved a discussion of wealth issues and the local 
indicators of wealth and the establishment of a set of indicators for three wealth categories 
(poor, average and wealthy). The elders were then asked to distribute households amongst the 
wealth categories. Within a village and within wealth groups we made selections by using a 
random number table, in order to select 12 parishes (Local Council II or LCII), then 1 village 
(LCI) from each parish and subsequently five households from the three categories of wealth 
group.  
 
Wealth is a composite measure of a households physical resources, it encompasses income, 
savings,  land, livestock, and other capital assets such as bicycles, radios, cars, farm 
equipment and other means of production.  It is a relative concept as what constitutes a 
wealthy household in one community may be different in another. At the level of a village or 
perhaps even a parish it provides a useful assessment for stratifying a sample, but is limited in 
                                                 
13 Wealth ranking is a tool to identify different wealth strata of a community f or the purposes of sampling. Key 
informants such as the village leaders and women’s groups’ representatives were convened to brainstorm about 
local perceptions of wealth. They were then asked to discuss a typical example of the spectrum of wealth groups 
found in their community to identify their assets and resources i.e type of dwelling, number so livestock of 
different types etc. size of land holding. Using the list of households available in each village from the local 
government representatives, key informant were then asked to allocate all of the households under one of the 
wealth categories. This formed the stratified sample list at the village level from which households were chosen 
at random. 
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terms of quantitative analysis were an absolute measure that can be used to compare between 
households is needed.  
 
In this study in the final analysis households are disaggregated according to income quartiles. 
However it is difficult to identify income groups initially from within the villages, even with 
the use of key informants hence the need for the wealth ranking exercise described earlier. 
Once the household income data was obtained comparisons on the basis of income groups 
(income quartiles) was possible. The measure of income used in this study comprises goods 
sold, the prevailing market value of own-produced goods consumed in the home, monetary, 
non-monetary transfers into the household account, and income from wage labour in cash or 
the value of goods in kind. The measure of income used in this study is net of input costs, 
although little or no use of agricultural inputs (variable costs) or wage labour was evident.  
Where inputs in to the agricultural, livestock or other enterprises were recorded these were 
deducted from the total income for that activity or groups of activities.  As a stratified random 
sample of households around each site was used, representative of all the probable users of 
the forest resource, no special treatment of one off or infrequent use of forest resources was 
required, on the assumption that the sample would be representative of the overall annual 
similar uses of forest goods by the population thus no particular bias would be introduced as a 
result. 
 
In this study  following (Ellis 1993) own labour in the peasant farming system is  assumed to 
have a zero value, this is because the opportunity cost of labour in general is either zero or 
extremely low. The seasonal nature of farm work in a peasant farming system shows that 
there are work peaks and troughs. During planting, or harvesting periods the opportunity cost 
of labour can be very high as household labour resources are stretched to capacity to complete 
activities within a limited period of time (Upton 1987). At other times of year there may be a 
surplus of labour. With a finite amount of household labour resources the only option to 
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increase the labour requirements would be to hire workers. However given that on a regional 
scale every other peasant farming household will also be facing the same acute labour 
constraint, little labour is available even if the means to pay for it were obtainable.  Thus there 
is little scope to vary farm labour requirements according to work needs.  The result is that the 
marginal product of labour varies from season to season where an extra unit of labour in the 
seasonal work peaks would tiled a high return in terms of total yield and nothing in the 
seasonal troughs.  Thus there is no single meaningful value for the marginal product or 
opportunity cost of household labour (Byerlee et al. 1976; Upton 1987). 
 
A meta analysis of environmental incomes from forest resources, by Vedeld et al. (2004), 
show that 56% of studies in the analysis did not include labour costs whilst estimating forest 
environmental income. This implies an overestimation of the economic rent derived from it. 
However when they included labour costs and checked for any systematic differences 
between studies that included labour costs and those that did not, they found no significant 
differences in either absolute income or relative measures. This implies that the assumption 
that the opportunity cost of labour is low or zero as discussed previously is reasonable. 
However the Vedeld et al. (2004) did also indicate that the fact that labour costs were 
included in some studies might point toward a more rigorous effort in identifying and valuing 
all sources of income, thus estimates in such studies may have been higher, explaining the 
lack of significant difference between cases. At best then the marginal value of labour is very 
low, so the treatment of these costs as zero is rational in this case.  
 
Income can also be a relative concept depending on unit of analysis. A household that earns a 
$1000 per annum and has 5 members has a higher income on a per capita basis than a 
household that earns a $1000 per annum and has 10 members. However, a larger household 
enjoys better economies of scale than smaller households with more labour available for 
different activities. In addition the composition of a household in terms of age and sex 
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structure affects levels of production and consumption of the household as a unit of analysis 
(Campbell & Luckert 2002; Deaton 1998) . In order to make valid comparisons in absolute 
terms across households an “adjusted net household income” was therefore used in this study, 
to reduce bias in inter-household comparisons of income.  The weakness of this approach lies 
in a critique of the validity of the coefficients in different national settings as they are based 
on a study conducted in Sri Lanka (Campbell et al. 2002). However the biases created in the 
analysis by the use of such scaling will be considerably less than using either unadjusted 
figures or per capita income (Lanjouw & Ravallion 1995). 
 
Adjusted net income was calculated by dividing the total net income by a factor comprised of 
two coefficients of adult equivalency and economy of scale (Table 3.2), to give an adjusted 
equivalent unit (AEU) derived from World Health Organization methodology reported in 
Campbell & Luckert, (2002). A household’s AEU was calculated according to the following 
procedure. A coefficient of a standard adult equivalent unit is awarded to each household 
member. The sum of the coefficients gives a standardised measure of household size. Each 
household was scored on its number of occupants and given a coefficient of economy of 
scale. The absolute income (net value) is then divided by the AEU coefficients to give the 
income per AEU and the product then multiplied by the economy of scale coefficient 
(referred to as an adjusted value)14. This helps to account for biases otherwise introduced if 
comparisons are made on the basis of unadjusted income. 
                                                 
14 Example AEU calculation: If a households had 3 members, an adult female age 19-59 and adult male aged 18-
59 and an infant aged 3-4 years their combined value of their AEU would be  
0.88+1.00+0.48=2.36 adult equivalents. If the household had $1000 total annual income then their income per 
AEU would be 1000/2.36=$423.73 per AEU. This value is then multiplied by the economy of scale co=efficient 
fro a houhold fo 3 people ($423.73*0.946) to give the AEU/ES value $400. 
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Table 3.2 Coefficients for adult equivalence and household economies for scale calculations 
(Adapted from Cambell and Luckert 2002) 
 
Household economy scale 











        
Effectively the adjusted income value gives a figure that depicts household income on the 
basis of a standard adult unit. Therefore in the results section inter household comparisons of 
income and consumption are conducted using income quartiles based on the adjusted total 
income figures.  
3.4 Results 
A total of six hundred and ninety-six households were interviewed amongst the four survey 
sites in 70 LC1 (an LC1 is equivalent to a village and is an administrative unit used in 
Uganda). The number of LC1s sampled around each area varied slightly because of time 
constraints and access issues. It was especially problematic around the Rwenzori massif 
where communities were often extremely remote requiring a lengthy drive to a drop off point 
with the team continuing for several hours on foot to the LC1 centre. The number of 
households interviewed in each LC1 also varied slightly because of time and distance 
constraints, especially where households in an LC1 were diffuse over a wide area. Importantly 
the data set did not fit a normal distribution according to absolute and adjusted income 
measures, being skewed towards low income. Therefore, non-parametric tests are used in the 
results noted below. 
Adult equivalent scale 






11-12 0.80 0.88 
13-14 1.00 1.00 
15-18 1.20 1.00 
19-59 1.00 0.88 
  60+ 0.88 0.72 
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3.4.1 What is the contribution of forests to household income? 
As income data does not fit a normal distribution the Kruskal-Wallace test was used to 
analyze ranked sample means. Adjusted household income showed no significant differences 
between forests (Table 3). However mean total incomes were significantly different between 
Budongo and the Rwenzori, where the Rwenzori had the highest household income (X2= 
17.3, d.f. = 3, p = 0.001). 
 
Table 3.3. Mean absolute and adjusted household income by forest site and mean % forest 
income as a share of total income. 




















784 66 219 21 8.4 
Bugoma (175) 1091 178 313 49 16.3 
Kasagala 
(151) 
953 101 294 39 17.0 
Rwenzori 
(159) 
1189 462 281 107 38.8 
All (639) 1009 204 278 38 20.2 
 
Households in the Rwenzori had significantly higher levels of absolute income from the forest 
as well as the proportion of income derived from the forest than all other sites (Chi Sq = 31.52 
d.f.=3, p<0.01). Bearing in mind that comparisons of income between households should be 
made using the adjusted income figures, Households in Bugoma had significantly higher 
income than other sites (Chi Sq = 17.45, d.f. =3, p<0.01). Households around Budongo 
showed lowest forest incomes in absolute and proportional terms.  
3.4.2 Do living standards affect who uses the forest? 
A key assumption in ICDP is that it is the households with the lowest living standards are 
most likely to be highest users of forest resources and that improving living standards will in 
some way reduce use of forest resources in protected areas. An OLS regression was used to 
analyze the relationship between the dependant variable AFI (adjusted total annual forest 
income) and the independent variable ATI (adjusted total annual income). Locational 
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dummies were included to account for the influence of the 4 different sites on the results. AFI 
data were found to be heteroskedastic (White- χ2=2701.98, d.f.=4, p<0.001) with the level of 
AFI varying markedly as ATI increased. Therefore a weighted least squares model was 
estimated using ATI (adjusted total income) as the weighting variable. The locational 
dummies showed no significant difference from the constant so were subsequently omitted 
from the model. That the data are heteroskedastic is probably a natural phenomenon.  
Importantly it is indicative of a level of choice between forest use at higher income levels and 
lack of choice or dependency at lower income levels.    
 
From the weighted least squares estimate there was a significant relationship between ATI 
and AFI, showing that as ATI increases so AFI increases (R2=0.180, t=11.821, p<0.01,  = 
0.43) the slope of the relationship was close to unity, which means that for every unit change 
in ATI there is a corresponding unit change in AFI.  The low R2 value and high degree of 
scatter, shows that ATI may not be the clearest single determinant of which households use 
the forest.  According to expectations in the literature it might be expected that AFI would 
decrease as ATI increased. This finding is an important result and shows that we cannot 
assume that the poorest (in income terms) households in a community are those most likely to 
be using forest resources. Thus by extension, improving living standards (ceteris paribus) will 
not reduce the level of consumption of forest products. This evidence also shows that without 
the current access that households have to forests, it is likely that many would become 
significantly poorer should there be no change in other aspects of their income.  
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3.4.3 How much is the forest used by local households? 
It is also of interest to understand how the use of forest products is broken down between cash 
income and consumption (Table 3.4).  
 
Table 3.4. Household income from forests separated into goods sold and goods consumed 
Forest (n) Mean value of 






from the forest  
US$ p.a. 
Value of goods 
consumed as % of 
mean forest 
income 
Budongo (154) 21.74 44.19 65.93 67.0 
Bugoma (175) 31.63 146.18 177.81 82.2 
Kasagala (151) 45.71 55.69 101.40 54.9 
Rwenzori (159) 85.19 318.76 403.95 78.9 
All forests (639) 46.06 142.66 188.72 75.6 
 
In absolute terms there was a significant difference (ANOVA – F=4.2, d.f. = 3, 634, p<0.05) 
between the mean values of forest goods sold between forests with Rwenzori and Kasagala 
showing the highest averages. In terms of the value of forest goods consumed in the 
household Rwenzori was significantly higher than all other forests surveyed (ANOVA – 
F=18.9, d.f. =3, 634, p<0.05). 
 
When considering the value of forest goods consumed as a proportion of the total income 
from the forest, it can be seen that households in Kasagala consume proportionately less of 
the value of forest products in the home (ANOVA – F=38.5, d.f. = 3, 634, p<0.05). It may 
also illustrate that because Kasagala is savannah woodland, there is substantially less woody 
biomass generally, and less diversity of species, (wildlife, foods and craft materials) as 
compared with THF, which can be consumed in the household.  Typically from savannah 
woodland, the most important product is charcoal and in the villages people sell it rather than 
use it, preferring to use firewood instead.   
 
A break down of mean value of household income from non-timber forest products (NTFP) 
and timber products was also made (Table 3.5). NTFP in this study are any goods harvested 
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from the forest not comprised of woody biomass. Items such as wild fruits and vegetables, 
bushmeat and vegetation for artesian handicrafts are some examples of NTFP.  
 
Table 3.5. Sources of forest revenue by type 






Timber value as a % of mean 
forest income 
Budongo (154) 30.75 27.00 40.9 
Bugoma (175) 65.12 109.45 61.6 
Kasagala (151) 26.21 61.45 60.6
Rwenzori (159) 287.97 168.35 41. 
All forests (639) 97.94 89.61 47.5 
* Firewood and charcoal included under timber income 
Analysis of the mean NTFP incomes showed that households in the Rwenzori had the highest 
income from the forest derived from NTFP compared with the other forests and this 
difference was significant (ANOVA – F= 15.3, d.f. = 3, 695, p<0.05 – Tukey HSD test). In 
terms of timber values, households around Rwenzori also derived the highest mean incomes, 
with Rwenzori being significantly different from other forests (ANOVA - F= 8.741, d.f. = 3, 
695, p<0.05 – Tukey HSD test). It might have been expected that Budongo Forest, the main 
timber forest in Uganda, would have had high income values for local communities from 
timber, but the results show the lowest income values for this forest from timber. This may be 
due to a number of reasons such as good enforcement of regulations to halt illegal timber 
harvesting in the forest or reluctance to admit to illegal harvesting of timber given current law 
enforcement efforts. In addition, timber harvesting using hired labour (pit sawyers15) from 
outside the local area may bias reported timber values. Pit sawyers are often employed from 
outside the region because they work harder and then return to their home areas having 
completed the job. The local community is usually used as porters only. As such pit sawyers 
are transient members of local communities and income derived from this activity does not 
accrue locally and may not be accurately represented in the sample 
 
                                                 
15 Pit sawyers are manual labourers cutting trees and sawing timbers by hand. The term comes from the method 
of hand sawing timbers from large sections of tree trunks. A wooden trestle is erected and a pit is dug below, 
whereupon the section of tree to be sawn into timbers is levered on to the trestle. Two men using a double 
handed long wood saw, one on top of the trunk and one below in the pit then manually saw lengths of timbers 
from a section of tree trunk. 
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Table 3.6 Value of forest product categories as a proportion of total income value of forest 
products consumed by survey site.  
Forest Non Wood 
Products a 
% of total value 
Wood 
Productsb 




% of total value 
Large Wild 
Animalsd 




% of total value 
Budongo 12.07 69.81 18.12 8.81 9.30 
Bugoma 33.19 60.28 6.53 0.98 5.55 
Kasagala 10.75 82.08 7.17 1.46 5.71 
Rwenzori 11.97 29.96 58.07 39.97 19.10 
 aNTFP not including wild animals and birds; bTimber, firewood, charcoal; cWild animals and birds; dDuiker, 
small antelopes and smaller game such as rats, bush pigs ; eElephant, buffalo and larger antelopes 
 
Table 3.6 shows the share that the different categories of forest products have of the total 
value of forest products consumed. More of the total income value comes from NTFP than 
timber products. In the Rwenzori bushmeat contributes the largest proportion of the NTFP 
value and this may be because of the link to DRC where bush meat including primate meat is 
a popular food (Plumptre et al, 2004). Normally when wildlife is abundant, the large wild 
animals represent a higher gain per unit effort than smaller animals and are thus a preferred 
target for hunters. Interestingly in Budongo, Kasagala and Bugoma, the proportionate value of 
small wild animals consumed is higher than Rwwenzori. This could be an indicator that large 
wild animal densities in these sites may be low, resulting in lower catch rates or effort being 
switched to other prey that is easier to catch and is a supply side constraint rather than a 
demand constraint related to bushmeat consumption.  I light of the earlier evidence presented 
that there was no significant difference between sites in the level of ATI determining AFI, 
supply constraint variations between sites of all other forest products this is probably not a 
general condition affecting AFI. Also anecdotal evidence from around the sites shows people 
have a preference for domestic (beef, goat and poultry) rather than game meat.  
3.4.4 How is forest income distributed? 
As noted above, the relationship between forest use and household wealth is important in 
understanding the links between forest conservation and rural development. The pooled 
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sample was divided into income quartiles based on the adjusted total income figures (Table 
3.7). A Kruskal-Wallace test was used to define any significant difference between income 
groups. 
Table 3.7 Income categories and proportionate shares by income group. 
 Quartile (n=639) (S.E below in parenthasis) 
Income Variable 1.Lowest 25% 2. 25 to 50% 3. 50 to 75 % 4. Top 25% 
Adjusted mean total income (ATI) 









Adjusted mean forest income (AFI) 









% Adjusted Forest Income (Share of 
total income) 









ATI and AFI increased as we move from lowest to top quartile reiterating earlier findings 
from the weighted regression of AFI vs. ATI. In the case of proportion of total income from 
the forest the lowest and upper quartile are seen to derive 18.8 and 22 % of total income 
respectively from the forest; however there was no statistically significant difference between 
wealth groups. 
 
In order to understand how wealth groups utilise their AFI an analysis of the mean and 
proportion of AFI consumed in the home was conducted (Table 3.8) 
Table 3.8. AFI consumption by income group 
 Quartile
Income Variable 1. Lowest 
25% 
2. 25 to 50% 3. 50 to 75 % 4. Top 25% 
Mean AFI consumed in the 
home($) 












% of AFI consumed in the home ( 
share of FI)  













An ordinary linear regression of AFI against the proportion of AFI consumed in the home 
showed a positive but very weak relationship (R2=0.008, d.f.=639, F=4.853, p<0.05). The 
forest income consumption results are surprising as it is often assumed that at low income 
levels forest income activities are for subsistence and at higher levels for cash; after all there 
are surely limits to how much firewood, NTFP etc can be consumed. These results clearly 
show in proportional terms that there is little difference regarding the importance of AFI 
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consumption between wealth groups, they are possibly symptomatic of the general level of 
poverty, in consumption terms, of the entire population living adjacent to the forest in all of 
the sites. 
3.4.5 What determines forest income? 
Following the earlier regression of AFI vs ATI to control for heteroskedacticity, a weighted 
least squares model was used to analyze the impacts of income and other social and economic 
and social variables on forest income (Deaton 1997; Woolridge 2002). The dependent 
variable AFI was tested against a number of other variables shown in Table 3.9 below.  
Variables were chosen that reflect what we considered to be the main socio-economic and 
spatial factors that might determine households use of the forest. The significant factors were 
ATI, value of capital assets (motorcycles, bicycles, radios etc) and value of livestock assets 
(cows, goats, poultry) (Table 3.9).  The fit of the model was low, but significant. 
Table 3.9 WLS analyses – determinants of net annual total forest income 
Variable  t value Significance 
Constant 60.92 4.11 <0.001 
Adjusted total income  0.6 *10-5 7.519 <0.001 
Value of capital assets -0.19*10-4 -3.163 <0.01 
Value of livestock assets -0.24*10-4 -3.119 <0.01 
Distance from the forest -0.13*10-3 -0.001 Not significant 
Model Summary, R2=0.371, n=639, Likelihood ratio test –χ2=64.94, d.f.=4, p<0.001 
Distance from the Forest 
Proximity to the forest was not a significant determinant of forest use. This result is perhaps 
not unusual as the sample population for the study was taken to be all probable forest users so 
it might be unlikely to expect high variance in forest use between households in the sample.  
However additional exploration of the data did show that ATI was significantly and positively 
related to distance from the forest16, although the very low r2 value showed a high degree of 
scatter. For some households at least being further from the forest improved the likelihood of 
having improved living standards. 
 
                                                 
16 Weighted least squares - =0.42, t-value=1.98, p<0.05,  R2=0.006, Likelihood Ratio- χ2=3.92, d.f.=1, 
p<0.001) 
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Adjusted total income  
As demonstrated earlier a significant positive relationship was shown between AFI and ATI. 
An interesting observation was that mean household occupants between income quartiles 
showed that high income quartiles had significantly higher numbers of total household 
occupants than low income households (ANOVA – F=28.4, d.f. = 2, 634, p<0.05 – Tukey 
HSD).  Since the adjusted measures which effectively control for differences in household 
size it was not appropriate to include a variable for number of household occupants as this 
might cause unnecessary bias in the model e.g. auto correlation). This factor indicates that 
there is this additional labour in higher income households to exploit forest resources.  
 
Value of livestock assets 
Values of livestock assets were calculated using prevailing market prices. There was a 
significant negative relationship between the value of capital assets and AFI. A high livestock 
asset value is indicative of households being engaged in an alternative to forest based income 
generating activities. As such it is a useful indicator of dependence on forest resources. 
Higher household livestock asset values are also an indicator of wealth.   
 
Value of capital assets 
A measure of the value of capital assets such as fixed (bicycles, radios etc.) and livestock was 
made for each household. This was calculated by using the prevailing market price for the 
assets listed by each household and summing the values. There was a clear negative 
relationship between the value of capital assets and AFI. A high capital asset value is 
indicative of households being engaged in alternative income generating activities, such as 
agriculture and animal husbandry. As such it is a useful indicator of dependence on forest 
resources. Higher household capital asset values are also an indicator of wealth.   
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3.4.6 What is the seasonal importance of forest use? 
The survey also investigated seasonal aspects regarding forest use. Respondents were asked 
questions about which months they used the forest most, which months they needed to 
purchase food, and which months they needed cash most. A positive correlation was found 
between the months when the forests were used most and the months in which food was most 
scarce (Spearmann r=0.1, p<0.05). In addition a positive correlation was found between the 
months when forests were used most and the months in which cash was most required 
(Spearmann r=0.2, p<0.05). 
 
The months of most frequent forest use overall were December through to March, which not 
surprisingly correspond with the long dry season over much of Uganda and a period often 
termed in socio economic literature as the 'hungry gap', where harvests or food stocks have 
run out and it will be some time before the next harvest (Upton, 1987). The above correlations 
provide some evidence in aggregate that forests do play a role in reducing vulnerability and 
providing a buffer against seasonal shocks.   
3.5 Discussion: Forests and Their Role in Living Standards  
3.5.1 Income, wealth and forest use 
Many households that live near forests benefit from their direct use. If rules governing access 
or use of the protected forests were effectively enforced, it is clear that an ‘income gap' would 
created, in terms of income and consumption, to maintain a households current level of 
welfare. As ATI increases so does AFI but interestingly there was no significant difference in 
the proportion of AFI consumed in the home between income groups.  This means that meant 
that as AFI increases amongst income groups so the adjusted value of forest goods consumed 
per AEU also rises. 
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3.5.2 Household Labour and Forest Use 
The survey showed that higher income households, as measured by the AEU, tended to have 
higher numbers of total occupants. Assuming no differences in fertility or investment costs of 
having children, we can extend this observation to conclude that higher income  households 
will have a relatively higher level of household labour available than poorer households and 
are thus able to generate more income.  It is possible to conclude this as differences of 
composition between households was taken into account by the use of an adjusted income 
measure to make inter-household comparisons. 
 
This is an important consideration in the ability to exploit protected areas. There was a clear 
link between increased protected area use and higher numbers of household occupants. For 
relatively higher income, or larger, households it concludes that forests represent an 
opportunity for income generation, a stock of goods that allows the optimization of other 
resources. As such protected areas and unprotected environmental resources (such as forests) 
can be considered as key resource to help drive rural economic development as they assist 
rural households to generate cash and produce surpluses that improve household income.  In 
the short term, assuming that such a socio-economic trend continues, richer and typically 
larger households may in fact be able to exploit the forests more. Indeed studies from other 
countries have shown that as wealth increases so does forest use (Vedeld et al 2004).  
3.5.3 Role of Natural Forests in filling the “Hungry Gap” 
A predominant feature of the effects of seasonal change on peasant households is the “hungry 
gap” which relates to a pre-harvest shortage of food. Upton (1987) identifies the hungry gap, 
as the period when food is scarce and energy requirements are high, there also tends to be a 
high incidence of disease, exacerbating the problems many families’ face at this time. Cash 
stocks will also be lower and food prices higher. All of these factors occurring simultaneously 
reinforce the problem of the “hungry gap” for the peasant household. The survey results show 
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a clear link between seasonal stress on the household and forest use. Across all forests, 
households were more likely to use the forest at times of year when both cash and food stocks 
were low.   
3.5.4 Forest benefits and the threat to forest conservation 
What we have described is the 'benefit' (albeit mainly illegal) of forest access, but similarly it 
also represents an ‘opportunity cost’ to local living standards should there be effective 
enforcement of the regulations excluding or regulating use. Budongo, Kasagala and Rwenzori 
are all protected forests, whilst the area south of Bugoma was forest on private land. The 
protected forests currently have regulations excluding their use for extractive purposes. In 
addition the national laws of Uganda prohibit the hunting of any wildlife. Obviously such 
regulations are no impediment to local people’s use of the forest. There exists a question of 
property rights regimes and enforcement, where the property right of the state is not enforced. 
Clearly local people use forests because they can (illegal or not) and that the opportunity cost 
and risk of detection is probably lower from using forests illegally over other forms of 
economic activity. 
3.6 Implications for policy and practice 
What does this mean in terms of forest policy and management? The enforcement of policies 
that exclude local people from using the forest therefore run the risk of contributing to rural 
poverty from reduced living standards and livelihoods insecurity. We saw in table 3.3 that 
overall the mean absolute forest income was $204 per household annually, ranging form $66 
to $462 per household per annum between sites. This is the financial opportunity cost of 
conservation.  Therefore exclusionary policies should account for the need to assist in 
generating alternative income or food security options.  
 
The integrated conservation and development approach, which promotes local people into the 
sustainable management or promote diversionary activities of forests, have the potential to 
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contribute significantly to local communities’ living standards and welfare, as well as 
conserving the forest resource (Andrade, 2003; Berkes, 2004). The design of such policies are 
context specific, their success being dependent on a number of factors such as the integrity 
and viability of the resource, the size and homogeneity of the population relative to the 
sustainable stream of benefits coming from it, well defined property or user rights and 
adequate protection and monitoring of the resource. 
  
However from the survey data it was observed that that AFI increase with ATI. A large 
proportion of household AFI is also consumed within the home and this was also across 
income groups. Therefore we conclude that the planned for effects of integrated conservation 
and development activities in increasing household incomes or making households wealthier 
may only serve to increase forest exploitation under current access conditions. In terms of 
practice this study presents a challenge to the classic integrated conservation and development 
program assumption that welfare gains should reduce forest use through alternative income 
generation and substitution.  
 
The impacts of broader economic growth at a local level, in the short term, could have serious 
negative effects on the integrity of forests and the environment generally. Clearly integrated 
conservation and development approaches must work closely with enforcement and 
protection activities to ensure the desired effect. Many factors affect how people might 
change their pattern of use on environmental resources and the uptake of alternative activities. 
For example in a study from Eastern DRC, bushmeat hunting increased as households became 
wealthier because the resources (rifles and cartridges) with which to hunt became affordable 
(Brown, 2003). Interventions to improve the welfare of local communities must take into 
account the environmental impacts of their actions and plan to mitigate them from the outset 
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An important question that arises from the discussion is, to what extent should the protected 
area authority be willing to go to, or is able to go to, in order to promote alternative 
livelihoods amongst current forest users? It is clear that the principal focus for the Uganda 
National Forest Authority and Wildlife Authority is to manage the protected areas and forests 
directly. The capacity in terms of finance and expertise to become involved in broader rural 
development activities is clearly limited. Instead it calls for more integration of conservation 





Chapter 4.0:  
Valuing local direct benefits from protected areas in 
Uganda; testing a provision point mechanism to reduce 
hypothetical bias in a compensatory framework 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Communities adjacent to protected areas in Uganda normally consume or sell timber and non 
timber forest products (NTFP) sourced locally as part of their livelihood strategies. As was 
illustrated in Chapter 3, these uses often are illegal and there are many indirect social values 
from protected area such as the role that they play in maintaining living standards and 
reducing risk in the livelihoods of local users. Market price surveys are useful in eliciting 
financial values but cannot capture the full economic (financial and social) values of such 
resources. Contingent valuation methods are useful in capturing the economic value. This 
chapter uses a novel device in a contingent valuation exercise to value local direct benefits 
form protected areas under different management and access arrangements.  
 
Typically rural households around the study sites exist in a peasant/subsistence farming 
economy, with only partial integration into the market economy and consuming most of what 
they produce. Despite national legislation that precludes hunting of wild animals and, in the 
case of national parks, use of other NTFP, poor enforcement by under resourced management 
authorities means there is de facto open access, which local communities exploit. In the 
Albertine Rift region of Uganda, much of the natural forest on private lands (areas outside of 
the protected areas) has already disappeared due to conversion of forest to agricultural and 
pasture land (Dirichi et al, 2002). Protected areas provide the last remnants of the forest 
biomes that once covered this area.  Without  access to forest resources in protected areas 
many rural households may face high levels of impoverishment, thus the protected areas play 
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an important role in poverty alleviation even though much of the direct use may be illegal 
(Bush et al. 2004; Ministry of Lands Water and Environment (MLWE) 2002).  
  
There is growing recognition that conferring some form of property/use right and 
management responsibility on local communities might provide a cost effective solution for 
protected area conservation and sustainable management. Contemporary approaches to 
conservation attempt to address these issues by placing communities at the centre of 
conservation through integrated conservation and development approaches (Hulme & 
Murphee 2001a). A key aim of such approaches is to increase local human welfare (income) 
in some way, to mitigate the local need to exploit PA resources. In order to be successful with 
integrated conservation and development projects (ICDP) it is essential to quantify welfare 
levels associated with direct use of products from protected areas in order to, at a minimum, 
provide a similar level of welfare through alternative livelihoods options.  Measurement of the 
actual impacts from different scenarios is possible once ICDP schemes are in place; however 
implementing such projects without knowing the minimum level of impact necessary for 
success is a risky gambit.  
 
 
In order to understand how communities and different socio-economic groups of households 
might respond to different forms of management arrangements a better understanding of the 
economic importance of protected area within local communities is needed. This will enable 
protected area managers to understand how communities might respond to proposed 
collaborative management schemes and to evaluate the cost effectiveness of such schemes 
against more traditional forms of protected area management. In addition outcomes from 
international conventions on protected area management (e.g. Convention on Biological 
Diversity and World Parks Conference 2003) indicate that on no account should protected 
area management contribute to or exacerbate poverty. Understanding the variable effects of 
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protected area management strategies on communities as whole as well as different socio-
economic groups should therefore be of great interest to protected area managers and 
conservation policy makers. 
 
Through conducting targeted economic valuation, a protected area manager might find that 
park adjacent people are not deriving any benefits from the protected area or may have been 
forced to forego opportunities of using the land for agriculture, forestry or other uses due to 
the establishment of the protected area. The protected area manager needs to look for 
alternative management practices that enable the protected area’s neighbours to derive some 
benefit from the presence of the area without compromising its overall conservation 
objectives, thereby reducing the pressure to convert the protected area land to other uses. 
Alternatives may be to open the protected area to sustainable harvesting of forest products or 
to develop local capacity to service tourists visiting the protected area. Where different 
management approaches already exist it is useful to economically understand the variable 
economic impacts on local communities or distributional impacts within communities to be 
able to fine tune or focus community conservation activities. However financing the 
establishment of collaborative management programs is challenging, and many protected 
areas authorities do not have the finances to establish programs themselves. 
 
Use of protected area resources such as fuel wood in Uganda has increased dramatically in 
recent years (Bush et al. 2004; NEMA 2001) partly the cause is due to increasing populations 
around protected area and poor enforcement of regulations.  It appears that current levels of 
use will mean that in the future such resources will become increasingly scarce and may even 
become exhausted. In fact in the late 1990’s Uganda declared a national fuel wood deficit 
(NEMA 2001).  Also much current use is illegal and assuming effective governance, users run 
the risk of being caught and punished (prison or fines) by parks and forest authorities for 
illegal use (Bush et al, 2004). Exclusive management practices tend to create tension between 
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local people and protected area authorities as local people see the regulations as unfair 
(Hulme & Murphee 2001a; Plumptre et al. 2004). If the local community wishes to be able to 
receive direct benefits from the protected area in the future more effort must be made to 
effectively manage, regulate, or provide incentives to change local behaviour over the use of 
the protected area.   
 
The household income approach to measuring welfare from protected areas is a difficult and 
arduous endeavour in a developing country context. The basic lack of infrastructure and 
seasonal stresses and strains that rural communities face are similar for the field team. Poor 
communications along badly maintained dirt-roads which require the use of four wheel drive 
vehicles or lengthy walks from a drop off point are some of the access considerations. 
Conditions can be physically demanding due to extremes of weather such as tropical 
rainstorms and high heat.  Accommodation for field teams is often rudimentary or completely 
lacking requiring a high level of self-sufficiency on the part of the team. At times the work 
can be dangerous due to the presence of large wild animals, especially when camping. 
Generally, a survey in such conditions requires much careful planning and forethought 
regarding the basic housing and accommodation of the survey team, in addition to the 
technical details of administering the survey itself. 
 
Whilst the level of qualitative and quantitative detail obtained in a household survey is 
extremely useful, there are weaknesses in that it is difficult to capture in financial terms the 
social value of the direct benefits from protected area exploitation (Vedeld et al. 2004). Social 
values such as the ‘insurance’ value environmental resources play in mitigating risk to 
livelihoods or the cultural importance of local natural heritage have no market based value, 
yet make up a key part of the social value that resource plays in local peoples livelihoods.  
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The contingent valuation method (CVM) uses a direct approach to valuing an 
environmental good or service in that it asks people through surveys or experiments what they 
are willing to pay for the good or willing to accept for the loss of the good. Contingent 
valuation is particularly attractive because it can estimate values where markets do not exist 
or where market substitutes cannot be found, often a limitation in market price valuation 
approaches. In addition market price methods as a financial approach may not capture social 
values attributed to the resource, undervaluing the true economic value of the resource.   For 
these reasons, CVM is widely used to measure existence values, option values, indirect use 
values and non-use values. CVM is part of a broad group of survey based valuation methods 
known as ‘stated preference’ techniques, where respondents to valuation questions are asked 
to directly state their value or preference. This is in contrast to ‘revealed preference’ 
techniques where values are inferred from actual choices respondents make. Valuations are 
‘contingent’ on a hypothetical market scenario presented to respondents in a survey.   
 
Portony (1994) reports that the early underpinnings of the approach are discussed by 
(Ciriacy-Wantrup 1947) where it was observed some of the benefits of soil conservation were 
not market commodities in a conventional sense. He proposed that the way to obtain 
information on the demand for these public goods would be to simply directly ask individuals 
about their willingness to pay for successive additional quantities of the good.  Early CVM 
studies were often considered unreliable and results were often held sceptically.  This is 
perhaps not unreasonable for an emerging technique; however the knowledge and experience 
of CVM has developed considerably to date. A notable breakthrough in the confidence 
assigned to CVM to inform policy was seen in the work of Arrow et al (1993b) and their 
report to the United States National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration. Carson 
et al (1996b)  made a test of the methodological assertions by Arrow et al (1993) and broadly 
found them to hold true. Despite the last decade’s methodological advances, the critique of 
CVM now focuses on issues to do with controlling, detecting and understanding the 
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generation of bias in responses especially with reference to non-use values (Diamond & 
Hausman 1994; Guzman & Kolstad 2007; Harrison et al. 2004). However empirical studies 
have shown that many sources of bias are both detectable and can be controlled for (Bateman 
et al. 1998; Harrison & Rustrom 2005)  
4.2 Study aim and objectives 
This study aims to test a provision point mechanism (PPM) in a novel setting (willingness to 
accept compensation) to assess its affect in reducing strategic bias to provide a more reliable 
estimate of household economic values. In addition the data is used to assess the local direct 
benefits of households living around protected area under different resource access 
arrangements and draw some conclusions about the potential performance of community 
conservation. The case study presented in this chapter represents a different set of respondents 
in different sites from the data presented in Chapter 3. The questionnaire survey used is 
presented in Appendix 2.  
 
In section 4.3 selected methodological issues in CVM are discussed with the objective of 
setting up the theoretical framework for the choice of valuation approach. To this end the 
literature review will concentrating on the WTP/WTA disparity debate key sources of 
strategic and hypothetical market bias in responses. Section 4.4, deals with the application of 
a provision point mechanism (PPM) in the context of this study.  and the application of a PPM 
in mitigating strategic and hypothetical market bias. In section 4.5 key literature on the 
application of CVM is reviewed with the objective of understanding practicalities in the 
design and implementation of CV in a developing country context. Finally sections 4.6 and 
4.7, present the case study with the objective of conveying the context background, methods, 
results and conclusion of the empirical research, focusing on testing the effects of the PPM 
and the application of the values to conservation management policies.  The CV approach 
used a one shot open ended format to elicit local peoples direct use values of protected areas 
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under different management arrangements with particular reference to the impact of total 
household income on the stated preference.  
4.3 Selected methodological issues in CVM 
4.3.1 Measuring individual preference – utility and consumer surplus 
The objective of this section is to review a selection of theoretical issues to motivate the 
choice of valuation method in the case study in part 3. CVM requires that individuals state a 
preference for a hypothetical level or change in provision of environmental goods and 
services. The hypothetical scenario typically involves explanation of a change in the provision 
of environmental goods and services under specific conditions. The survey then elicits a 
response in monetary terms for an individual’s willingness to pay (WTP) for a welfare gain or 
willingness to accept compensation (WTA) for a welfare loss as a result of the specified 
change; thus valuation is based on individual preferences.   
 
Peoples’ choices over environmental goods and services are worth studying for several 
reasons; a key reason is to understand people’s behaviour, i.e. explaining past or predicting 
future behaviour. Importantly understanding peoples’ preferences for environmental goods is 
useful in order to assess how actual or hypothetical changes in their provision may impact on 
an individual’s welfare. CVM data can be used to estimate the utility and thus the consumer 
surplus, in the absence of market prices, for different levels of environmental goods and help 
policy analysis through giving insights into optimal resource allocation by predicting and 
assessing welfare impacts.  
 
The basic theory of welfare economics, utility and consumer surplus is well developed and 
documented (Bateman & Turner 1993; Hanley et al. 2007). This section will focus attention 
to relevant key issues related to the choice of the valuation approach (WTA vs WTP) and 
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sources of strategic and hypothetical market bias in responses and the application of a PPM in 
mitigating them.  
4.3.2 Willingness to pay and willingness to accept; the divergence in value 
measures 
The theoretical divergence between willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept 
compensation (WTA) measures for identical goods is well documented (Hanley et al. 2007).  
WTA is larger than WTP is also found when either a gain or a loss of welfare is being 
considered (Willig, 1976; Randall and Stoll 1980). This has prompted considerable debate 
over the correct elicitation format to estimate consumer surplus and it is a question that 
concerns us here in terms of the selection of the elicitation format for this study. 
 
Using utility curve analysis of welfare gain and loss measurements we can identify some 
theoretical problems.  The upper part of Figure 4.1 (adapted from Hanley et al. 2007) depicts 
an unpriced environmental good in a discrete choice setting (X1), shown on the horizontal axis 
while the vertical axis shows income as a composite of all other consumption. (X0). The 
budget line ( X ) is horizontal as the good is unpriced with the initial consumption of X1 being 
quantity constrained (not price constrained) at Q0 (point A on U0). 
 
In the last two decades, empirical evidence has clearly demonstrated the divergence between 
WTP and WTA measures  (Boyle 2003; Hanemann 1991; Hanley & Shogren 2005), which 
has raised questions over which measure to choose and, in fact, the validity of CVM to 
accurately measure welfare at all. Evidence from the experimental economic literature has 
showed considerable divergences (Kahneman et al. 1991; Knetsch 1989; Knetsch & Sinden 
1984), but this divergence seemed to exist irrespective of income effects, transaction costs or 
how often the good was traded.   Experimental evidence (Loomes et al. 2003; Shogren et al. 
2001)  has shown that detailed explanations of the mechanism and how to derive valuations, 
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practice in using the mechanism, binding outcome experiences and anonymity can result in no 
significant differences being found in WTP-WTA value measure. One explanation for why 
familiarity with the good reduces the divergence is preference construction, where individuals 
develop preferences as choices present themselves, based on underlying beliefs and attitudes, 
dependant on the valuation context.  Hanley et al (2007)  suggests that where non-market 
goods are unfamiliar, values are likely to depend on how the exercise is undertaken and will 
vary over context. This indicates that the WTA-WTP divergence is largely based on technique 
or approach and that the divergence problem can be void if the appropriate choice of valuation 
approach or technique is employed. 
 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed a loss aversion theory that states individuals judge 
all gains and losses from a reference point, which is their existing entitlement to a given level 
of resources i.e. air quality. The loss aversion theory has been further extended and explained 
as ‘endowment effect’, (Knetsch et al. 2001).  Any decrease below the reference level will 
have a higher impact on their welfare than the impact of an increase in the provision of the 
good will have on welfare gains.  This implies that where a loss in welfare below the 
reference point occurs, WTA is the correct measure as WTP will understate the loss. Thus 
WTP should be used for environmental gains and WTA for environmental losses.  
 
Detailed analysis of the WTP-WTA divergence literature by Plott and Zeiler (2005) revealed 
that despite claims in the literature about the growing evidence to support the ‘endowment 
effect’ theory, this mainstream argument was in fact mainly based on incorrect interpretations 
of experimental results; whilst many experiments have observed the gap, many have also not.  
 
A common finding by Plott and Zeiler (2005) was that whatever experimental procedure was 
adopted , a common and extremely important issue detailed in much of the literature, was the 
need to avoid subject misconceptions and it was in this issue that Plott and Zeiler (2005) 
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focused. They identified that lack of an operational definition of subject misconception meant 
that different experiments that had attempting to control for subject misconceptions in 
different ways. This depended on how the researchers anticipated which form that subject 
misconceptions might take. In their experiment, Plott and Zeiler (2005) control for subject 
misconception by adopting the gamut of approaches detailed in the literature.  
 
In broad terms, Plott and Zeiler (2005) found no significant differences in WTP and WTA 
values as a fundamental feature of human preferences, but differences were found between 
different procedures altering the level of control for subject misconception, thus refuting the 
endowment theory. A further point is that issues of ownership can confound the result in that 
in their experiment subjects were meant to strip from their responses any special value related 
to ownership, but their results cannot confirm if this transformation actually took place. It is 
an important observation that ownership can have profound effects on measuring an 
individual’s judgement of value.  
 
A relatively recent empirical test of the difference between hypothetical and real WTA has 
yielded some critical insights.  List and Shogren (2002) in an experimental study to calibrate 
the divergence, show that subjects significantly understated their real WTA in the 
hypothetical scenarios, however after controlling for subject specific effects marginal effects 
were minimal and there was no significant difference between hypothetical and real values. 
 
Therefore there remains some uncertainty over when to use the WTP or the WTA approach 
related to ownership of a good.  Mitchell and Carson (1989)  propose a property rights 
approach to understanding welfare measures. They focus discussion on collective property 
rights and public goods and the annual payments necessary to maintain a given level of the 
good i.e. air quality or water quality. It is the non-excludable nature of a public good that 
ensures such goods are available to everyone, to which Mitchell and Carson (1989) argue that 
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WTA formats are inappropriate. This leads to an approach to identify the correct welfare 
measure to be used where we must examine the level of goods provision and property right 
status.  
 
For pure public goods, WTP should be used to assess consumer surplus (CS) to ensure a gain, 
or equivalent surplus (ES) to avoid a loss occurring. However there remains a problem in 
terms of valuing public goods with a low substitutability i.e. water and air.  Where private 
property rights are assignable to individuals or groups in some sense over the environmental 
good, the range of CS and ES measures in WTP and WTA forms are appropriate. In fact 
where the environmental goods have a low substitutability then WTA is actually the correct 
approach, as WTP would underestimate the individual’s true economic value. Table 4.1 
depicts the appropriate measures under the property rights and substitutability framework 
described above. 
Table 4.1 Welfare measures in a property rights framework 
Property right Welfare 
change 
Substitutability Level of Provision  Welfare 
measure 
Public Gain High/Low WTP ensure gain CSWTP
 Loss High/Low WTP avoid loss ESWTP
Private Gain High WTP ensure gain CSWTP
 Gain Low WTA if gain does not 
occur 
ESWTA 
 Loss High WTA if loss occurs CSWTA
 Loss Low WTA if loss occurs CSWTA
 
Whilst initial theoretical examination suggested that the divergence should actually be low, 
(Willig 1976)  it is most likely that the magnitude of the difference is dictated by the slope of 
the utility curve and the marginal rate of substitution for the good in question with money  
(Bateman & Turner 1993; Brown & Peterson 2003; Hanley et al. 2007). (Hanemann 1991) 
supports this view arguing that if the level of substitution between goods is high then the 
divergence between WTA and WTP tends to disappear. Shogren et al. (1994) also support the 
substitutability hypothesis, finding in laboratory experiments that the WTP/WTA divergence 
for goods with relatively close substitutes disappeared with repeated exposure to market 
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experience and feedback. For environmental goods, which often display a high degree of 
inelasticity over demand, the marginal rate of substitution of the environmental good for 
money/income could be very low. This means that the magnitude of the difference between 
WTP and WTA will be high and sometimes very high. 
 
Moral and ethical issues are also an important dimension regarding the choice approach to 
valuation. What rights do people have to consume environmental goods and services versus 
what responsibilities do they have to maintain them and what are the right approaches to 
enforcing any standards?  From a ‘rights based’ perspective although the value of a loss is 
appropriately measured by WTA, what is in fact experienced as a loss may not be treated as a 
loss within legal systems  (Knetsch & Sinden 1984). This distinction between de facto and de 
jure loss occurs often with environmental goods. If the laws governing resource management 
preclude rights to existing uses, then the relevant measure of the recreation value is what users 
would pay to prevent the harvest. To reiterate, the welfare loss to the person losing access is 
measured by WTA, but the assignment of rights may not be equitably undertaken depending 
on the institutional arrangements and who sets the agenda.  In the case of some of the 
protected areas in this study, access rights by local communities were expropriated from them 
by the state upon the creation of the protected areas. For example the state may not recognize 
any local community use right under constitutional law and thus would not agree with the 
WTA approach. This and the fact that alternative livelihoods options are few and far between 
means that enforcement of de jure regulations may contribute significantly to making poor 
people even poorer. In such cases, the WTA measure is still the most morally appropriate. 
 
Several authors have examined the impact of moral and ethical responsibility towards the 
environment on welfare measures (Boyce et al. 1992; Brown & Gregory 1999; Gregory 1986; 
Irwin 1994; Ritov & Baron 1992). Results from such studies show that a sense of moral 
responsibility e.g. for things placed in one's care or to the environment, can also lead to a 
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WTA–WTP disparity (Gregory 1986). When responsibility is felt and a potentially damaging 
or harmful outcome is possible, inaction could be favoured over action, because people feel 
better if the harm just occurs than if they acted in a way that caused it i.e. benign neglect 
(Ritov & Baron 1992). The premium required to offset this potential therefore contributes to 
the disparity by lowering WTP and raising WTA (Brown & Gregory 1999) 
 
Evidence that moral responsibility may enhance a WTA–WTP disparity was presented in an 
unusual scenario by Boyce et al. (1992).  In a real-money experiment involving a house plant, 
participants were placed in the position of potentially allowing the destruction of the plant 
though a decision to either sell it or not purchase it. The authors argued that the loss aversion 
experienced by the respondents was altered by the differential assignment of property rights 
under WTA and WTP measures. This was in their opinion due to a shift in the respondent’s 
allocation of moral responsibility for the preservation of the commodity.   
 
Other recent studies principally investigating hypothetical bias have also provided insights in 
to causes of the WTP-WTA disparity where studies of induced values point towards ‘home 
grown’ values as a cause of the disparity in valuation measures, where the value of a good or 
service is dependant on a respondent’s own innate values rather than an appreciation of a real 
market price value based on their own experiences (Collins & Vossler 2008; Polome 2003; 
Taylor et al. 2001; Vossler & McKee 2006). These studies focus on eliciting values for a real 
commodity or policies and use induced values to test if observed choices are consistent with 
induced preferences and to establish if welfare estimates are equal to induced values.  Liu et 
al. (2006) also found that WTP distributions were systematically different between those who 
viewed their survey as inconsequential and those who did not, therefore disparity between 
WTP and WTA may occur when respondents do not believe that their decisions are 
consequential or when goods are unfamiliar (Carson & Groves 2007; Vossler & Evans 2008). 
These recent findings may help to explain the results of Irwin’s (1994) study on WTA and 
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WTP differences for both market and environmental goods. In addition to the standard WTA–
WTP disparity, WTA of the environmental goods exceeded WTA of the market goods, 
although WTP did not differ between the two sets of goods. Perhaps the compensation 
scenario in the case of the environmental good was not really believable to the respondents.   
 
From the theoretical and empirical evidence it seems that far from being unreliable, the theory 
behind CVM is sound. Importantly the WTP/WTA divergence is not a methodological glitch, 
as it has a strong theoretical basis, but problems arise in understanding or controlling for the 
degree of divergence. Empirical evidence has shown that the level of divergence can be 
insignificant and differences between value measures may be due to procedural issues related 
to controlling for subject misrepresentation. This means that in order to choose the right 
valuation approach (WTA or WTP) careful consideration must be given to controlling for 
subject misconception over the valuation task, property rights or if welfare gains or losses are 
proposed. Two factors are also critical to reducing the WTP-WTA disparity, firstly the 
familiarity and substitutability of the good in question. Secondly, the reality of the 
hypothetical scenario relative to perceived consequences for the respondent. Both are forms of 
inaccuracy and bias introduced in the hypothetical scenario.  In the case study presented later 
on a WTA approach is adopted in light of the evidence examined above where the forest 
goods familiarity is high, substitutability is low and a de facto use right is inexistence 
irrespective of the legality. 
4.3.3 Inaccuracy and Bias 
Much concern in recent years about CVM has focused on the sources of bias affecting the 
accuracy of the tool.  The researcher may unwittingly introduce sources of bias, or the 
respondent may for some reason wish to strategically influence the outcome of the survey 
(Bateman & Turner 1993; Hanley et al. 2007; Harrison & Rustrom 2005; Shogren 2004). 
Following Hanley et al (2007), problem areas may be classified as follows; biases, 
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embedding, WTP/WTA differences, information effects and the transferability of benefit 
estimates. The discussion in this section will focus on two key areas of bias, strategic and 
hypothetical bias, as being most relevant to the successful implementation (issues to do with 
WTP and WTA variance having been discussed in the previous section) of this survey and the 
field testing of the PPM in this context. 
4.3.3 a) Strategic Bias 
 
The holy grail of stated preference methods is the incentive compatible survey. An incentive 
compatible survey is one that results in respondents providing truthful and accurate responses 
to the valuation question. The process of getting to an incentive compatible result is that of 
demand revelation, implying the strict incentives necessary to motivate people to report their 
true valuation of a good or service. 
 
A useful entry point in understanding the problems faced in accurate demand revelation and 
incentive compatibility is through understanding strategic bias.  ‘Free riding’ is an example of 
respondent strategic bias, in the case of a public good (i.e. non excludable), if an individual 
believes that the bid will actually be collected on he could believe that a benefit will be 
received without their need to pay for it (Bateman & Turner 1993; Hanley et al. 2007).  Thus 
there is a strong likelihood that they will understate their bid.  Alternatively if a respondent 
would really like to ensure that an environmental change occurs and that the bidding is truly 
hypothetical, then they are likely to inflate their bid to ensure that the change occurs. Both of 
these situations rely on the believability of the scenario in the first instance and the risk of 
their strategic behaviour will not be detected.  In a WTP context regarding a private good, 
individuals are likely to understate their bids or make zero or protest bids in an attempt to 
drive down the price for the good if they believe that the survey may have some real outcome.  
 
Intuitively in the WTA scenario, applied to private goods, a strategic over inflated 
compensation bid may be induced in order to influence a perceived real outcome. However if 
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we look at this scenario objectively in a broader context where the goods are of very low 
substitutability bids may be inflated, as an individual could feel strongly that their livelihood 
may not be tenable without the good. Such bidding may in reality reflect the respondents real 
risks associated with loss rather than the cognitive burden of calculating how much money it 
may take to adequately compensate for the loss. 
4.3.3 b) Hypothetical bias  
From the above discussion it is clear that the hypothetical scenario being described is essential 
to the revelation of an accurate bid. The hypothetical scenario established as the basis of a 
response must enable the respondent to fully understand the good being valued as well as the 
market and its institutions. This is perhaps the most technique specific problem facing CVM 
(Bateman & Turner 1993; Harrison & Rustrom 2005). Essentially it is argued that the lack of 
a binding commitment might cause rational people to overestimate their true value 
(Cummings et al. 1986).   The criteria in the table 4.2 set out guidelines which if not met in 
the questionnaire design will result in biased and inaccurate data. 
 
Table 4.2. Scenario Design Criteria for CVM (adapted from Campbell and Luckert, 2002) 
If the scenario is not… The respondent will…  Effect on measurement 
Theoretically accurate? Value the wrong thing 
(theoretical misspecification) 
Measure wrong thing 
Policy relevant? Value the wrong thing (policy 
misspecification) 
Measure wrong thing 
Understandable to the 
respondent? 
Value wrong thing 
(conceptual misspecification) 
Measure wrong thing 
Plausible to the respondent? Substitute a condition or not 
take the exercise seriously 
Measure wrong thing or give 
unreliable, biased or protest 
response 
Meaningful to the 
respondent? 
Not take the exercise 
seriously 
Give unreliable, biased or 
protest response 
 
Schulze et al. (1996) define bias in CVM studies as the difference between the distribution of 
hypothetical bids obtained from a survey and the distribution of bids that would be obtained 
in an actual demand revealing market setting.  Hypothetical bias refers to the question 
whether hypothetical bids vary in some systematic manner from actual bids (Carlson 2000; 
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Willis & Powe 1998). Most often this question has been approached in laboratory 
experiments, which typically compare an initial hypothetical response valuing a commodity to 
actual laboratory market responses where the commodity can actually be purchased (Harrison 
& Rustrom 2005). 
 
Such experiments offer much greater precision than comparisons made between contingent 
values and values obtained from other studies, e.g., travel cost method or replacement cost 
method.  (Schulze et al. 1996) conclude that some upward bias is likely to be present in many 
studies and that hypothetical bias may be a function of income and richer people may use 
substitutes to a much larger extent than poor people do (Kriström and Riera (1996).  It was 
also speculated that the pure ecological motive for stating a WTP might be concealed by 
arguments about donating in order to achieve social status and contributing to a good cause.    
Social norms (perceived or otherwise) exert a profound influence on individual’s preferences 
and reflect the dynamic nature of society. In such a case, respondents are more likely to 
describe what is good for a country or region, expressing support for a perceived socially 
desirable outcome rather than their own innate value (Diamond & Hausman 1994) who 
confirm the existence of a strong bias for people when they overestimate the likelihood that 
they will engage in a socially desirable behaviour.  
 
Hypothetical bias is an issue that must be dealt with systematically to improve the reliability 
of CVM estimates. The literature defines many approaches to mitigating such bias yet gaps 
remain in our approaches to utilising CVM. An important gap is the WTP versus WTA 
argument. (Harrison & Rustrom 2005) eloquently discuss the historical side stepping of WTA 
measures due to problems with controlling hypothetical bias in responses. The forms of bias 
and strategic bidding described before affect WTP measures and WTA similarly. However 
there is still a general avoidance of WTA, even when it is theoretically more appropriate to 
use. In part at least this may be due to the standards set early on by organisations such as 
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NOAA17 in the application of CVM in legal cases.  (Harrison & Rustrom 2005) further point 
out that WTA may be the most logical counter part to the issue in question, after all why 
should anyone pay to avoid another environmental catastrophe where in fact we should be 
compensated for the last one? 
4.3.3 c) Payment Vehicle Bias 
This is an area of survey design where there is a trade off between credibility with the 
respondent and the potential of the researcher introducing unintended side effects (Cummings 
et al. 1986). Typical payment vehicles include levies on income taxes, water or land rates, 
increased park entrance fees and increased sales taxes. The use of levies or taxes, and 
referenda in which the community votes on whether a specific project should go ahead, are 
less common in countries other than the USA and Switzerland, although there is increasing 
experience in Europe and elsewhere (Navrud & Pruckner 1997). A relative unfamiliarity with 
such institutional procedures can lead to problems regarding the plausibility of payment 
vehicles and the appropriateness of political market models included within CVM 
questionnaires. Blamey (1995) suggests, for this reason, that selecting plausible and non-
objectionable payment vehicles presents a major challenge to CVM researchers.  
 
The payment vehicle is a crucial element in any CVM survey because it provides the context 
for payment. Similar to other aspects of a CVM scenario, the payment vehicle can affect the 
way respondents answer the elicitation question. Respondents’ choices may depend on when 
payment is due and the way in which it is collected. For example, Stevens et al (1997) found 
that WTP varied across alternative temporal payment schedules. These effects do not signal 
the existence of bias, so long as the effects of a payment vehicle are appropriate for the 
context of the study. Bias only arises if there is a spurious effect resulting from the selection 
of a particular payment vehicle. Payment vehicle bias occurs, according to Mitchell and 
Carson (1989), ‘where the payment vehicle is either misperceived or is itself valued in a way 
                                                 
17 NOAA – National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, United States Government. 
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not intended by the researcher’. Unless payment vehicles and payment scenarios are selected 
and designed with reference to the institutional and cultural context, it is possible that 
payment vehicle bias will arise.  Morrison et al (2000) propose that the payment vehicle issue 
can result in protest responses to the valuation exercises, not because the respondent doe not 
value the good in question but because of doubts about the plausibility of the payment 
vehicle.  
 
In this study rural people in Uganda pay few taxes, partly because they are so poor and not 
fully integrated in to the market economy (subsistence producers still using a lot of barter to 
trade). The Ugandan government tried to implement a form of income tax called graduated 
tax a decade ago. This was with intention of getting a large majority in the population who are 
not fully integrated in to the market economy and do not earn taxable wages contributing to 
public service provision. The scheme was so widely unpopular it was scrapped after two years 
of unsuccessful implementation, which aroused strong civil unrest such as nation-wide 
protests. As a result, rural Ugandan people are highly sensitive towards taxes on their 
livelihoods. Use of taxes as a payment vehicle in a CV scenario may result in inaccurate 
demand revelation, due to protest responses. Payment vehicles such as voluntary 
contributions or WTA scenarios may work better or have a less distortive effect in this 
situation. 
4.3.4 Risk preference and sample heterogeneity 
The issue of risk in poor rural peoples’ livelihoods merits some examination in relation to 
WTA compensation. Household access of direct benefits from protected areas is uncertain 
where seasonality and periodic shocks such as drought or flooding can also impact the 
productivity of the protected area therefore harvests are often an unknown quantity.  
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Imagine a low and high-income rural household, where the low-income household extracts in 
financial terms a lower value of goods form a protected area than the high-income household. 
The role that the protected area goods play in securing the basic livelihood may be more 
important (due to high dependency) for the low-income household than the high. Thus the 
low-income household rather than the high-income household might perceive more 
livelihoods risk in terms of vulnerability from losing access.  Level of compensation payment 
will be a known quantity and assuming effective implementation mechanisms, more of a ‘sure 
thing’. Therefore accepting compensation will be a lower risk proposition than accessing a 
protected area under any given set of institutional arrangements. Therefore risk preference 
will also matter in terms of stating a WTP/A.  
 
Risk preferences will also be heterogeneous in that each respondent or household will be 
different from one another in some fundamental way i.e. income, assets, composition, age, 
education, livelihoods options etc. which will mean different attitudes towards risk. Risk 
aversion is a classic feature of a peasant-farming household (Ellis 1993) and could therefore 
have a profound impact on the measurement of WTA. Thought must be given to how a 
scenario design might be more or less acceptable in terms of risk to different social and 
economic groups, or how it might influence the outcome of the results between groups.  
 
Whilst it is it is not necessary to control for risk preference, as it is a feature of choice and 
utility towards a good or service, it is important to account for it in the interpretation of results 
(Hanley & Shogren 2005). Where respondents have high dependency on an environmental 
resource, they will more likely be risk averse to a reduction or exclusion in its use. This will 
contribute to higher social values as well as the direct use values of the resources. For instance 
mean market price values of goods harvested annually form a protected area may be higher in 
high income groups than in lower, but the mean annual WTA for loss of access in relation to 
income group may be the opposite. A seemingly incongruous finding, but viewed in the light 
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of high dependency for the low-income group quite logical. The significance of the variability 
between individuals is supported by Burton et al (2007), who found that that individual 
hypothetical bias was driven by the differing influence of pure self-interest and other- 
regarding preferences in real and hypothetical situations, not by a single behavioural theory 
such as free riding. In a hypothetical situation these preferences cause ‘yea’ saying and non-
demand revealing voting in some but not others. 
 
Sample heterogeneity is also relates to respondent income and the potential impacts of income 
on values of environmental goods. In the case of environmental goods, the individual is often 
faced with a quantity rather than a price constraint and such goods may have high-income 
elasticity’s of WTP. Consequently a large income effect could compromise the consumer 
surplus measure of welfare change (Bateman & Turner 1993). Hokby and Soderqvist (2003)  
show environmental services characterised by their respondents as an ordinary good and price 
elastic. They developed a model of income elasticity of demand (based on aggregated data of 
5 different CVM studies conducted in Sweden) for eutrpohication of the Baltic Sea.  
 
Respondents faced with no alternative sources of environmental goods and services may well 
have very low income elasticity of demand. Indeed both this position and that of high income 
elasticity’s of demand are implicitly supported by Hokby and Soderqvist (2003) who 
conclude that their findings should not be regarded as a general finding for all environmental 
goods and services; they are all essentially all different in character where some people may 
regard them as necessities and others as luxuries (preference heterogeneity). In the first case 
the income elasticity issue does not present a particular bias in estimation of WTP or WTA. 
Thus a thorough examination of the valuation context must be made in order to understand 
bias in estimation potentially introduced by income elasticity. 
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4.4 The PPM and its application to mitigating bias 
A novel approach to improving on incentive compatibility and demand revelation in reducing 
strategic bias and free riding in CVM is the provision point mechanism (PPM). With this 
mechanism a good of a predetermined magnitude and institutional form is provided only if the 
sum of contributions from a defined group equals or exceeds its cost (Rondeau et al. 1999; 
Rose et al. 2002).  Experimental research has shown that although individuals make voluntary 
contributions for the provision of public goods, it is often done sub optimally and supporting 
predictions of under contribution (Ledyard 1995). Early mechanisms to reduce under 
contribution in such lab settings found that better contributions could be induced through 
repeated rounds of bidding, an approach not practical in the field setting. Later developments 
saw the introduction of the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM), a one shot approach in 
reducing strategic bias and under contribution, however it consistently produced contribution 
levels 40 to 60% below optimal (Ledyard 1995).   
 
 
The PPM can be regarded as an alternative to VCM as experiments have shown that free 
riding is substantially reduced in comparison to VCM. Additional innovations such as rebate 
rules and money back guarantees have also been found to increase contributions (Rondeau et 
al. 1999; Rose et al. 2002).   
 
An interesting development in the application of the PPM is that of including a money back 
guarantee (MBG). The MBG is a rebate rule, which states that should either the PP be 
exceeded or not enough funds be elicited, and then the individual will either get a rebate of 
the excess proportionate to their contributions or, in the latter case, their money back. (Isaac et 
al. 1989; Rondeau et al. 1999) The MBG then acts as an insurance against risk of unnecessary 
loss. Although Dawes et al (1986) found no improvement in contribution rates when testing 
the effect of a MBG, significant increases in contributions were found by other researchers 
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from the use of an MBG (Isaac et al. 1989; Marks & Croson 1998; Rapoport & Eshed-Levy 
1989). So at best it is effective having a positive impact on demand revelation and at worst no 
particular effect.  
Following Rondeau et al (1999), in the WTP situation, a typical provision point situation will 
comprise of participants that are part of a group of a number of individuals (N) taking part in 
the bidding round. Each individual has a budget (I) such as the total household income, and 
must decide on their individual contribution (Bi) to a group fund (Bj) to ensure a given welfare 
gain (Ui). With a money back guarantee (MBG), if the sum of group contributions is below 
the provision point (PP) then contributions are fully refunded, thus individual earnings are 
equal to their initial bid hence no net change in utility. However if the group WTA bids 
exceed the PP then individual earnings are equal to the sum of the return on their bid (Vi) plus 

























 PP is exceeded; program goes ahead people pay individual WTP 
minus a rebate of their proportional share of any surplus above the PP 
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Rapoport and Suleman (1993), Asch et al (1(1993) and Croson and Marks (1996) have also 
conducted PP experiments in lab settings in the WTP context. Bagnoli and Mckee (1991) 
conducted PP experiments with an MBG and Cadsby and Maynes (1998a, 1998b, 1999) 
utilised a similar approach without an MBG using small groups. Of all of these experiments 
only Bagnoli and Mckee (1991) managed to reveal true demand for the public good. Problems 
related to true demand revelation are linked to the small group sizes (5-12 subjects) and the 
homogeneous nature of the groups i.e. students, nurses, all male, all female. Rondeau et al 
(1999) recognised this problem and conducted lab based experiments more closely emulating 
field conditions (with group sizes of 50 participants drawn from a more heterogeneous 
background). They found that under these conditions the PPM was demand revealing in 
aggregate and conclude that the PPM is simple enough to be used in field conditions and 
capable of efficiently estimating the value of public goods through a voluntary contributions 
scheme. In the WTA context the MBG is not applicable, as no contribution is being solicited 
therefore there is no risk associated with an individual contributing too much.  
 
Few CVM applications with PPM have been designed to empirically test the PPM in a field 
setting. The most notable example is Rose et al (2002) who utilise PPM in both lab and field 
experiment to test WTP to finance renewable energy programs, finding that in both settings 
their PPM with money back guarantees substantially increased contributions and corroborate 
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the findings of Rondeau et al (1999). Currently we are aware of no other application of the 
PPM applied to a WTA scenario in a laboratory or a field setting.   
In a WTA setting the PP is a sum of money that constitutes the entire fund available for 
compensating all affected individuals in a group. Respondents are faced with the prospect that 
should the sum of group bids exceed the sum of money available then the entire compensation 
scheme would not go ahead and some other course of action would be taken or the status quo 
would be maintained. Should the sum of the bids be less than or equal to the PP then the 
individual can expect their additional income to be the value of their bid plus a proportional 
increment of the difference between the sum of the group bids and the PP. The rebate rules 
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Here the individual’s task is one of constrained optimisation i.e. to maintain a given level of 
utility through maximising the income stream from the park related services (Vi) subject to the 
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In this case the individual gets no services from the protected area in the “with project” case. 
However in reality Vi in the project scenario is unlikely to be zero community wide as some 
individuals may continue to violate rules and illegally extract resources from the protected 
area as well as receive compensation. 
 
The game theory prediction for the PPM in the WTP context is described in Bagnoli and 
Lipman (1989) and developed by (Marks & Croson 1998) where a rebate rule is added to the 
mechanism.  Assuming that participants are only motivated by their own gains, a bid is 
rational if it does not exceed the individual’s value for the public good. If the sum of the bids 
does not exceed the provision point then the Nash equilibrium is achieved as shown in by   
 










;     (4.3) 
 
Thus, the sum of WTP bids is below the PP and no individual can unilaterally increase their 
own contribution in a rational manner to reach the provision point. (Rondeau et al (1999). A 
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profit maximising solution will be reached when the sum of the bids is equal to or greater than 
the provision point. This could mean that an individual may be motivated to overstate their 
true value to ensure the scheme went ahead for some other reason. Importantly it is clear to 
see that the PPM is not incentive compatible as long as there is incentive for strategic bidding 
confounding true demand revelation. 
 
Therefore in the WTA context the converse is true (4.4) where 
 










;     (4.4) 
 
Thus, the sum of the bids is greater than the PP and no individual can decrease their bid in a 
rational manner to reach the provision point.  However, if the sum of bids exceeds the PP any 
individual who made a contribution may choose to decrease their bid if given the chance, so 
the mechanism may not in fact be strictly incentive compatible. However the issue of its 
demand revelation properties is not so clear, in that a change of bid value may not necessarily 
reflect a change in the value of the good, but a trade off in terms of willingness to accept less 
than the true value of the good for some other reason. 
 
However this problem only arises if an individual knows the PP amount and the size of the 
target group in a scheme. In the WTP context a respondent might make a decision based on an 
equal cost share strategy in order to reduce their level of contribution. Conversely in the WTA 
context they may inflate their bid level above their real utility on a similar basis to capture a 
higher equal share of the compensation fund. This would of course require a high degree of 
conference between the individuals in a community in order to establish what level of bid 
would be made, but would still not eliminate focal point bias as individuals could still bid 
freely (and anonymously). It would in effect be an inverted example of the prisoner’s 
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dilemma whereby the theoretical end state would be decided upon, but could still be 
influenced because of anonymous bidding. In addition it would encourage the participation of 
individuals who might otherwise have received no compensation. This seems like an unlikely 
and high-risk scenario due to the information and coordination requirements as well as level 
of trust required in a community to ensure success and another indication of the PPM’s not 
being incentive compatible.  
 
A further threat to the mechanism is the power an individual may also have to veto the entire 
scheme by bidding an amount greater than the PP in the WTA. This is an altogether more 
complex problem, as the reasons behind such a veto may be difficult to ascertain. It may be 
due to cultural factors i.e. opposition to any form of control over local access due to people 
having a grudge about being displaced from former traditional lands.  However it is possible 
to screen for such bids by simple examination of the distribution of bids and the removal of 
obvious outliers, or where enumerators noted that a respondent may have had such strong 
opinions against the scheme. This underscores the importance of gathering other social data 
alongside CV studies especially regarding attitudes towards the protected area.  
 
One way around these forms of bias is to withhold the level of the provision point to prevent 
participants from using an equal or higher benefit share strategy or easily establishing a veto. 
In order to remove this source of bias the rebate rule can also be modified to specifically 
provide an equal share of any difference between the PP and the group bids removing the 
need for strategic bidding to maximise the return on investment. Whilst this will not make the 
PPM incentive compatible it may in practice  improve the demand revealing properties, 
however evidence on this issue is weak (Rondeau et al. 2005). 
 
This effectively mimics real life situations where a program’s costing may not have been 
established in detail before such a CV exercise could be carried out. The example from Rose 
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et al (2002) of the Niagara Mohawk Power Company, ‘Green Choice Program’, offered to its 
1.2 million residential customers, stated that the final cost of the project was to be established 
through competitive bidding. In the context of our case study such a CV exercise may in fact 
be the basis of assessing the financial viability of a compensation scheme prior to looking for 
funds from national park revenues or the international donor community. Logically the 
establishment of the provision point in the WTA context should decrease the likelihood of an 
individual’s overstatement of a bid, reducing ‘free riding’ and give a more accurate measure 
of CSWTA , thus giving policy researchers a useful tool for assessing the full economic costs of 
changes in access arrangements to protected areas. 
 
In summary, in the WTP setting the PPM  can help to improve demand revelation through 
reducing the incentive for strategic bidding, consistent with the ‘free riding’ finding of the 
Rose et al (2002) study. Where a rebate rule is applied then the incentive to free ride may be 
further reduced as there is a risk of sub optimal returns to the individual from overstating their 
true WTP. In addition withholding the intended provision point introduces an informational 
constraint to making a strategic bid to maximise individual return.  However strategic bidding 
cannot be eliminated in that an individual may grossly inflate their WTP value in order to 
ensure a scheme went ahead. However such bids might be picked up as an outlier when 
screening data so may be controlled for in analysis.  
 
In the WTA setting similar but converse issues apply, thus a surplus benefit share rule can 
eliminate or reduce the individual incentive to free ride, but not to bid strategically. A veto of 
the scheme could be possible through grossly inflated bids but as with the WTP setting, such 
bids may be identified as outliers when screening the data. Again withholding the actual 
amount of the PP also removes a critical piece of information upon which to make strategic 
bids. Thus, the theoretical demand revealing properties of a PPM in the WTP and WTA 
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setting means they are not incentive compatible, but the mechanism may possibly have 
practical effects on more accurate demand revelation . 
4.5 The application of CVM in developing countries 
The application of CVM in developing countries has focused mainly on the valuation of water 
supply, improved sanitation and health services and the valuation of environmental amenities 
arising from national parks (International Institute for Environment and Development 2003; 
Kramer et al. 1992; Kramer et al. 1995; Whittington 1998; Willis & Garrod 1996).  
Mekonnen  (1997) applied WTP elicitation formats to obtain the economic value of 
community forestry in Ethiopia and similarly Lynam et al. (1994) valued trees on communal 
lands in Zimbabwe.  Ruitenbeek (1992) valued rainforests in Cameroon using a WTP-CVM 
scenario. In contrast to applying WTP elicitation format, Smith et al (1998) use a WTA CVM 
approach to analyse potential compensations payments required to induce land use changes 
among farmers in Peru with the objective of CO2 sequestration. Other studies address the 
problem of compensation payments that are required in order to induce land use change of 
local frames for watershed protection (Kramer et al 1992; 1995).  
 
Despite the fact that CVM surveys are frequently applied in developing countries, the results 
must be critically evaluated, to provide a better understanding of the contextual strengths and 
weaknesses in apply CVM in a developed versus a developing economy. Whittington (1998) 
states that many studies have been conducted without better prior knowledge of their correct 
application in developing countries most have followed the NOAA guidelines (Arrow et al. 
1993a) devised in the context of litigation in an industrial marine setting in a developed 
economy.   After numerous applications of CVM in the developing world, it must be 
concluded that those guidelines often do not fit the specific circumstance confronted with in 
developing countries and, hence, the result of CVM surveys may be biased or simply wrong.     
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In support of this view Mekonnen (1997) regards posing hypothetical questions to low-
income, perhaps illiterate respondents as potentially too overwhelming. This is perhaps an 
extreme conclusion as illiteracy does not necessarily infer low intelligence, but the 
institutional context is of great importance.  People operating in peasant economies are often 
mainly subsistence producers, only partially integrated in to market economies and have 
varying needs for money (Ellis 1993). In addition they are often operating in highly risk prone 
environments with high levels of vulnerability to environmental change and will have 
developed their own conventional wisdom, and institutions to cope with life in such 
conditions. Perhaps the NOAA guidelines in this context are not appropriate.  
 
Significantly Whittington (Whittington 1998)  concludes that although there are numerous 
issues that arise in contingent valuation work in developing countries in many respects it is 
easier to do high-quality contingent valuation surveys in developing countries than in 
industrialized countries. Typically response rates are very high and respondents are often 
quite receptive to listening and considering the questions posed.  Costs of administering 
surveys are typically lower than in developed nations, allowing researchers to use larger 
sample sizes and conduct more elaborate experimental designs. Often the available data on 
the benefits of different kinds of projects are typically quite limited. This means that the 
marginal value of additional information obtained from CV surveys is likely to be large. As 
long as the CV design criteria are well applied to appropriate valuation questions it is not only 
feasible but and advantageous to use CVM in developing countries to help evaluate a wide 
range of projects. 
 
Two additional narratives on CVM in developing countries by Whittington (2002; 2004) 
address important ethical issues and highlighting shortcomings of CVM surveys conducted in 
developing countries. Whittington (2002) concludes that such surveys are often poorly 
administered and executed, that hypothetical scenarios are often poorly designed.  Key 
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problems identified were that few studies are designed to verify whether some of the key 
assumptions that the researcher made were the right ones or whether the results were robust in 
respect to simple variations in research design and survey method. In addition he highlights 
that there is a significant risk that the push for simpler, cheaper survey methods could 
discredit the CVM method in itself.  However one might add this is not a shortcoming just 
because a CVM study was conducted in a developing country (there are perhaps also plenty of 
poorly executed studies for similar reasons in the developed country context as well) but is 
more an issues to do with the competencies of the researcher. 
 
Whittington (2004)  discusses the impacts of cross-cultural communication in implementing 
CV studies in developing countries and further identifies three cross cultural problems, 1) 
promises of anonymity and the right of respondents not to participate, 2) power asymmetries 
between international and local members of the CVM research team, and 3) compensation of 
respondents.  Firstly developing countries with the best sampling frames are generally the 
least democratic and even though respondents may be promised anonymity the reality is 
different, as individuals living in undemocratic governance regimes may be easily located. 
Additionally it may be difficult to convince government officials why anonymity and no 
access to the original data is an essential need of the survey approach. To some extent 
anonymity may be guaranteed where no details that can identify the household are collected 
and convincing government officials of the need for anonymity may not be so difficult is the 
researcher spends some time and effort explain the bias that may be introduced in to the 
survey results without anonymity. In reality few government officials have the time and 
energy to go sifting through piles of survey questionnaires. 
 
On the second issue researchers may find that in certain cultural circumstances respondents 
are trying very hard to please by giving responses based not on the preferences, but what they 
think the researchers preferences may be. This is a common problem in societies where trying 
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to please esteemed visitors is a cultural nicety. However the skill of the researcher in 
designing the questionnaire comes in to play and the design of the scenario needs to be 
carefully considered so as to be neutral and not leading in any way. This is clearly a design 
issue related to reducing hypothetical bias.   
 
Thirdly researchers may offer compensation to respondents for their time and effort in taking 
part in the survey and this might be perceived as coercive. Context is everything in terms of 
prices and it is important for the researcher not to unwittingly set compensation levels so high 
that respondents feel coerced (given an offer they can’t refuse) into accepting. Whittington 
(2004) stresses that even the smallest amount of compensation may be considered coercive for 
the poorest people in developing countries. Here timing may be everything and the impact of 
compensation may be related to how it is offered. If nothing is offered up front then the 
researcher’s solicitation to a respondent may be accepted or declined on its own merit. The 
researcher is then free to offer an appropriate contribution for the person’s time at the end of 
the interview. The compensation does not have to be monetary, but could be a good in kind 
such as soap, tea or salt. The application of CVM in developing countries to measure 
preferences for environmental goods and services has an established pedigree. Early 
applications may have been wildly inaccurate due to hypothetical bias induced by poor 
instrument design. However there is now enough contemporary experience and wisdom about 
the need for contextual adaptations to make CVM a very useful and applicable tool. 
Importantly the issues discussed in this section fed in tot the design and implementation of the 
case study in section 4.6.  
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4.6 Valuing local direst use benefits from protected areas in 
Uganda using a CV with PPM 
4.6.1 Case Study Objectives 
As indicated earlier the PPM has been shown in the WTP context to increase contributions, 
however few field tests have been conducted to demonstrate its performance under conditions 
where a single shot is required to estimate the economic value of an environmental good 
affecting a large population with heterogeneous values (see discussion on the PPM and its 
role in mitigating bias and respondent incentives in Part 1). Extensive field based sample 
surveys are expensive exercises to undertake, invariably there are time and financial 
constraints.  In a field setting a researcher may have only one attempt to ascertain a 
respondent’s true value hence the ‘single shot’ term. Typically extensive surveys of 
population’s mean that the research will encounter a wide spectrum of social and economic 
groups as potential consumers of the good being valued and will not typically be focusing on 
a particular homogeneous group. Surveys need to be designed to cope with respondent 
heterogeneity therefore larger sample sizes will be necessary, reinforcing the need (under 
resource constraints) for an effective single shot approach.  
 
In the WTA context the PPM is a novel tool, the central of objective is to empirically test its 
performance in mitigating bias in that the establishment of a provision point in the WTA 
context should decrease the likelihood of an individual’s overstatement of a bid, giving a 
more accurate measure of true WTA. In our policy context, this would provide a useful tool 
for assessing the full economic costs of changes in local access arrangements to Protected 
Areas.  
4.6.2 Method 
The CVM survey was administered alongside a  market price method household survey of 
social and economic costs, benefits as well as social impacts (key results are reported later) to 
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park adjacent households. Respondents were asked to state their maximum level of 
compensation required to forgo access to timber and non-timber forest products from their 
local protected area for a period of one year.  The questionnaire survey is found in Appendix 
2. Two separate payment mechanisms were employed in split samples (Table 4.3). In the 
control treatment, an open-ended CV format was used in which respondents were simply 
asked to state their WTA compensation to forgo the benefits from the protected area for one 
year.  
 
The scenario sets up a framework for the implementation of a hypothetical novel community 
based park management scheme in collaboration with park management authorities. It 
stipulates direct payments for conservation as an incentive to provide benefits to the local 
community and to enforce non-use regulations and reinforce the link between the benefits and 
conservation of the resource. The bidding is open-ended, based on the respondents perceived 
level of compensation to lose direct benefits form the protected area on an annual basis. The 
provision point, rebate rules and money back guarantee are detailed in the text box below.  
 
The survey tool administered by a group of trained enumerators and was pre-tested in the 
field. Surveying was rigorously supervised to ensure that enumerators complied with 
established procedures. Pre-testing was conducted to identify weaknesses in the presentation 
and comprehension of the tool by both the enumerators and respondents. In general there was 
Provision point and money back guarantee description in the CV scenario 
The community is being asked to make monetary bids to assess the demand for such a scheme and estimate 
the level of compensation.  Only a limited amount of funds are available for such a scheme. If the sum of all 
the communities compensation bids is less than or equal to the money available then the scheme would go 
ahead as described and a proportional share of any surplus funds between the community bid and the 
compensation fund will be made.  
 
If the sum is more than the money available then such a scheme would not go ahead and it is likely that the 
current management practices would continue with increased enforcement efforts. 
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consensus from enumerators that the scenario was believable by respondents. Importantly the 
scenario addressed both a real conservation issue (illegal use) and an appropriate response to 
resolving it (direct payment for conservation) with an enforceable set of rules, as such it was 
plausible and policy relevant.  
 
The survey was administered using a team of field assistants (enumerators) to conduct 
interviews in the local languages of the region. The questionnaires were in English, questions 
were verbally translated into the local language and then responses translated into English and 
recorded directly on to the data sheet.  
 
Whilst in the English language version of the survey presented in Appendix 2 used technical 
terms like “biodiversity”, “demand” and  “bid”, these terms had no direct translation in to the 
diversity of local tribal languages encountered in the survey, into which the questions were 
translated. Much time was spent in discussion with the survey team to ensure their full 
comprehension of the underlying concepts so that more appropriate and detailed translation 
could be made when administering the survey locally. Local comprehension of the survey 
issues was significantly aided by conservation education and awareness programs that have 
been operation around the protected area sites in recent years.  
 
Usually it took the team of 5 enumerators about 3 days in each community to complete the 
interviews. During this period the research team either found local lodgings, or camped within 
the community. The extended period of contact with local people allowed the team to develop 
a high degree of familiarity with the social and natural environment of each community. This 
often gave opportunities to discuss responses and triangulate on any issues to highlight 
discrepancies. For example, amongst some of the diverse local cultures in which the survey 
was administered, it was culturally taboo to tell strangers how many children or livestock the 
household has for fear of bringing bad luck and the possible loss.  However it is not a social 
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taboo for neighbours or other local key informants to divulge information about one another’s 
situation, so a point of triangulation of the accuracy of information was available. 
 
Execution of the CV exercise was significantly aided by the lengthy household social and 
economic study, being in a sense a warm up exercise, with the respondent to explore local 
cost benefit issues in depth. This may have helped to produce a more considered response to 
the CV question and avoid confusion in responses. In the results section we show that there 
were few 0 or no bids recorded. Sampling of households was on a random stratified basis of 
wealth categories within a community (identified through a participatory wealth ranking 
exercise). Data were collected on 690 households in communities around each of three 
different protected area (Table 4.3), and included not only the CV bids, but also various 
social, economic household data. The protected areas are ecologically different (tropical 
closed canopy rainforest, afromontane forest and savannah woodland) which means different 
ranges of goods and services and therefore utility derived by local households.  
 
Local impressions of wealth are site specific making inter-community comparisons of 
households difficult i.e. a wealthy household in one community might be poor in another. In 
each case a monetary estimate of total household income (adjusted per adult equivalent unit – 
see method described in chapter 2) was made so that households can be allocated to income 
quartiles as a basis for comparison. An assessment was made of the demographic composition 
of each household, level of education, employment etc. Income data was collected on total 
household income in terms of sale and consumption of protected area and non-protected area 
goods. The stated preferences from the CVM study may therefore be compared on the basis of 







Table 4.3 Data collection sample frame 
 























































  Total HH 660 330 330 
 
The CVM study is based on the stated preference of local households stratified by different 
management approaches and income, using a provision point to reduce strategic bias from 
respondents and free riding.  
4.6.3 Results 
Results are presented in two parts firstly to give some socio-economic context to the study 
some basic descriptive data are reviewed on household income, wealth and demographic 
characteristics. Secondly the CV results are reviewed to empirically test the PPM performance 
in mitigating bias specifically does it decrease the likelihood of an individual’s overstatement 
of a bid and give a more accurate measure of true WTA. In addition socio-economic 
determinants of WTA bid value are also presented.  A total of 10 interviews were discarded as 
incomplete due to poor completion or respondent unwillingness to complete the interview 
leaving 680 completed surveys to be included in the analysis.  
4.6.3 a) Local socio-economic context 
Typically all households surveyed were involved in subsistence agriculture. As such they fit 
the model of a peasant-farming household. There are two main distinguishing features of 
peasant economies, partial integration into markets and the incomplete natures of the markets 
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in which they operate(Ellis 1993). Incomplete integration refers to their ability to engage in or 
withdraw from markets as they choose. This in part is due to their variable capacity to provide 
much of their own food requirements as well as from the imperfect market in which they 
operate. Market incompleteness refers to the sporadic operation of certain markets. For 
example Ellis (1993) cites seasonal demand for labour for harvesting at differential wage 
rates, the difficulty in obtaining imported inputs and the restricted availability of consumer 
goods in rural areas. Peasant societies often exhibit a form of barter or other non-market 
transactions between farm households that of course have an economic basis but their 
reciprocal nature makes it difficult to value such transactions in a market context. In order to 
give some broad contextual background to the survey respondents some basic socio-economic 
characteristics aggregated at the survey site level are presented below. 


















Budongo 60 6.37 3.02 3.35 47.38 
Tengele 59 5.78 3.02 2.85 51.45 
QEPA 319 6.14 3.14 3.18 49.75 
Bwindi 232 6.24 3.35 3.07 52.18 
All 670 6.16 3.19 3.13 50.53 
hh= household 
 
Table 4.4 shows the composition by gender. The average household size across the sample 
was 6.16 individuals approximately evenly split between men and women. There was no 
significant difference between sites. Average household size (mean number of occupants) was 
slightly higher than the national average of 5.1 persons (UBOS 2003). 










Budongo 60 21.55 23.45 22.10 
Tengele 59 20.68 19.89 22.01 
QEPA 319 22.40 22.74 23.17 
Bwindi 232 21.58 22.70 22.44 
All 670 21.89 22.55 22.72 
hh = household 
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Household average ages are quite low (Table 4.5) reflecting high proportions of young 
people.  These findings are consistent with the Uganda National Household Survey (UBOS 
2003) showing that slightly more than half the population of Uganda is below 15 years of age.  
 










Budongo 60 26.32 60.00 13.16 0.53 
Tengele 59 22.45 58.16 17.35 2.04 
QEPA 319 24.88 58.91 12.74 3.48 
Bwindi 232 26.90 60.41 10.48 2.21 
All 670 25.47 59.45 12.43 2.65 
 
In the proportion of household members, above the age of 15 years old, having no formal and 
secondary education there was no significant difference between sites (Table 4.6).  Significant 
differences were seen between sites in terms of the proportion of households receiving 
secondary (χ2= 140.462 d.f. = 21, Ф = 0.658, p<0.001) and higher education (χ2=76.539 d.f. = 
36, Ф = 0.933, p<0.001). Primary school education is provided freely by the state, but not 
secondary and tertiary education. Whilst the state has endeavoured to make primary schooling 
accessible to all through constructing and staffing rural primary schools, the program with 
secondary schools is not so advanced. Achieving secondary schooling and higher education 
will be influenced by both access and affordability. The overall proportions are in line with 
national averages 
















Budongo 60 7.38 1.50 8.88 
Tengele 59 5.89 0.63 6.51
QEPA 319 4.08 1.43 5.52 
Bwindi 232 3.95 0.88 4.83
All 670 4.49 1.18 5.67 
hh= household 
Significant differences between sites the amount of land owned (F=4.044, d.f. =3, p<0.01) 
and rented in (F=7.957, d.f. =3, p<0.001) were significantly different (Table 4.7). This is a 
reflection of the relative land scarcity and population densities of the different areas rather 
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than agro ecological potential. Bwindi has perhaps the highest population density and 
Budongo the lowest. Both along with Tengele are characterised agro ecologically as highly 
productive crop growing areas, being most tropical forest zones (Bwindi is also at a high 
altitude).  QEPA is largely a savannah and acacia woodland ecosystem (although there are 
areas of tropical high forest), with much more marginal arable production systems (dryland 
agriculture) and more pastoralisim. The areas around Budongo and Tenegele have also been 
more recently settled with natural forests on private lands being converted to agricultural land.   
A significant part of this conversion is due to recent population growth in the last 10 years, 
due to translocation of people from around the western parts of QEPA and Bwindi areas. 
 
Table 4.8 shows the mean hh income across all sites was just over $1010 per annum. There 
were however significant differences in annual hh income between sites. The overall annual 
value is consistent with the studies conducted by this author of $1009 per household per 
annum (Bush et al. 2004) and the values presented in Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
 
  































as a % of 
total hh 
income 
Budongo 60 373.30 4.40 1.05 3.35 23.93 1.18 
Tengele 59 894.00 44.16 29.79 14.37 67.47 4.94 
QEPA 319 1393.05 36.24 1.44 11.18 3.98 2.60 
Bwindi 232 681.37 0.05 0.05 0.00 100.00 0.01 
All 670 1011.35 21.56 3.42 10.54 15.88 2.13 
hh= household 
From this basic social and economic data we see that the respondents in this survey are 
overwhelmingly poor by international standards e.g. per capita income less than the $218 per 
day per capita global poverty measure. In addition survey households were highly and reliant 
on natural resources as the foundation of their livelihood. Less than 2% of the sample 
                                                 




recorded sources of income other than agriculture, livestock or protected area related income 
e.g. casual labour, remittances from extended family or small business activities.  Locally 
acute fuel wood shortages may mean that the substitutability of protected area products for 
money may in general be low, as locally it may be difficult to source fuel wood should none 
be forthcoming from the protected area.  
4.6.3 b) Impact of the PPM on mean bid value and distribution  
As a reminder this contingent valuation study utilised a provision point mechanism (PPM) 
where the implementation of a community protected area management scheme is dependant 
on the sum of respondent bids not exceeding a maximum threshold.  Bids were solicited in the 
local currency (Ugandan Shillings, UGS), but results are presented in $US terms (exchange 
rate, 1900UGS/$US). A total of 4 zero bids and 5 no responses were recorded to the WTA 
bidding out of the 680 completed surveys. Where 0 or no response was forthcoming 
clarification was sought from the respondent. The 0 bids may have genuinely been because 
those households did not use the protected area however cases of ‘no response’ can be 
variously attributed to respondents not understanding the valuation exercise, as well as the 
valuation task not being relevant because there was genuinely no use of the protected area.  
 
Protest bids are a common problem in all WTA valuation exercises, and the PPM cannot be 
expected to eliminate true protests. The reasons behind such a protest response may be 
difficult to ascertain. It may be due to cultural factors i.e. opposition to any form of control 
over local access, or due to people having a grudge about being displaced from former 
traditional lands.  However, a credible PPM scenario should curtail the number of very high 
claims that are not simply true protest bids. At a minimum, the limit on the total amount that 
can be paid out in compensation provides a strategic incentive to bring one’s claim closer to 
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the true value of losses. If anything, PPM results might also make it easier to screen for true 
protest bids by comparing the distributions of bids across payment scenarios19. 
 
The main effect of the PPM should be to reduce mean bid value, upper extreme value and 
variance, when compared to bids solicited without the use of a PPM device. We would expect 
the variance to reduce with the device as bids will range from 0 to some upper value. If the 
upper extreme value is reduced then consequently the spread of bids is reduced which means 
that degree of standard deviation will also be reduced. Table 4.9 sets out the descriptive 
statistics for the sample.  

























Bound   
NO PPM 337 482 541 29 1.12 424 540 0 3,158 
WIITH 
PPM 338 354 320 17 
0.90 
319 388 0 1,579 
ALL 675 418 448 17 1.07 384 452 0 3,158 
(Mann Whitney U test mean WTP; Z = -2.605, p<0.01) 
When considering the entire data set between the two cases the mean WTP with the PPM 
device20 was $354 compared to $482 without the PPM device, this difference was found to be 
significant (Z= -2.605, p<0.01). With the PPM device a lower standard error was recorded 
($17 compared to $29) and a lower maximum bid value ($1,579 compared to $3,158) than 
when the PPM device was not used. Given the degree of difference in the mean values S.E. 
may not be directly comparable therefore the coefficient of variation is used, which also 
shows a lower coefficient with the PPM than without the device. Data conform to all of the 
hypothesised effects as mean bid value, upper extreme value and sample variance are all 
reduced with the use of a PPM device. 
                                                 
19 Another possibility, not explored here, is that if respondents think that the size of the compensation fund is 
partly endogenous, they might increase their bids to raise the provision point. 




Figure 4.2 Distribution of WTA bids under different experimental treatments 
 
The distributions of bids under the different experimental treatments are shown in Figure 4.2; 
it seems that broadly speaking without the PPM respondents made fewer high bids. In 
comparison of quartiles of the two treatments distributions (Table 4.10) we can see more 
clearly where the effects of the PPM lie. From the table it can be observed that the differences 
in quartile means standard deviations are quite small and not significant except for the highest 
quartiles, where the mean bid value with the PPM treatment was difference was significantly 
lower than without the treatment (Z= -3.852, p<0.001). This shows that the PPM in this case 
has had the effect of lowering the upper bid values only, indicative that little free riding going 
on amongst respondents at lower bid levels. 
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NO PPM Lowest 25% 65.47 79 32.18 3.62 0.49 
 
Lower 
middle 25%  212.19 79 53.67 6.04 0.25 
 
Upper 
middle 25% 435.64 79 105.87 11.91 0.24 
 
Highest 
25% 1835.95 77 2007.60 228.79 1.09 
       
WITH 
PPM Lowest 25% 58.60 79 31.93 3.59 0.54 
 
Lower 
middle 25%  206.76 79 53.92 6.07 0.26 
 
Upper 
middle 25% 405.46 79 112.12 12.61 0.28 
 
Highest 
25% 1102.70 78 953.51 107.96 0.86 
       
* Quartiles assigned from within each treatment distribution not entire sample 
The impacts on hypothetical bias are less clear, but the similarity of the mean bid values in the 
lower quartiles shows that the PPM either had no effect, or perhaps that there was little 
hypothetical bias in the responses in the first instance. An interesting experiment by Murphy 
et al (2005) evaluated the impact of ‘cheap talk’21 on hypothetical bias in a PPM valuation, 
finding that it did indeed help to reduce hypothetical bias. However the design of this 
experiment does not allow us to conclusively test for this. 
4.6.3 c) Effects of the PPM and social and economic influences on bid value 
It might be expected that peoples’ WTA statements would depend on a number of social, 
economic and institutional factors (livelihoods context) that might influence bid value e.g. 
current level of use of the protected area and the role that these resources play in reducing 
vulnerability, or the demand in the household for food and income.  Livelihood strategies are 
also dictated by options therefore access to or ownership of other resources and 
communications to market as well as proximity to the park may also be determining factors of 
protected area use. The institutional structure governing people’s use of the protected area 
resource may also pay an important factor in people WTA responses, and these might be 
                                                 
21 Cheap Talk is where an explanation of the bias problem is delivered in the hypothetical scenario to 
respondents prior to the valuation task 
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given proxy measure where these were surveyed.  The variables that most closely correspond 
to such social, economic and institutional factors are described in table 4.11 below.   
 
In the case of the governance structure, dummy variables were used to account for the 4 
different governance types of protected area or the level of effective enforcement of current 
access restrictions. As such 3 dummies were constructed with the omitted variable being the 
strict national park (Queen Elizabeth Protected Area), where legally there is no direct use of 
the protected area allowed other than tourism. The other dummies are arranged in order of 
increasing community use rights. It is could also be expected that there we should see an 
increasing WTA with increasing community use rights therefore an increase in the magnitude 
of the coefficient between GTDUMMY1 to GTDUMMY3, demonstrating higher levels of 
utility towards the protected area under more participative governance arrangements. 
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Table 4.11 Variable descriptions for determinants of bid value 
Variable Description Expected sign 
HHTOTALO       Household total occupants; total number of 
individuals in the household irrespective of 
age/sex class 
Positive - the greater the number of 
household occupants the more labour there 
is to exploit resources therefore the higher 
the value of protected area income and 
WTA value 
AGRILAND      Agricultural land (Ha.); area of agricultural 
land cultivated by the household  
Negative - the more agricultural land a 
household farms the more resources 
required for farm operations and the less 
resources available to exploit the local 
protected area and lower use value therefore 
a lower WTA 
ATHI           Adjusted Net total household income; net 
total annual household income  
Negative - the higher the level of adjusted 
household income the lower the utility of 
protected area direct benefits and WTA as 
households are engaging in other income 
generating activities 
APAI Adjusted Net Protected Area Income; net 
total annual protected area income  
Positive - the higher the level of APAI the 
lower the higher the utility of protected area 
direct benefits and therefore WTA as 
households get increasing level of direct 
financial benefits from the protected area 
DISTMARK       Distance to market (Km); distance from 
households dwelling to travel to nearest 
market 
Positive - the further away from markets the 
higher the value a household might hold for 
protected area goods thus a lower WTA  
DISTPA         Distance to protected area  (Km); distance 
from household’s dwelling to the protected 
area boundary 
Negative - access is an important factor of 
protected area use, the further away a 
household is from the protected area the less 
attractive it may be as a livelihood resource 
and lower utility and WTA  
EXPTREA        Experimental Treatment; bid with or 
without PPM device (dummy with 0 with 
the PPM device) 
Positive - higher bids are expected without 
the PPM device than with it 
GTDUMMY1      Governance type, dummy variable 1; 
national park with some community co-
management (Bwindi Impenetrable Forest 
National Park) 
Positive aggregate of individual household 
welfare value of direct use of  protected 
area should be higher than the omitted 
variable 
GTDUMMY2      Governance type, dummy variable 2; forest 
reserve with collaborative management 
(Budongo Central Forest Reserve) 
Positive aggregate of individual household 
welfare value of direct use of  protected 
area should be higher than the omitted 
variable
GTDUMMY3      Governance type, dummy variable 3; 
community owned and managed reserve 
(Tengele Community Forest Reserve) 
Positive aggregate of individual household 
welfare value of direct use of  protected 
area should be higher than the omitted 
variable
 
Multicollinearity is a common problem in analysis of cross-sectional data (Green, 2003). The 
severity of multicollinearity among explanatory variables was checked using the Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) comparison. VIF is (1-Ri2)-1, which is the diagonal element of the 
inverse correlation matrix; where R2i is the coefficient of determination obtained from 
auxiliary regression. According to Gujarati (1995) as a rule of thumb, if VIF exceeds 10, this 
is considered as an indicator for the existence of serious multicollinearity problems between 
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regressors. VIF estimates for the regressors are found in Table 3.12 and show that there were 
no serious multicollinearity problems. 
 
Table 3.12 Variance inflation factor collinearity statistics for regressors 












A Tobit model was applied to the selected variables that could have had an influence on bid 
value. A Tobit model was utilised, as the bid value could be any value from 0 to infinity, thus 
the data are effectively censored for any values below e.g. there could be in theory negative 
WTP values (however unlikely). Such a case cold be where a respondent may in fact be 
willing to pay to conserve the park, such observations would be recorded as a 0. However 
given that only 4 zero bids were actually recorded the effects on the model are likely to be 
limited.  An OLS regression is also reported alongside the TOBIT estimate to assess any kind 
of bias that may be introduced as a result of the different estimation procedures.  
 
Only 472 observations were included in the model compared to 675 in the descriptive 
statistics as a full set of data on all of the parameters was not available. Both the variables 
DISTMARK and DISTPA had a high number of missing entries. This was due to distance 
measurements in km being poorly understood by respondents as distance is more commonly 







Table 4.13 Results for determinants of bid value 














HHTOTALO       9.00 1.23 8.631 1.169 7.31 6.22 
AGRILAND    -0.89* -2.11 -0.922* -2.155 0.42 2.48 
ATHI            2.90e-7 0.681 2.86e-6 0.653 4.29e-6 642.1 
APAI 1.197e-4** 2.786 1.19e-4** 2.836 4.33e-5 24.9 
DISTMARK       3.52 0.53 3.67   0.492   6.61 3.24 
DISTPA         10.02 0.87 10.62   0.908   11.59 1.43 
EXPTREA        114.56** 3.02 75.54**     2.475 37.98 - 
GTDUMMY1      -11.01 -0.18 -9.09 -0.150 60.03 - 
GTDUMMY2      -25.24 -0.39 -25.17 -0.385   
 
64.97 - 
GTDUMMY3  -199.75** -2.82 -192.11* -2.689   
 
70.86 - 
CONSTANT 343.44*** 54.30 323.44***   5.858 55.2  - 
Disturbance 
standard 
deviation (σ)  
429.18*** 30.657   - - 14.00 - 
p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001; Tobit - n=472, R2 (Decomposition) = 0.061; OLS - R2 = 0.064, F= 3.94, d.f. = 9, 
463 p<0.001 
Results, in Table 4.13, show only three significant explanatory variables of bid value in the 
model, AGRILAND, EPTREA, GTDUMMY3. No bias was detected as a result of the 
estimation procedures, although the significance of the GTDUMMY3 variable declined 
slightly under the OLS procedure. 
 
The significance of AGRILAND was of interest. The relationship was negative, indicating 
that those households with more agricultural land hold a lower value for protected area access 
than those with less agricultural land. This infers that rather than exploiting the protected area, 
such households prefer to employ their household labour in the transformation of their own 
natural capital. It comes as no surprise that EXPTREA was significant as previously 
demonstrated; the PPM mechanism has an effect on reducing the mean bid value. NPAI had a 
significant positive effect, which is consistent as higher levels of income from the protected 
area would also imply higher welfare values. 
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GTDUMMY3 also showed a significant and negative relationship compared to the constant. 
The dummies for governance type are arranged in order of increasing community 
involvement in control and ownership of the resource. Although GTDUMMY1 and 
GTDUMMY2 were not significant, they also showed a negative value, but much less than 
that of GTDUMMY3.  
 
Initially one might expect that with increasing community ownership and control we should 
see increasing bid values for WTA, and that the coefficient for GTDUMMY3 could be 
positive, or at least less negative than GTDUMMY 1 or 2.  A number of factors may have 
affected this result Dependence on a local protected area is not only intra site specific issue, 
but inter site as well. If we look at the mean land holdings between sites (Table 4.14), we see 
that there are some distinct differences. Tengele (GTDUMMY3) households have a high 
mean land holding with a low standard deviation form the mean compared to the other sites.  
 
Table 4.14 Descriptive statistics for land ownership by study site 






Interval for Mean Minimum Maximum
     
Lower 
Bound Upper Bound  
Budongo 55 7.377273 13.8232 1.863919 3.64034 11.11421 0.25 80 
Tengele 58 5.887931 4.813216 0.632006 4.62236 7.153502 1 30 
QEPA 291 4.082646 7.3838 0.432846 3.230728 4.934564 0 80
Bwindi 225 3.948978 5.93471 0.395647 3.169311 4.728645 0.01 50 
Total 629 4.48938 7.573974 0.301994 3.896339 5.08242 0 80
 
According to the regression model AGRILAND was an important factor in lowering 
respondents WTA value, thus respondents in Tengele may have had a lower WTA value than 
the strict national park for this reason. 
 
If we consider the broader institutional context de facto access might be another key factor in 
explaining this apparent anomaly. In the case of a strict national park, although there the 
regulations do not allow any use by local communities, poor local enforcement of the 
regulations by under resourced staff means that a de facto open access arrangement exists. In 
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this case use is unregulated and also likely to be unsustainable. With increasing levels of 
community involvement in the management of the protected area more effective enforcement 
of lower but more sustainable levels of use may be apparent. This means that overall less 
goods are available to the community form the protected area and therefore less on an 
individual basis to households in the community.  
 
Another contextual factor that may affect the result is that in the site represented by 
GTDUMMY 3 (Tengele) is under a collaborative forest management scheme and was 
gazetted within the last 5 years. Prior to that Tengele was open access forest on private land. 
The other sites have been under some form of protection by the state since the 1950s. Recent 
developments in the region have seen large investments in tobacco and tea. Therefore the 
local people may be experiencing some sense of loss in terms of the opportunity cost of the 
land upon which the forest lies. Financial returns may be higher in terms of alternative land 
uses than the forest products that can be extracted under the CFM arrangement.   
 
Another consideration may be that given a functioning management regime was only recently 
enforced, this relatively small forest could have already been depleted of most of its valuable 
timber and NTFP, thus the low value may be less to do with the governance arrangement than 
the relative scarcity of resources available. Although the mean adjusted value of protected 
area goods was highest in Tengele, there was also a higher degree of variance in the 
individual values than other sites. Therefore the mean value was biased upwards by a few 
households expropriating a greater share of the available benefits.  
 
No significant value was found for DISTPA. It was hypothesised that proximity to the 
protected area might be an important factor in that household further away from the protected 
area might value their benefits less. However this result is not conclusive in that a sampling 
bias might be present as the sample population were households in communities adjacent to 
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the protected area. The mean distance from the protected area was calculated as 1.43km. This 
might change in a broader sampling frame in which more variance to the proximity of the 
protected area occurred. No significant relationship was noted for DISTMARK as access to 
markets may have been similar across the sample frame. This result is not conclusive as 
proximity to markets was not a specific sampling criterion.  
 
In addition ATHI also showed no significant impact on the bid value, indicating that there 
was no specific income effects observable in this data on the economic value of protected area 
to households. This is an inserting finding, as a key assumption in ICDP approaches is that 
making protected area adjacent households wealthier may in some way reduce their use or 
dependence on protected area resources. This result indicates that at best increasing local 
household incomes (ceteris paribus) it will have no significant change on local use of the 
protected area. 
4.6.3 d) Evaluating the difference between the MPM value and the CV estimates 
From the market price estimate of total annual mean net protected area income ($22) and the 
CV estimate with the PPM device ($320) we can see that there is a large difference ($298, just 
over 10 times) in mean value estimates. This is not surprising as the two approaches 
essentially measure different things; the MPM measures financial values and the CV 
economic values (financial plus non-market). Whilst it is difficult to ascertain by how much 
the magnitude in the difference is affected by hypothetical market bias, we can be sure that 
the PPM device has acted to reduce its impact. Essentially the difference between the two 
values is a measure of the non-market benefit of protected area access.  
 
It would be interesting to understand which type of households i.e. what social and economic 
factors, might determine the level of difference between the financial value and the economic 
values in the different estimates. In terms of dependence on forest resources, irrespective of 
the absolute financial value of protected area goods harvested by a household, there will be 
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variation in the perception of the role that protected area goods play in maintaining living 
standards through reducing the impact of seasonal and cyclical shocks and thus mitigating 
risk. The main hypothesis in this case is that that the more protected area dependant a 
household, the higher the difference between the financial and economic estimate will be, 
where dependency is a function of the lack of other alternatives to maintain a household living 
standards.  
 
A Tobit model was applied to the same set of selected social and economic variables as in the 
previous analysis against the MPM-CV difference (GAP). The Tobit is applicable in this case 
as any negative values would be assigned as zero. In this analysis a subset of cases was used 
representing WTA values where the PPM was applied, as testing the effect of experimental 
treatment was not an objective. The model fit is not very good with a low R2 values, 
indicating a lot of sample variance, but a few key variables do stand out as being strongly 
significant. 
 
The analysis reveals some interesting results (Table 4.14), household total occupants 
(HHTOTALO) was positive and significant, the larger the household size the more likely a 
bigger GAP value. This might be because larger families feel more dependant on forest 
resources for livelihoods security i.e. a larger household may have higher vulnerability to 
seasonal shocks such as when crops fail, thus they may have a higher social value attributed to 
being able to access the protected area. AGRILAND was significant and negatively associated 
with higher values of GAP. Thus the more agricultural land a household has the less likely 
that there is a big GAP, showing clearly that household perception of dependency on the 
protected area is related to having other livelihoods options.  
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Table 4.14 Tobit regression determinants of GAP (difference between CV – WTA and MPM 
valuation results) 
Variable ( X) Coefficient (β) Standard 
Error 
b/St.Er. Mean of X 
HHTOTALO*      18.63 6.44 2.89 6.32 
AGRILAND **     -0.05 0.07 -0.66 2.48 
ATHI            0.00 0.00 2.183 162.54 
DISTMARK       0.08 0.07 1.12 3.24 
DISTPA         -0.20 0.16 -1.24 1.43 
GTDUMMY1     -55.18 38.92 -1.42  
GTDUMMY2      -25.94 62.34 -0.42  
GTDUMMY3 **    -250.08 72.44 -3.45  
CONSTANT *** 326.70 85.74 3.81   
Disturbance standard 
deviation (σ) *** 
310.48 12.03 25.8     
 n=337; R2 (Decomposition) = 0.051; * p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
          
The other significant variable was GTDUMMY3, the community forest management 
scenario, which showed a negative relationship. The community management scheme is a 
recent innovation, having only begun two years ago, when the protected area was more or less 
an open access resource. Owing to more effective enforcement of use regulations, local 
households may have reduced access to the resources, increasing vulnerability and the feeling 
of risk. Despite local households currently extracting a low mean value this does not represent 
the real social value of access to the protected area. Market valuations are in this sense 
inadequate as they do not take account of transaction costs and risks as well as transformation 
costs involved in asset use or production. 
4.7 Discussion and Conclusion 
4.7.1 Methodological 
As previously discussed there has been a general reluctance to implement WTA-CV studies 
because of perceived theoretical and practical problems in eliciting useable data. However on 
balance it was noted that the same set of theoretical problems in fact rationally affect WTP-
CV studies as well so there is no reason not to use WTA as a measure form a theoretical 
perspective. In addition choice of valuation approach must be carefully considered in a 
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property rights context and that WTA was the most valid measure when trying to reflect a 
private welfare loss. Otherwise this could lead to misspecification of the valuation task 
resulting in the valuation task being irrelevant and introducing hypothetical bias, which may 
also be a cause of WTP-WTA disparity. 
 
This study represents one of few PPM assessments in a field setting and perhaps the first 
applied to assessing the effectiveness of the mechanism in a WTA context. The results clearly 
show that the PPM has the desired effect in mitigating bias in responses to the valuation task, 
which gives a more reliable estimate of consumer surplus. However there still exists an 
incentive to strategically overstate true losses or making an extraordinarily high bid to veto 
the project by stating a WTA greater than the provision point thus the mechanism is not 
incentive compatible. Whilst the overstatement problem is difficult to eliminate in its entirety, 
as was discussed earlier the veto problem can be eliminated by simply not defining the PP 
amount. In this way the provision point is used in a conceptual manner to reduce free riding 
and bias. 
 
The PPM in this case has had the effect of lowering the upper bid values only, indicative that 
little free riding going on amongst respondents at lower bid levels. The impacts on 
hypothetical bias are less clear, but the similarity of the mean bid values in the lower quartiles 
shows that the PPM either had no effect, or perhaps that there was little hypothetical bias in 
the responses in the first instance. This may be related to issues to do with different preference 
structures amongst segments of the population and echoes the concerns of Burton et al (2007) 
regarding the importance of an individual level of analysis and the impacts of risk preference 
on responses in subsets of the sample.  
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An interesting experiment by Murphy et al (2005) evaluated the impact of ‘cheap talk’22 on 
hypothetical bias in a PPM valuation, finding that it did indeed help to reduce hypothetical 
bias. However the design of this experiment does not allow us to conclusively test for this. 
Although in theory the PPM is not demand revealing empirically it could be although 
experimental evidence on this is mixed. Bagnoli and Mckee (1991) found that their 
respondents implemented on of the Nash equilibrium surprisingly frequently, but they did not 
reveal value.  Rondeau (1999) found that respondents did reveal demand, but it was not a 
Nash equilibrium and in Rondeau (2005) found that respondents over contributed at low 
induced values and under contributed at high induced values and although they did 
approximate demand revelation in aggregate.  
 
There is a potential bias issue related to the hypothetical scenario and micro behavioural 
decision making at the household level. Given the labour resource constraint in terms of 
protected area exploitation discussed earlier,  if respondents are asked to contribute labour to 
monitoring and enforcement efforts there exists a trade off related to the amount of effort 
required to be put in to the scheme in return for a payment versus the current level of effort to 
maintain the status quo. No clear specification of the amount of effort required was made. 
Although the PPM estimate does give a smaller figure we should not assume that this is equal 
to the actual welfare measure. It is however the best estimate. Clearer specification of the 
level of effort required in implementing the proposed scheme would then mean respondent 
could make a decision regarding the returns to labour which would be implicit in their bid, 
making the estimate more robust. 
 
In terms of the application of the valuation approach in a developing country context a variety 
of contextual considerations were discussed in relation to the application of CV studies. These 
considerations were adopted in the design and implementation of this survey where the 
                                                 
22 Cheap Talk is where an explanation of the bias problem is delivered in the hypothetical scenario to 
respondents prior to the valuation task 
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applicability of an individual payment to households that are by and large operating in a 
functioning market economy all be it in a subsistence mode of production.  
 
The control for the study was a corresponding CV study where the hypothetical scenario left 
out the PPM description. This means that we are unable to make direct comparisons between 
WTP-WTA measures. However the results look favourable in light of the reduced mean bid 
value of the WTA measure and theoretical prediction of improved WTP values, further 
empirical testing of the PPM effects is imperative. In addition it would also be interesting to 
test the impact of bid elicitation format between the open ended and double bounded formats 
according to the different PPM treatments in order to understand the implications for more 
accurate demand revelation. 
4.7.2 Conservation management 
Determining what social and economic parameters affected bid value revealed three 
interesting results. Access to agricultural land (AGRILAND) had a marked impact on the bid 
value. This indicates that households with more agricultural land for cultivation value 
protected area resources less than those with less land. This is an indication that protected area 
dependency is linked to the lack of access to other livelihoods means. This is especially 
interesting when compared to the result that levels of adjusted household income (ATHI) 
were not seen to have an impact on bid value indicating that the value of the protected area 
goods available to households may be similar.  This may be an indication that wealthier 
households are using the protected area because they can, whilst poorer households are using 
the resources because they have fewer other choices. 
 
Access arrangements are also an important determinant of bid value. Whilst community 
involvement in managing and protecting biodiversity and environmental resources can be 
effective in terms of enforcement of regulations, the significance of the parameter for 
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community owned and managed protected area (GTDUMMY3) showed that attempts to 
formalise the management of natural resources in communities can also have negative 
impacts on household perceptions of welfare. In light of the forest dependency issue this 
raises a concern of equity related to poverty alleviation, in that where poorer households are 
more dependant on protected area resources, they will be hit hardest if reductions on the 
availability of those resources are imposed upon them. However we must treat this result 
cautiously as the case of community forest management in Tengele CFR is subject to number 
of external institutional and economic factors that may not be generally representative of other 
protected area in the study i.e. opportunity cost of land, recent gazettment of the community 
forest reserve and extent of degradation of the forest prior to gazettment.    
 
It does however highlight the complexities of setting up such schemes, especially with the 
objective of establishing equity in the management of natural resources. Whilst the objective 
of conserving the forest seems to be a clear outcome of the scheme, the benefits to the 
community may be perceived to be less in the short term due to the opportunity cost of land 
being high through converting the forest to agricultural land for cash crop production. Such 
dynamics may be decreasing willingness for the community to take part in collaborative 
management efforts. 
 
Such dynamics are critical issues when thinking about ICDP approaches and efforts to pursue 
community based approaches to conservation. Any alternative activities to protected area use 
must be designed to offset the local welfare loss (economic loss) rather than simply the 
financial loss to maintain household participation. In addition the social perspective on the 
value of the protected area is not static and may change over time.  This is a minimum 
requirement, in that imposition of welfare losses must to be met with similar welfare gains 
from other sources in order to change local behaviour and perceptions towards protected area.  
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A quantitative understanding the scope and nature of costs and benefits helps realistic 
planning in terms of understanding the investments required to implement successful ICDP.  
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Chapter 5:  
Valuing the demand for mountain gorilla eco-tourism in 
Rwanda; testing for non-compensatory preference 
inconsistencies and hypothetical market bias using a cut 
offs based choice experiment  
5.1 Introduction 
In many developing countries, tourism is providing an increasingly important source of 
foreign revenues and direct investment (Kontoleon & Swanson 2003; Wunder 2000). In 
Rwanda, tourism is a particularly dynamic sub-sector, thanks to the charismatic mountain 
gorilla Gorilla beringei beringei found in the Volcanoes National Park (VNP) in the north-
west of the country.  VNP consists of about 160km2 of montane forest and until Rwanda’s 
independence in 1962 was part of Africa’s first national park, the Parc National Albert, 
created in 1925 with an intention of protecting the great apes (ORTPN 2004). Both the 
mountain gorillas and the VNP as a tourist destination became internationally renowned 
through the work of the conservationist Dian Fossey who died in 1986 and whose biography 
was later turned into the popular movie “Gorillas in the Mist”. By the early 1980’s Rwanda 
was receiving up to 22,000 visits to the national parks annually. However, visits collapsed 
during the genocide, civil war and subsequent period of insecurity from 1994 to 1998 
(ORTPN, 2004).  Despite recent serious threats to the gorillas from illegal hunting, today the 
park is well protected, and numbers of the great apes are increasing  (Gray et al. 2003). 
 
Since the park was re-opened in 1999 its tourism industry has seen an incredible rebound 
from 417 park visits in that year to around 30,000 park visits in 2006. Tourism is currently 
ranked as the third highest foreign revenue earner for Rwanda, generating around $35.7 
million of income in 2006 (Republic of Rwanda 2007). To understand the national 
significance of the sector, tea, coffee and minerals accounted for more than 80% of all export 
receipts in 2005 (UNCTD 2006). This equates to annual non-tourism exports per capita of just 
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$18 – far below the sub-Saharan African average of $145 (Republic of Rwanda 2005). 
Likewise, the share of exports in GDP is one of the lowest in the world at 5.3% 
(Republic of Rwanda 2005). Coupled with this Rwanda relies heavily on imports for 
consumer, intermediate and capital goods. Tourism is thus one of Rwanda’s priority sectors 
for economic development, so that understanding international demand for tourism is an 
important task. Eco tourism is a pivotal concept in the model of tourism development that 
Rwanda is currently following. In the context of this study we consider eco-tourism to be 
nature based tourism that actively benefits local communities e.g. socially responsible 
(Wunder 2000).  Economic valuation methods can help us identify how much tourists are 
willing to pay for the opportunity to visit national parks (Schultz et al. 1998), and importantly 
in the context of eco-tourism understand their preferences for both biodiversity conservation 
and local social benefits from nature tourism activities (Naidoo & Adamowicz 2005). 
 
Valuation practitioners are increasingly developing an interest in alternative stated preference 
formats such as choice experiments. CE is a family of survey-based methodologies for 
modelling preferences for goods, where goods are described in terms of their attributes and of 
the levels that these take. Respondents are presented with various alternative descriptions of a 
good, differentiated by their attributes and levels, and are asked to rank the various 
alternatives, to rate them or to choose their most preferred. By including price/cost as one of 
the attributes of the good, willingness to pay can be indirectly recovered from people’s 
rankings, ratings or choices. As with contingent valuation, CE can also measure all forms of 
value including non-use values. The conceptual microeconomic framework for CE lies in 
Lancaster’s (1966)  characteristics theory of value which assumes that consumer’ utilities for 
goods can be disaggregated into utilities for composing characteristics. Empirically, CE has 
been widely used in the market research and transport literatures (Green & Srinivasan 1978; 
Hensher 1994; Swait 2001), but has only relatively recently been applied to other areas such 
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as the environment.  (Glenk et al. 2006; Hanley et al. 1998; Hanley et al. 2000; Naidoo & 
Adamowicz 2005). 
 
The application of CE to the environment has stimulated some debate over its applicability 
regarding valuing ecosystem services such as flood or erosion control (Gatto & de Leo 2000; 
Glenk et al. 2006; Morrison et al. 1998; Nunes & van den Bergh 2001). Problems arise when 
respondents are unfamiliar with the scientific aspects of such services in order to make 
meaningful choices between sets of attributes. The complexity of the ecological subject matter 
usually does not allow improvement of respondent comprehension through more detailed 
explanation in the scenario presented. Clearly the problem of scenario uncertainty not just 
limited to environmental goods and can clearly be extended to any context such as social 
benefits. Therefore one of the key challenges in scenario design is to be sufficiently explicit 
about the goods or services to be valued or to value less complex proxy attributes.  
 
Recent developments in CE in the transport economics literature (Swait 2001) have seen the 
incorporation of attribute cut-offs23 as a direct response to the issue of measuring the limits 
within which decisions are made by individuals over their preferences for different attributes 
within a specific choice framework.  These cut-offs represent a kink in the individual utility 
curve with respect to the tradeoffs that consumers make. Knowledge of the cut-off limits can 
help to explain in more detail consumer behaviour and may substantially improve our ability 
to predict behavioural changes arising from policies that may affect attribute levels. 
Importantly cut-offs may be used to screen for irrational choices and could be a way of 
moderating hypothetical market bias in stated choice data that has yet to be explored in the 
literature. 
 
                                                 
23 Cut-offs are minimum or maximum tolerances or thresholds of demand for a products features influencing 
consumer choices.  
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In this chapter, we use the “cut-offs” model proposed by Swait (2001) to represent choices 
and preferences for ecotourism related to mountain gorillas in Rwanda. The cutoffs model 
was initially suggested as a way of handling the non-compensatory nature of choices. Here, 
we extend it to allow consideration of inconsistencies in choice, and as a way of controlling 
for hypothetical market bias in stated preference choice data. We find that this allows a better 
fitting model to be estimated, and that it produces considerable effects on the implied 
willingness to pay for changes in ecotourism experience attributes. In addition we present a 
unique case study that values both consumer willingness to pay for biodiversity conservation 
and community benefits from mountain gorilla tourism. 
5.2 Background theory of choice experiments with cut-offs 
5..2.1 Choice experiments 
Random utility theory, in which consumers make discrete choices from a set of alternatives, 
underpins the choice experiment approach  (McFadden 1974; Train 2003). In random utility 
theory, the consumer is said to obtain utility U (conditional on their choice) from an 
alternative i. This conditional indirect utility function is composed of the deterministic 
component (V ), and a stochastic component (ε ). The utility of an option (i) for an individual 
n (Uin) is assumed to depend on environmental attributes of the option (Zi) and the socio-
economic characteristics of the individual (Sn).  
 
Uin = V(Zi, Sn) + ε(Zi, Sn)      (5.1) 
 
An alternative i will be chosen if it has a greater utility than alternative j. The probability of 
choosing i over j is thus 
 
p(i|C) = p{Vin + εin > Vjn +ε jn; j   C}    (5.2)  
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where C is the complete choice set. It is assumed that the error terms of the utility function are 
independently and identically distributed. Consequently the property of independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) requires that the probability of choosing one alternative over 
another is completely independent of the utility of the respective alternatives e.g. all pairs of 
alternatives are equally similar or dissimilar (Hensher et al. 2005). The probability of 
choosing i is given by,  







exp       (5.3) 
 
where Vi = V(Zi, S) is the indirect utility function, Zi is a vector of environmental attributes, S 
is a vector of socio-economic characteristics.  
 
The standard conditional logit model applies to choice experiments when Vin is defined as 
 jn kinkin XV         (5.4) 
where βk is the coefficient on attribute Xk . This model can be estimated by maximum 
likelihood techniques, and is a useful first cut at modelling choice behaviour. However, the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives property, which states that a change in the attributes of 
one alternative changes the probabilities of the other alternatives in proportion, may not be 
realistic in all settings.  
 
Secondly, the coefficients of all attributes are assumed to be the same for all respondents in a 
choice experiment, whereas in reality there may be substantial variability in how people 
respond to attributes. Thirdly the standard conditional choice model assumes IIA, whereas 
one might actually expect such factors to be correlated within decision-makers (Train, 2003). 
In addition to the conditional logit model, several alternatives are also offered as 
methodological advancements, such as mixed logit, multinomial logit, nested logit and 
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random parameters logit each with different sets of assumptions and applications depending 
on the constraints of the data. A comprehensive review is available in Train (2003). 
5.2.3 The cut-offs approach to choice modelling 
Swait (2001) indicates that in the extant literature dealing with consumer behaviour (drawing 
from economics, psychology and marketing) a practical anomaly exists. Generally it is 
concluded that humans are cognitive misers in that they adapt the amount of effort they invest 
in making optimal decision depending on the context and resources available (Bettman et al. 
1991; Ford et al. 1989; Payne et al. 1993). However this fact is not generally incorporated in 
to models of consumer decision making where it is normally assumed consumers actually use 
all the available information to make decisions. This assumption is more often an expedient of 
the difficulties sin modelling the relaxed assumptions associated with humans as cognitive 
misers. The cut off approach is a practical approach to relax the complete information 
assumption that is both straight forward to administer and also to model. This will result in a 
clearer understating of consumer behaviour and substantially improve predictions of 
consumer behaviour under different attribute conditions. 
 
In this chapter, we make use of the “cut-off” choice experiment approach proposed by Swait 
(2001) to investigate i) non-compensatory preferences and (ii) inconsistent behaviour. These 
are two issues of concern to economists making use of stated preference approaches for 
environmental valuation; and which also pose problems for the application for the rational 
economic model of cost-benefit analysis to project/policy appraisal.  
 
Non-compensatory preferences imply that models of consumer behaviour should not assume 
smooth, continuous indifference curves, such that any marginal change in environmental 
quality can be compensated for by a finite marginal change in some other good, this would 
imply WTA amounts are bounded.  In the ‘soft cut-offs’ approach presented in this chapter a 
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model of behaviour which is compensatory, demonstrated by the existence of a respondents 
stated minimum or maximum levels (cut-off) of an attribute which must be satisfied before an 
alternative will be chosen.  The cut-offs are ‘soft’ because the limits are not viewed as discrete 
where the individual can trade off the penalty loss against some other attribute. 
 
Choice inconsistencies represent a second major challenge to the use of stated preference 
methods of valuation. Such inconsistencies violate the neo-classical assumptions of 
preference, specifically that of the rational economic decision-maker e.g. where there are 
violations of the transitivity axiom (circular triads, where A   B, B   C, but C   A). Choice 
modellers have also sought to screen data for evidence of irrational choices for confirmation 
of irrational behaviour (Hanley et al. 2002); finding such behaviour then casts doubt on the 
reliability of choice data. In this chapter, the cut-off idea is developed as an additional test for 
preference inconsistencies.  
 
An additional idea explored here, is that it is also possible to identify respondents who violate 
their stated cut-offs by large enough amounts to suggest the presence of hypothetical market 
bias. For instance, a respondent may say that they would never pay more than $200 for a trip, 
but subsequently select a choice option with a cost of $300. An interesting exercise is then to 
compare choice model estimates under different assumptions about what constitutes a “large” 
violation of this stated cut-off. This could be a way of moderating hypothetical market bias in 
stated choice data that has yet to be explored in the literature. 
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Choice modelling assumes that respondents make rational choices that maximise their utility 
(equation 5.5 below). Following the theoretical framework used by Swait (2001), a typical 
formulation of the choice problem is:  
 
 
[ ] ( )




i C i C
Max U U X






    

     (5.5) 
 
where U is the utility, C is the set of substitute alternatives, δi is a choice indicator equal to 1 
if respondents choose alternative i and 0 otherwise, pi is the price of alternative i, Xi is the k 
dimensional vector that describes the good, and Y is respondents’ income. 
 
Under the above conditions, a respondent n is assumed to consistently evaluate all the 
attribute tradeoffs between alternatives and choose only one alternative in each choice set. 
According to  (Ford et al. 1989) , respondents may use “non-compensatory” decision rules to 
simplify these choices. Thus in reality, other decisions rules may be used by respondents in 
the choice exercise depending on factors such as the difficulty of the choice task, their 
knowledge about the goods under study, and the environmental and social conditions in which 
the choice is carried out.  
 
A cut-off is a non-compensatory choice heuristic intended to simplify choices in a world of 
costly decision-making. This suggests that even with perfect information, an individual has a 
problem in processing the costs and benefits of all of the alternatives e.g. individuals are 
unwilling or unable to maximise utility by considering all possible choices and their pay-offs, 
relative to their budget constraint. Thus, simplifying strategies are adopted due to the costs of 
information processing (Svenson 1996).  
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Swait notes that cut-off’s may be thought of as “hard” or “soft”. Hard cut-offs are attribute 
levels that must be reached before a choice is allowed; an example of strategy involving an 
alternative that must meet the cut-off for all attributes is known as conjunctive satisficing), as 
well as elimination-by-aspects  (Manari & Sinha 1989; Tversky 1972). However, cut-offs 
need not be hard: consumers can choose to violate them if the benefits are great enough (that 
is, once the opportunity costs of self-imposed cut-offs are recognised). 
 
The inclusion of hard cut-offs into the choice modelling framework requires adding additional 
constraints that impede respondents from choosing an alternative that violates any of their 
stated cut-offs. For example, if respondent n stated that he would not pay more than x (the 
hard cut-off value), the utility maximization process only considers all the alternatives with a 
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where θL = [l1 l2 ..... lk lp]´ is the vector of lower limits and price (lp) cut-offs; and θU = [u1 u2 ..... 
uk up]´ is the vector of upper limits and price (up) cut-offs; Zi = [Xi pi]´. 
 
Soft cut-offs, proposed by Huber and Klein (1991) and Sethuraman (1994)  are incorporated 
into a discrete choice setting by Swait (2001) and is also the method employed here. Since 
soft cut-offs allow for a linear piece-wise utility function to be estimated, they can represent 
non-linearity25 and discontinuities in the deterministic portion of the utility function. Swait 
                                                 
24 The same would apply in case of a lower limit cut-offs, for instance if respondent declares he/she would not 
select any alternative cheaper than x. 
25 Non-linearity refers to a kink in the consumer’s utility curve for a good as a result of the 
cut-off being violated. Under such a soft cut-off scenario, a good still might be chosen over 
competing goods if the benefits of all of the other attributes provide sufficient compensation 
to overcome the disbenefit of cut-off violation a given attribute.  
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(2001) demonstrated for his data on rental car choices, that use of a soft cut-offs model would 
provide a better fit to stated choice data; this was also found by Amaya-Amaya and Ryan  
(2006) for two stated choice data sets for health care options. Swait (2001) also notes that 
ignoring the presence of soft cut-offs, when these are in fact present in peoples’ decision 
making, will lead to biased estimates of marginal utilities.  
 
Cut-offs are made soft by the addition of a penalty, associated with the violation, to the utility 
function, where the marginal disutility of violating the lower cut-off for attribute k 
(k=1...K+1) is denoted by wk; vk is the marginal disutility of violating the upper cut-off for 
attribute k (k=1...K+1); λik is a cut-off constraint variable for the lower limit cut-offs and κik is 
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   (5.7) 
 
 
Where a choice alternative satisfies all cut-offs, the optimal solution has all λik and κik equal to 
zero, thus the utility maximization problems reduces to equation (5). Coding of the cut-offs 
constraint variables is a straight forward exercise. For quantitative attributes λik = max(0, θLk-
Zik), κik = max(0, Zik- θUk) where (k=1...K+1); for qualitative attributes λik and κik are equal to 
1 or 0 depending if the stated cut-offs have been violated or not. 
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In this model specification the marginal effect of each attribute will be affected by the 
disutility of cut-offs violation (under linear utility function) so that: 
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     (5.8) 
 
This modelling framework is able to represent combinations of compensatory, conjunctive 
and disjunctive choice strategies (Swait, 2001). For example if a respondent holds pure 
disjunctive behaviour, an alternative will never be chosen where the price level is above his 
stated upper cut-offs, so vk penalty for that attribute will tend to  and all other taste and 
penalty weights will be zero. Similarly, pure conjunctive behaviour, where all the chosen 
alternative must meet the requirement for all attribute cut-offs, can be captured by simply 
having the wk  and vk go to ± . 
 
Attribute cut-offs can also be used as a way to reduce hypothetical market bias. Since choice 
experiment data may over-state absolute WTP values (Harrison 2006), this is an important 
issue in stated preference surveys. Hypothetical market bias can happen because respondents 
do not fully understand the choice task or because they do not act as if they had to pay the 
amount attached to each alternative26. In both cases estimated parameters are potentially 
biased as the model specification of equation (5.7) assumes, i) that the penalty component of 
the objective function is valid everywhere outside the “feasible” region of an attribute and ii) 
the “feasible” region of an attribute is not defined. Using cut-offs to test for hypothetical 
market bias may be done by specifying “hard” cut-offs constraints e.g. when respondents 
violate their upper price stated cut-offs by more than a specified value (the “feasible” region 
                                                 
26 This could be particularly true for “tourist preferences” where respondents know that they would not return to 
the same area again, but think that “higher fees” would contribute to improve the quality of the good (natural 
parks, conservation of historical buildings, biodiversity, etc.). However in this model application it is unlikely as 
only 5.8% of respondents had previously visited Rwanda, implying a low likelihood of repeat visits in the future. 
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of the attribute). In this case how the value was determined post exercise by the analyst is 
discussed later.  
 
In practice this “hard” constraint is usually satisfied in stated choice studies, where the cost 
attached to the alternative often represents only a small part of respondents’ income. The 
approach is beneficial due to survey time and budget constraints where the analyst is often 
unable to collect all the data needed to calculate the respondent’ disposable income. An 
additional survey constraint is that the analyst cannot read the respondents mind to evaluate 
the maximum proportion of income he/she will dedicate for the good under study. However, 
this information is revealed by the upper price cut-off, as a respondent knows their own 
personal disposable income and how much they are willing to pay for any good.  
 
For example if we focus on a price attribute, if respondents n declared that they are unwilling 
to pay more than $100 for an alternative, the “soft” cut-offs approach would actually allow a 
choice as rational even if it were higher than the stated cut-off for the price attribute e.g. a 
choice of $120 was made. This is allowable as the model assumes the alternative offers the 
respondent some compensating features conferring greater benefits than the marginal cost 
above the cut-off. However, as indicated previously this can only be true up to a specific level 
of cut- off violation. In this study, under the specification used in equations (5.5) to (5.7) it is 
achieved by stipulating that the price attribute of the chosen alternative is not greater than a 
given proportion of the respondents stated cut-off. This constraint can then be added to the 
maximization problem where γ is an exogenous value set by the analyst. This value represents 
the amount of the violation (as percentage relative to upper price cut-off) that the analyst is 
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Thus under the soft cut-off approach responses can be coded as having violated the 
constraints when the ratio κip / θUp is greater than the γ value e.g., the price violation is too 
large with respect to what can be considered “acceptable”. They can then can be either 
excluded by the analysis or recoded as having chosen the opt-out option27. 
 
For the case study of gorilla tourism used in this chapter, if a respondent declared that he is 
willing to pay as maximum excess, $100 above the current permit price and then chooses an 
alternative that costs $200, we have a case of cut-off violation. If the analyst is willing to 
accept a violation of the upper price cut-offs of 50% as maximum e.g. $150 this respondent 
would be treated as they had chosen the no trip choice.  As was mentioned earlier what value 
to use as an acceptable limit is an empirical question that the analyst can address by 
undertaking a sensitivity analysis using different “γ values”. However the issue of consumer 
sovereignty arises e.g. what right does the analyst have to make choices on behalf of the 
respondent? At one extreme this might be considered as simply trimming out undesirable data 
that might confound the model and making use of otherwise senseless data. On the other hand 
this does present a useful tool to edit choices if a rational theoretical approach is taken, the 
issue then is how to proceed without jeopardizing the integrity of the choices that the 
respondent made? In this study several “γ values” extending over the interval [0.04-1.5] were 
                                                 
27 As Swait (2001) pointed out, the set C must have a null alternative (e.g. the possibility of not choosing), 
otherwise the utility maximization problem might not have a feasible solution for particular configuration of 
attributes and cut-offs.  
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applied. For conciseness, only models estimated using 50% and 100% of the maximum 
permitted upper cut-off price violations are described.  
5.3 Valuing the demand for mountain gorilla eco-tourism in 
Rwanda 
5.3.1 The application of choice experiments in developing countries 
Applications of CM approaches are widespread in the developed country context, but 
examples of their application to value goods and services in a developing country are 
comparably rare and tend to be in the context of urban areas focusing on transport and 
sanitation (Glenk, 2006). Fewer still are applications of CM to biodiversity and environmental 
valuation (Christie, 2006), especially in developing countries. Recent applications have 
examined non-use values of coastal ecosystems (Othman et al. 2004; Seenprachawong 2003) 
or specific ecosystem goods and services from Tropical forests  (Glenk et al. 2006; Naidoo & 
Adamowicz 2005; Rolfe et al. 2000). 
 
(Naidoo & Adamowicz 2005) surveyed tourists and foreign residents in Uganda to determine 
how preferences for particular protected areas are formed. Tourists demand for elevated 
biodiversity levels (increased numbers of bird species seen) were evaluated relative to other 
protected areas attributes. Results showed that as the number of bird species increased, 
tourist’s willingness to pay also increased, independent of all other factors. This is an 
important study as it is to our knowledge the first to explicitly value tourists’ preferences for 
biodiversity conservation and is also in a developing country context.  
 
A study in Indonesia by Glenk (2006) estimated local peoples values for rattan availability, 
water supply for irrigation, population size of game mammals as well as different methods of 
coco cultivation along a shade tree gradient. While on average willingness to pay for the 
maintenance of the resource base was found for the first three attributes, respondents had 
preferences for more intensive ways of coco cultivation. The finding by Glenk (2006) 
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indicates an interesting conflict in the choices that an individual has to make. Utility, as it is 
comprised of different attribute benefits, may contain attributes that fundamentally conflict to 
some extent e.g. that while preferences for biodiversity conservation and environmental 
attributes are important to people so is coco cultivation which has a negative impact on 
biodiversity and that to some extent individuals must make trade offs between the levels of 
utility derived from different attributes.  
 
Further to the findings by Glenk (2006) Rolfe et al 2000 conducetd a study of Australinas 
values towards tropical forest conservation in Vanuatu.   
5.3.2 Conservation, tourism and economic development 
The Virunga mountain gorilla (Gorilla beringei beringei) is a highly endangered African ape 
subspecies, with a total estimated population of 380 existing only in the Virunga Conservation 
Area encompassing Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda (Fawcett et al. 
2004; Homsy 1999). The distribution of the Virunga mountain gorillas is limited to an 
approximate area of 447 km2, which encompasses the Mgahinga Gorilla National Park of 
Uganda, the Parc National des Volcans of Rwanda and the Mikeno sector of the Parc 
National des Virunga of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The current population size of 
380 individuals represents a 17% increase since in 1989, when a complete census estimated 
324 individuals (Gray et al. 2003).  
 
The Virunga mountain gorilla population represents an isolated island population in an upland 
area surrounded by populations some of the highest human densities found on the African 
continent (some areas reach 820 people per km2) with extremely poor, agricultural-based local 
economies (Plumptre et al. 2004). As such, these gorillas are and will continue to be severely 
threatened by anthropogenic disturbance, such as agricultural conversion and illegal 
extraction of resources, for example, snare setting for smaller mammals that entrap gorillas. 
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While these gorillas are no longer hunted for their trophies in this region, they are however, 
the focus of illegal animal trafficking. A current threat in the Virunga occurs when members 
of a group are killed and wounded (with the group sometimes disintegrating as a result) in an 
effort to trap infants for the black market. In 2002, three separate incidents accounted for the 
death of at least six adults and three infants. In 2004, yet another infant mountain gorilla was 
confiscated, suggesting that a Virunga gorilla group suffered at the hands of poachers.   
 
Despite the anthropological threats, the direct poaching, and insecurity in both areas related to 
the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the subsequent Congolese civil wars that began in 1996 and 
are now just coming to an end, the documented increase in the Virunga population since 1989 
can be attributed to one important factor. These populations are located in National Parks with 
well-developed protection and enforcement programs supported by a plethora of international 
conservation organizations, first initiated by Dian Fossey and her efforts to focus world 
attention on the plight of mountain gorillas.   
 
Early conservationist’s precautionary approach to tourism with the mountain gorillas, tourist 
visits have been shown to provide much needed finance for the protection and management of 
the gorillas and their habitat. Tourism is now an established part of the conservation strategy 
for the mountain gorillas alongside law enforcement and protection programs. Importantly the 
economic benefits realized from gorilla tourism and its central focus of all tourism activities 
in the Virunga has also brought much needed political will to support conservation activities 
in the national park. 
 
Given the current economic impact of gorilla tourism in Rwanda and its potential in DRC, it 
is critical to consider the economic parameters underlying these activities, both from the point 
of view of local stakeholders (communities, businesses and the parks) as well as the market 
forces that sustain these income streams.  With respect to stakeholders, the approach of 
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integrating conservation with local community development projects through integrated 
conservation and development projects (ICDP) is now a standard sustainable development 
methodology. It is often assumed that ICDP will result in the conservation of natural 
resources, while at the same time leading to benefits for local communities who may forgo 
less environmentally friendly activities (Barrett & Arcese 1995). If ecotourism as an ICDP 
initiative is to be an effective means of conserving biodiversity, tourists’ behavior must lead 
firstly to elevated revenues for areas rich in biodiversity and secondly an economic incentive 
to those who control the fate of the protected area 
 
This is a critical period for mountain gorilla tourism. Because security has returned to Rwanda 
and this is now clearly perceived by the global market, the current level of permits and visits 
is often full and there are distinct pressures to increase revenue. This is often viewed as a 
simple exercise in expanding tourism to other gorilla groups. Similarly, in DRC, now 
emerging from civil war, there is an intense effort to resurrect the gorilla tourism industry, but 
little data is available to design a sustainable planning approach. There is little doubt that 
tourism provides a useful tool to finance the management of protected areas, but financial 
considerations may tempt conservation managers to put short-term profit before long term 
sustainable gain. Fortunately current limits to exploitation are  set with due regard for 
underlying ecological constraints (Fawcett et al. 2004; Homsy 1999). Currently these limits 
are defined as 8 tourists per tourism group, for one hour, once per day. This gives a maximum 
quota of permits for Rwanda of 20,440 based on full visitation for the current 7 tourism 
groups 365 days per year. However, without economic data it is difficult for managers to set 
price structures to optimise returns, within the ecological constraints.  One of the few 




With respect to the tourism market, there is little evidence to suggest that tourists are 
interested in biodiversity and community development per se, rather than seeing charismatic 
flagship species such as the mountain gorilla (Kontoleon & Swanson 2003; Loomis & White 
1996; Naidoo & Adamowicz 2005) and experiencing an adventure with attractive 
accommodation and spectacular landscapes. Tourists’ variable motives for visiting tropical 
forests can make the reliance on nature-based tourism for financing conservation a risky 
venture, if they are not particularly interested in the conservation of biodiversity and 
especially in the light or regional insecurity.  
 
Quantitative assessments of the impacts of ICDP to either conservation or local human 
welfare are few (Balmford et al. 2002; Johannesesn 2005; Salafsky et al. 2001; Wunder 2000) 
fewer still are quantitative assessment of specific ecotourism programs within the ICDP 
context (Barnes et al. 2002; Naidoo & Adamowicz 2005; Wunder 2000).  Whilst there have 
been several endeavours to assess values for biodiversity (Christie et al. 2006)) few have tried 
to assess how such values for biodiversity are a function of demand for ecotourism (Naidoo & 
Adamowicz 2005). To our knowledge none have specifically tried to quantitatively assess the 
value of community benefits from tourism as a function of demand for ecotourism. This study 
presents a unique insight in to tourist’s values for both biodiversity conservation and 
community benefits from and ecotourism program as functions of demand for an eco-tourism 
experience. 
5.3.3 Structure of the Rwanda tourism industry 
Tourism in Rwanda has been recently liberalised under government reforms of the past 
decade. The GOR embarked upon an ambitious program of restructuring including the 
divestment of hotels from government ownership and operation, the decentralisation of the 
state tourism and wildlife agency (ORTPN)28 from a government department to a semi 
autonomous agency. Other liberalised policies include tax holidays fro the tourism sector, a 
                                                 
28 ORTPN – Office Rwandaise du Tourism et des Parks Natoinaux 
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framework to encourage international private sector investment MINICOM (Ministry of 
Commerce) is responsible for industry and commerce under which tourism and national parks 
fall. MINICOM is responsible for developing the broad policy guidelines under which 
tourism and the national parks are managed. ORTPN is the parastatal29 agency responsible for 
the management and implementation of tourism and park management policy as well as the 
management and development of policies to promote tourism within the national parks. 
Importantly they manage the framework within which the private sector operates. 
 
Many private tour operators both international and local exist in Rwanda. These range from 
operators with both vehicles and guides and a larger staff offering a complete package to 
individual operators with just themselves as a driver guide with one vehicle offering to 
organize a more home grown package for independent travellers.  I addition there are 
businesses offering self drive vehicles. There are many privately owned and operated hotels 
ranging from international operations such as the Serena Hotels chain to small family run 
guest houses. 
5.3.4 Price policy issues 
Under the newly liberalized arrangements ORTPN is faced with the challenge of maximizing 
the revenue obtained from park entry permits to finance management and conservation 
activities. The private sector also wishes to maximize revenues from the provision of tour 
services and accommodation. In the context of eco-tourism the public (local communities also 
wish to maximise their benefits from tourism, indeed ORTPN has a responsibility to ensure 
the framework conditions are in place to allow this to happen as sharing the benefits from 
tourism with local communities is an explicit policy objective). Tourism growth in Rwanda 
has been strong in the last two years. In the main season (July to September) almost all 
                                                 
29 A parastatal organisation is one that is government owned but is given a more liberal management mandate 
than the civil service. Often this means the opportunity to be self-financing through private sector business 
activities or to be able to receive finances from other non-government sources. These are often used to promote 
more responsive and demand orientated public services than the civil service might be able to deliver. 
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available permits for gorillas were purchased. Despite a massive gorilla permit price increase 
in 2004 from $250 to $375 no discernable impact on permit sales was experienced, in fact 
tourism numbers rose (ORTPN, 2007). 
 
An important dynamic in the tourism market is that tourists may have little incentive to stay in 
Rwanda beyond their gorilla visit. Currently consumption of alternative park activities is low 
(ORTPN, 2007). Relatively few visitors choose to climb the volcanoes or go on nature walks. 
Anecdotal evidence from the focus group discussions points toward tourists view the current 
price of these alternative activities as too high. Without appealing alternative activities the 
incentive for visitors to stay additional nights around the PNV or indeed in Rwanda is low. 
This affects the private sector to maximize their income, as they are able to sell fewer bed 
nights and corresponding services the shorter the visitors’ stay in country. 
 
Another component of price structure is that revenue from the parks is shared with local 
communities. Currently 5 % of revenue from tourism sales goes into a community revenue 
sharing fund to provide development assistance to communities who live adjacent to the 
national park. This is to provide an incentive for local communities to not illegally use the 
park and endanger wildlife.  However communities could also benefit from providing their 
own tourism products outside of the NP such as cultural events. However the willingness of 
consumers to pay increased permit prices to provide more benefits to local communities is not 
known. 
5.3.5 Park Based Tourism 
Understanding some of the details and context for the gorilla tourism experience and tourism 
activities in general are important in proving background to how the initial identification and 
final selection of attributes for the CE presented later were finally made. 
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Prices for activities vary according to residency status and are structured according to a park 
entry fee plus a permit fee for an individual activity (Table 5.1). The park entry fee does not 
actually give access to the park as every possible activity requires a permit and no visitor may 
enter the park without a guide and an escort of at least one park ranger. A break down of 
prices for different activities is given below. 
 
Table 5.1 Schedule of park entry fees at time of study (still current as of Aug 2008) 
Activity Price  









Park Entry Fee 25 25 2000 
Gorilla Trekking 350 175 8000 
Golden Monkey 75 40 2500 
Nature Walk  30 20 1500 
Karisoke Trek 50 40 2000 
Climb Karisimbi 150 100 5000 
Climb Muhabura - - - 
Climb Visoke 50 40 2000 
 
5.3.5 a) Gorilla Trekking 
The visit to see the mountain gorillas (Gorilla berengi berengi) in Rwanda ranks amongst the 
worlds top wildlife experiences. Tourists have a chance to get within close proximity of 
habituated wild gorillas for a period of one hour. The group size of tourists is currently 
restricted to eight to minimize the disturbance to the gorilla group e.g. so the gorilla group 
does not feel threatened by a large group of humans. 
 
During the allotted hour, tourists have the opportunity to witness the complex social dynamics 
and behaviour of the mountain gorilla in its natural environment. Beyond a minimum distance 
requirement of 7m30 and some basic guidelines about personal behaviour around the gorillas 
                                                 
30 There are close physiological similarities between mountain gorillas (as well as other great apes) and humans. 
This means that the same communicable diseases that can transfer between humans can also be transmitted 
between humans and gorillas. Of special significance from a conservation perspective are respiratory infections 
and their transfer from humans to gorillas. Periodically there are outbreaks of respiratory disease in the gorilla 
groups and occasionally fatalities as a result. There is a risk that visitors may transfer such infections to gorillas. 
Whilst there is a policy that visitors expressing symptoms of respiratory infection must not visit the gorillas (they 
receive a refund of the full permit price), there is the risk that people with no obvious signs of infection but with 
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(no loud talking or sudden movements etc.), visitors enjoy unrestrained access with no man 
made barriers between them and the animals.  The visit usually comprises of an initial contact 
with the group upon which the visitors will take up a strategically located position from which 
to watch the gorillas. If the gorillas move then the visitors are also able to move, in a 
respectful manner, amongst the vegetation to maintain a reasonable view. Visitors are allowed 
to take as many photographs or as much film footage as they please, without the use of 
flashguns or other lighting aids. 
 
The trekking day starts at 0700HRS at the park HQ in Kinigi. Visitors are organized into 
groups of eight and allocated a tourist group to visit (there were five tourism groups during 
the study period). Park Guides then give a debriefing about organization and the trekking 
experience. Visitors then have to depart by car to a drop off point to start the trek. The time 
taken from the drop off point to find the gorilla group varies considerably from 15 minutes to 
4 or 5 hours. Normally trekking starts at around 0800HRS and tour groups are back at the 
park HQ by 1400HRS to receive their certificate of viewing the mountain gorillas as a 
souvenir.  Visitors must be out of the park before dark therefore there is a cut off time of 
1500HRS after which if the tour group has not made it to the gorilla group they must return to 
the park boundary. In such cases no refund is made, however availability and time permitting, 
visitors may be given another chance to view in the following days.  
5.3.5 b) Accommodation and services 
Visitors to the gorillas have four main centres from which to base themselves for gorilla 
trekking. Until recently there was only average quality accommodation near the park and 
tourists would often stay in hotels in Kigali, nearly 3 hours drive from the park HQ. Local 
developments have seen new hotels being constructed or the refurbishment of existing ones at 
two localities of Kinigi and Ruhenegri. Kinigi is where the park HQ is located and Ruhenegri 
is the large provincial town only 10km away. At the time of this survey The road from 
                                                                                                                                                        
communicable diseases may slip through any screening. It has been deemed by veterinary experts that 
maintaining a distance of 7m from gorillas significantly reduces the risk of cross-infection. 
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Ruhenegri to Kinigi was extremely rutted and pot holed so the journey took a bone shaking 30 
to 40 minutes to complete, and necessitates an early start to make the 0700HRS rendezvous at 
the park HQ. Recently the road was tarmaced and the same journey now only takes twenty 
minutes. 
5.3.6 Developing the Choice Experiment Attribute list 
5.3.6 a) Focus Group Interviews 
During August 2005 Focus group interviews were held to identify the most important 
attributes and other aspects of their trip to Rwanda and the PNV. The sample was purposive 
to include focus groups from different market niches. The niches identified are characterized 
as high middle and low and are outlined in the Table 5.2 below. 




High Clients staying in more expensive accommodation ( us$65 per night per 
person or more) on organized tours or travelling independently 
Middle Clients staying in mid range accommodation (USD20 to 65 per person per 
night) on organized tours or travelling independently 
Low Clients staying in inexpensive accommodation or camping (less than US$20 
per person per night, on organized tours (overlanders) or travelling 
independently. 
 
Focus group sizes varied from 2 to 8 individuals. Respondents were from different European 
and North American countries as well as one respondent from Zimbabwe. A self-administered 
questionnaire was delivered to individuals in the focus group after which a semi-structured 
interview with the group was conducted. Questions were asked about the attributes and their 
importance as well as other issues about preferences and interests in tourism. The attributes 
presented in the questionnaire are listed in Table 5.3 below. Attributes that influence 
consumer welfare regarding their trip to visit the gorillas fall into two main areas those related 









Table 5.3 List of attributes generated from focus group discussions 
Attribute Description 
Gorilla Visit 
Tour Group Size The number of tourists in a group. Limited to a maximum of 
8 for conservation reasons 
Length of trek The amount of time taken to reach the gorillas. Some visitor 
feel a bit cheated if they reach the gorilla group quickly as 
experiencing the forest is an important part of the 
experience. 
Proximity to gorilla group The closeness to which the individual can get to the gorillas, 
up to the 7m boundary 
Conservation impact The impact of tourism on the integrity (behaviour and 
ecology) of the gorillas and other biodiversity 
General 
Community Benefit Currently 20% of gate gross park revenues is restricted 
towards financing development activities in communities 
adjacent to the national park.  To some visitors it is 
important that local communities receive some benefits 
from the tourism activities. 
Standard of accommodation Accommodation standard for tourists varies greatly between 
low standard accommodation in local lodges and 
guesthouses to the high-end safari camps; price is the main 
factor in consumer choice.  
Accommodation Proximity to 
Park 
This relates to the time travelled in the morning to get to the 
park for the 0700HRS meeting to be allocated gorilla 
groups. The further away the earlier in the morning you 
have to start. Also the road between Ruhengeri and Kinigi is 




It is not only important that there are alternative activities, 
but that they are priced appropriately. Many visitors feel 
that the current prices are too high. 
Marginal Price Increase on 
permit costs 
$25, $50, $100, $150 
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Tourist Attitudes toward attributes 
Table 5.4 below presents the attitudes of the different niches towards the different attributes 
previously identified. The table presents the attitudes according to a relative scale of 
importance (1=Low; 2=Medium; 3=High) 
 
Table 5.4 Importance of trip attributes by niche group 
Attribute Market Niche 
High Middle Low 
Tour Group Size 3 3 3 
Length of trek 2 2 2 
Proximity to gorilla group 3 3 3 
Conservation Impact 3 3 3 
Community Benefit 2 2 2 
Standard of accommodation 3 3 2 
Accommodation Proximity to 
Park 
1 1 1 
Alternative Activities 2 2 1 
Marginal Price Increase on 
permit costs 
2 2 2 
 
Tour group size: The policy is that 8 is a maximum number of visitors. It seemed preferable 
that the group size was kept small, or perhaps reduced.  
 
Price of Gorilla trek: In general the current price of 375 was thought acceptable. In most cases 
tourists were willing to pay more, especially if this meant more benefits towards conservation 
and community development. 
 
Length of gorilla trek: Whilst the hour with the gorillas is fixed, the time/distance to get to 
them varies greatly. There was a variable response in that some preferred the short trek and 
others felt a bit cheated that they didn’t get to see more of the park. This was mainly 
dependent on physical fitness. 
 
Conservation impact: Whilst people are keen to see the gorillas they also seemed sensitive to 
the potential impact on their well being, and were disinclined to visit the gorillas should the 
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visit actually cause unwarranted disturbance to their well being. This also relates to trek group 
size as the smaller the group the lower the disturbance on gorilla behaviour. 
 
Community benefit: All were concerned that communities were able to benefit economically 
from tourism. Of concern were the social impacts from tourism and the need to control them 
 
Price of alternative activities: General consensus was that treks up the volcanoes, visits to the 
golden monkeys and Dian Fossey’s Tomb were over priced. $50 (US) seemed to be the ball 
park figure. It seems that regardless of niche tourists want to feel like they are getting “value 
for money”. Distance of accommodation from the park seemed to be of little concern.  
 
Marginal price increase: Tourists seemed willing to pay more for the price of a gorilla permit 
provided that this meant there were additional benefits to conservation and communities.  
 
With respect to benefits transfer between stakeholders, current consumption patterns (visitors 
staying for 1 or 2 nights) means that ORTPN benefits the most followed by the private sector 
then communities. The strategy would be to try to keep tourists around the PNV for 3 to 4 
nights in this way the private sector and communities have a greater chance of benefiting from 
tourism spending. Currently there are two main bottlenecks to achieve this. Firstly from the 
focus groups tourists were not generally aware of the possibility of doing other activities. 
Secondly once they heard about the current prices $75 or more they were put off. In fact those 
that had heard about them and booked in advance had been given wrong information about 
prices e.g. that treks cost $50, and were a bit disgruntled at the $75 price tag. They indicated if 
they had known the price before hand they might not have opted to do the activities. 
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In terms of identifying which attributes to include in the choice experiment, we are presented 
with a range of attributes identified by the tourists themselves, both general in nature and 
specific to the gorilla trekking experience.  
5.3.6 b) Attribute selection  
The final choice of attributes (Table 5.5) was limited to those that most closely fit with the 
gorilla trekking experience and with the general tenants of eco tourism. Selected attributes 
were trek group size, length of trek, possibility of seeing other wildlife (a proxy for 
biodiversity value) and benefits to local community (a measure of their value for positive 
social impacts from tourism). The design also included an additional price parameter. 
Table 5.5 Attributes and their levels 
Attribute Description Level 
Tour Group 
Size 
The number of tourists in a group. Limited to a maximum of 8 for conservation 
reasons 
Small-4 
Medium-6   
Large-8 
Length of trek The amount of time taken to reach the gorillas. Some visitor feel a bit cheated 
if they reach the gorilla group quickly as experiencing the forest is an 




but <3 hours 




Currently 20% of gate gross park revenues is restricted towards financing 
development activities in communities adjacent to the national park.  To some 






Other wildlife The ability of tourists to see other flora and fauna in the park can contribute to 
the richness of the experience. For some tourist this is not so important for 







Marginal Price Increase on gorilla trek permit and implied new total (including 
park entry fee) 
$25  (400) 
$50  (425) 
$100 (475) 
$150 (525) 
5.3.6 c) Designing the choice experiment and survey tool 
Having identified the attributes it remains to make some decision about the design of the 
experiment. The number of attributes and levels were too large to accommodate in a full 
factorial experiment,  thus an orthogonal main effects only design was opted for to reduce the 
number of treatment combinations required (see Appendix 3 for treatment combinations and 
NLOGIT code). A total of 36 treatment combinations were produced paired together to from 
18 different choice sets, in two blocks of 9. Equal numbers of the blocked designs were 
delivered to respondents to maintain orthogonal properties of the experimental design.  The 
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experimental design was generated by SPSS using the ‘generate orthogonal design ‘tool. This 
approach followed the procedures specified in Hensher et al (2005).  In the survey a 
description of the choice context and the attributes were presented immediately before the 
choice exercise (See Appendix 4). Cut-off questions were presented both before and after the 
choice experiment ( two different treatments) for both blocks. Thus 4 different version of the 
CE survey tool were generated under the 2 different treatments and 2 block design. The final 
survey also included a series of questions on demography and tourism inertest as a warm up 
prior to the choice exercise.  
5.3.7 Organising and coding the data for analysis. 
Effects coding was chosen as a pose to dummy coding as not only did we wish to test for non 
linear effects in the in the levels of the attributes but we wished to do so without confounding 
measurement of the base level of the attribute with the grand mean. Effects coding allows for 
a more flexible approach to analysis of the true utility function of each attribute (slope 
coefficients) as a pose to the function relative to the grand mean of the overall utility function 
(Hensher et al, 2005) 
 
For a variable with a given number attribute levels effects variables were created equal to the 
number of attribute levels minus one. Thus for a variable with three levels we should create 
two effects variables. The variables should be coded with a -1 at the base level and with a 1 
for the level relevant to the effects variable. Other levels should then be coded with a 0. The 
effects variables and their codes are shown in Table 5.6 
Table 5.6 Effects variables and codes 
 Variable        
Attribute Level TGS1 TGS2 LOT1 LOT2 CB1 CB2 OW1 OW2 
high 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
med 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
low -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
TGS – Tour Group Size; LOT – Length of Trip; CB – Community Benefit; OW – Other Wildlife 
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Each respondent is presented with 9 choice sets, each with 3 alternatives (including the opt 
out). Each alternative has 4 attributes with 3 levels per attribute. Thus every respondent will 
have 27 rows of data. There are 4 attributes with 3 levels and a price attribute. The 4 with 
three levels will result in 8 columns of variables plus an additional column for price (absolute 
value). Columns were included for respondent identification, profile, choice selection, 
alternative selected, and number of choices in set and a selection of socio economic variables.  
.  
5.3.8 Survey results    
Focus group interviews were conducted in June and July 2005, with groups of visiting tourists 
to identify the key attributes that visitors to the gorillas were concerned about.  Collection of 
the survey data ran from August 2005 until January 2006. In total 426 individual respondent 
surveys were administered (Appendix 4), of which 419 were returned complete and useable. 
This represented a 98% success rate in completion.  Questionnaires were developed to be self-
administered. Respondents were identified at random each morning when they arrived for 
gorilla trekking at the national park and asked if they would participate in the survey. They 
were later approached in their accommodation, in and around Ruhengeri Town and Kinigi 
Village, post trek to fill out the questionnaires on 1) personal socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics, related tourism activities and interests, 2) the choice task (with 
nine sets/cards per respondent) and 3) the cut offs. 
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5.3.8.1 Demographic and tourism interest data 


































Visitor nationality as a proportion of sample
 
Figure 5.1 Visitor nationalities 
The highest proportion of respondents were from the USA (27%), followed by the UK 
(22.9%), Australia (13.1), Germany (5.7%) and Canada (5.5%) (Figure 5.1) 
 
Countries of origin were grouped into 4 global regions (North America, Europe, Australasia 
and Other). (Figure 5.2) 
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Origin of respondents by global region as a proportion of 
sample
 
Figure 5.2 Respondent origin by global region 
 
It was observed that in terms of regional visitors Europeans (48.4%) represented the highest 
proportion of respondents, followed by North America (32.5%), Australasia (17.4%) and 
people from other nations (1.7%). These data compare well to visitor demographic data 
systematically collected by ORTPN, showing that our sample is broadly representative of the 
tourists that visit Rwanda year round. 
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Demographics, income and interests 
The sample of respondents was split quite evenly between men (46.1%) and women (53.9%). 











Age groups as a proportion of sample
 
Figure 5.3 Respondent age groupings 
 
No significant difference in the proportion of respondents belonging to different age groups 
was found overall or between regional groupings (Figure 5.3). However, the majority of 
respondents were grouped between the ages of 25 and 49 (66.8%). Whilst visitors from North 
America showed no significant difference in the age groups visiting, results from Europe and 
Australasia were slightly skewed towards younger groups. 
 
There was also a peak in the consumers from 55-60 (8.4%) and in the 60+ (8.7%) age groups. 
The split between respondents gender was 46.1% male and 53.9% female the difference was 
not significant between income groups. Only 25.6% of respondents had children (a family) 
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In terms of education levels, respondents showed a high level of education with 46.9% having 
a university degree and additional 34.2% having a postgraduate qualification as well. This 
means that 81.1% of respondents had a tertiary education. 
















Individual income group as a proportion of sample
 
Figure 5.4 Respondent income group classifications 
 
Respondents were asked about their individual income, interestingly there were two peaks at 
US$25-45,000 (46.9%) and above $85,000 (30.2%) (Figure 5.5). An OLS Regression was 
conducted on the relationship between income and age and level of education.  Age and 
education level were positively related to income group (R2=0.214, p<0.001) e.g. older and 
more educated people were more likely to be in a high income group. 
 
Regional income data showed some interesting differences.  Across the entire sample 
proportionately more visitors were in the $85,000+ p.a. group (30.4%) and the $25-45,000 
p.a. group (25.9%) than other income groups, the difference was significant (χ2= 36.438, d.f.= 
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12, Ф = 0.322, p<0.001). In the highest income group ($85,000+p.a.) visitors from North 
America had the highest proportion of the sample (16.5% of entire sample), followed by 
Europe (10.5% of entire sample). In the $25-45,000 p.a. group, Europe had the highest 
proportion (14.8% of entire sample) 
 
Respondents were asked about how their interest in visiting the mountain gorillas in Rwanda 
had developed. The top three reasons for stimulating interest in Rwanda and the mountain 
gorillas were a knowledge of Dian Fossey and her work (31%), travel marketing material ( 
21%) and natural history television programs ( 12.3%).  Interestingly 50.6% or respondents 
also indicated that they took an active interest in conservation or were members of a 
conservation organisation. 
5.3.8.2 Trip characteristics 
Respondents were asked to select a category that described the mode of their travel. 
Overlanders are those on the large overland trucks run by international package tour 
companies. Back packers are those travelling independently on a low budget either 
individually, in pairs or small groups. Independent travellers are those travelling 
independently on a mid to high budget, possibly in their own vehicle. Organized tours are 
those organised tours characterised by mid to high end, low volume specialist tour operators.  
 
Of the different categories of tour 41.6% of respondents were on an organized tour (the 
highest proportion), followed by independent travellers (28.05%) and overlanders (24.65%) 
(Table 5.7). In the organized tour category the proportion of the total sample in the highest 
income category was 16.43% of the entire sample. Respectively the second and third highest 
proportions of the sample were overlanders in the $ 25-45,000 p.a. group (9.07%) and 
Independent travellers in the $85,000 plus group (8.78%). These results were significantly 
different (χ2= 32.417, d.f. = 12, Ф = 0.303, p<0.001). 
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Table 5.7 Respondent income classifications by travel class 
  Trip description
Individual 
income 





<25,000 US$ Count 15 7 17 16 
 % of Total 4.25 1.98 4.82 4.53 
25000-45000 
US$ Count 32 4 22 33 
 % of Total 9.07 1.13 6.23 9.35 
45000-65000 
US$ Count 19 6 18 19 
 % of Total 5.38 1.70 5.10 5.38 
65000-85000 
US$ Count 6 1 11 21 
 % of Total 1.70 0.28 3.12 5.95 
>85000 US$ Count 15 2 31 58 
 % of Total 4.25 0.57 8.78 16.43 
All groups Count 87 20 99 147 
 % of Total 24.65 5.67 28.05 41.64 
 
The mean trip length was 4.03 nights and the mode 6 nights stay (35% of respondents), there 
was also a peak at three nights (Figure 5.5). 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7













Figure 5.5 Respondent number of nights stay in Rwanda 
 
No significant difference in trip length was observed between income groups however visitors 
from Europe and Australasia spent a significantly longer stay in Rwanda than visitors from 
North America (F=16.477, d.f.= 3, p<0.001). 
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The main purpose of respondent’s trip to Rwanda was gorilla tourism (70.5%), followed by 
visits to family and friends then commerce (7.4%) or conferences/work shops (7.4%) 9 Table 
5.2). There was no significant difference between income groups. Resident expatriates made 
up 2.5% of the sample. Only 5.8% of respondents had visited Rwanda before. 
 
Respondents were asked about which other activities were undertaken and places visited in 
Rwanda during their trip Table 5.9.  
Table 5.9 Respondent activities in Rwanda by income classification 
















3.1 4.2 3.7 2 7.1 20.1 
Akagera 
National Park 
3.1 4 3.1 2 5.4 17.6 
Kigali City 
Tour 












0.3 3.7 1.7 1.1 2.3 9.1 
Golden 
Monkeys 
0.6 3.7 3.1 0.8 6.5 14.7 
Nature Walk 1.4 1.4 1.4 0 3.4 7.6 
 
All respondents had completed at least one trip to visit gorillas.  20.1 % of visitors indicated 
they had or would visit Nyungwe National Park and only 17.6% of respondents responded 
positively for Akagera National Park. Only 46 (10%) of respondents indicate that they would 
or had visited both parks. There was no significant difference between income groups or 
regional groups in this respect. Kigali based activities saw 65.3% of respondents visiting the 
Genocide Memorial and 39% taking a City Tour. In terms of PNV based alternative activities, 
the most popular was the Golden Monkey Trek (14.7%), followed by visiting the old 
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Karisoke Research Centre and the tomb of Dian Fossey (9.1%) and trekking the volcanoes 
(Karisimbi and Visoke; 8.7%). Only 7.6% of respondent’s went on the nature trail walk.  
 
Most activities showed no significant difference in consumption between income groups, 
except the Kigali city tour and visits to the golden monkeys.  In both cases respondents in the 
highest income category ($85,000+) showed the highest proportion of consumers for the City 
Tour (13.8%, χ2= 12.683, d.f. = 4, Ф = 0.189, p<0.05) and Golden Monkey trek (6.5%, χ2= 
11.314, d.f. = 4, Ф = 0.179, p<0.05).  
International travel and activities 
Respondents were asked about how their trip to Rwanda fitted in with travel to other countries 
in the region, namely Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania (Table 5.10). 
Table 5.10 Respondent regional travel by income class 
















Uganda 8.5 16.7 11.6 4.8 12.1 53.7 
Kenya 7.3 16.4 8.8 6.8 15 54,2 
Tanzania 5.9 10.5 7.6 4.5 11.0 39.5 
 
Of those who had already or would visit a second East African country, 53.7% said Uganda, 
54.2 % said Kenya and 39.5% said Tanzania. In the $25-45,000 p.a. group 16.7% would also 
visit Uganda and 16.4% would also visit Kenya.  In the highest income group 12.1% would 
also visit Uganda and 15% would also visit Kenya.  Only 12% of respondents visit two 
additional countries.   In terms of other nature based activities either in Rwanda or another 
country on their tour, 60.1% said they were planning to or had taken part in a savannah based 
safari, 16.7% would visit gorilla sin Uganda, 26% would do some other type of nature trek, 
17.7% were interested in bird watching and 17.2% would trek one of the major peaks in the 
Region e.g. Mt Kenya, Mt Kilimanjaro or the Ruwenzori). 50.7% of the respondents indicated 
that they had an active interest in conservation through being a member of or subscribing of a 
conservation or environmental group. 
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5.3.9 Choice Experiment and cut-off data 
A total of 18 different choice sets were developed which were separated into two different 
randomised blocks of 9 choice sets. Cut-offs were presented both before and after the choice 
experiment, between formats in order to assess the impact of cut-off questions on the 
completion of the choice task, however no significant impacts of this were found on cut off 
violation or model estimation.. The combination of choice set blocks and cut off presentation 
lead to the development of 4 different versions of the questionnaire (Table 5.11).  
Table 5.11 Number of complete surveys for choice set and cut off presentation combinations 
Version Cut-off Presentation Choice block Number of completed 
surveys 
1 After choice exercise 1 106 
2 Before choice exercise 1 98 
3 After choice exercise 2 110 
4 Before choice exercise 2 105 
Cut-offs were identified as the maximum trek group size, the minimum length of trek, the 
maximum length of trek and the level of community benefit from tourisms receipts, maximum 
willingness to pay over current permit price  (Table 5.12)  a total of 6 cut-off parameters to be 
estimated.
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Table 5.12 Cut-off frequencies for the sample  
Cut off Version 1 Version 2 Version 3 Version 4 All 
 Count 
(% of total 
sample) 
Count 
(% of total 
sample) 
Count 
(% of total 
sample) 
Count 
(% of total 
sample) 
Count 
(% of total 
sample) 
Max. people on tour/trekking group to gorilla 
1 4(0) 0(0) 0(0) 2(0.48) 2(0.48) 
2 0(0) 2(0.48) 2(0.48) 1(0.24) 5(1.19) 
3 3(0.72) 1(0.24) 3(0.72) 0(0) 7(1.67) 
4 6(1.43) 4(0.95) 8(1.91) 8(1.91) 26(6.21) 
5 7(1.67) 7(1.67) 8(1.91) 5(1.19) 27(6.44) 
6 30(7.16) 40(9.55) 35(8.35) 28(6.68) 133(31.74) 
7 7(1.67) 1(0.24) 4(0.95) 6(1.43) 18(4.3) 
8 53(12.65) 43(10.26) 50(11.93) 55(13.13) 200(47.73) 
Grand Total 106(25.3) 98(23.39) 110(26.25) 105(25.06) 419(100) 
Min. hours (round trip) to trek gorillas 
SHORT 58(13.84) 44(10.5) 56(13.37) 57(13.6) 215(51.31)
MEDIUM 24(5.73) 25(5.97) 19(4.53) 21(5.01) 89(21.24) 
 LONG 24(5.73) 29(6.92) 35(8.35) 27(6.44) 115(27.45) 
Grand Total 106(25.3) 98(23.39) 110(26.25) 105(25.06) 419(100) 
Max. hours to trek gorillas 
  
SHORT 26(6.21) 19(4.53) 21(5.01) 18(4.3) 84(20.05) 
MEDIUM 26(6.21) 27(6.44) 36(8.59) 25(5.97) 114(27.21) 
LONG (2.89) 52(12.41) 53(12.65) 62(14.8) 221(52.74) 
Grand Total 106(25.3) 98(23.39) 110(26.25) 105(25.06) 419(100) 
Lowest % of T.P.R to local communities 
2 1(0.24) 1(0.24) 0(0) 0(0) 2(0.48) 
5 6(1.43) 10(2.39) 4(0.95) 8(1.91) 28(6.68) 
10 40(9.55) 36(8.59) 44(10.5) 43(10.26) 163(38.9) 
20 35(8.35) 30(7.16) 43(10.26) 28(6.68) 136(32.46) 
30 20(4.77) 17(4.06) 15(3.58) 23(5.49) 75(17.9) 
35 0(0) 1(0.24) 0(0) 0(0) 1(0.24) 
40 0(0) 0(0) 1(0.24) 1(0.24) 2(0.48) 
48 1(0.24) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 1(0.24) 
50 2(0.48) 3(0.72) 3(0.72) 2(0.48) 10(2.39) 
100 1(0.24) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 1(0.24) 
Grand Total 106(25.3) 98(23.39) 110(26.25) 105(25.06) 419(100) 
Max. additional amount above current permit price 
Mean $95.55  Minimum $0.00    
Standard Error 6.63  Maximum $500.00    
Median 50       
Mode 0       
 
Table 5.13 shows detail on cut-off violations in terms of actual choices made. It had been 
hypothesised that presentation before the choice exercise may act as a ‘warm up’ and might 
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lead to lower level of violation than when presented after. No significant difference was found 
in the level of cut-off violation between there presentation before or after the choice exercise.  
Table 5.13 Frequency of cut off violations  
Version 
 
1 n=106 2 n=98 3 n=110 4 n=105 All n=419 
Cut off position After Before After Before  
Maximum length of 
trek 25 18 22 17 82 
Minimum length of 
trek 16 13 24 26 79 
Permit price 42 50 45 57 194 
Community benefit 45 40 53 52 190 
Tour group size 24 21 17 14 76 
 
Numbers of violations were similar between the tour group size and maximum and minimum 
length of trek cut –offs e.g. around 20%. However both permit price and community benefit 
cut offs showed a much higher level of violation almost 50% of the sample. This may be an 
indication that either respondents were not understanding the choice exercise and the role of 
the cut offs, or that some other compensatory decision process is going on between the 
attributes. 
5.3.9 a) Model estimations  
Results are organised as follows. First, we present results from models estimated on all data 
without and with soft cut-offs, secondly, we consider the impacts of stipulating different 
values for γ (50% and 100% excess of stated price cut off), to represent alternative views as to 
what constitutes unacceptable hypothetical market bias. A focus on model fitting is 
demonstrated through analysing the impacts of applying the price cut-off parameter is 
adopted. The price parameter was selected to demonstrate the effects of cut off 
reclassification. The classical assumption being that price is the principle motivating factor in 
most consumption decisions; similarly we are interested in the potential changes in consumer 
behaviour from changes in price for a gorilla trek based on the selected attributes.  
In addition price is also the most important factor from an applied policy perspective. 
Changes to trek price are most likely to be considered or implemented than say changes to 
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tour group size, level of benefits to local communities. Whilst increase of the trek group size 
are not allowed under the strict conservation limitations of the gorilla tourism program, 
reductions in the trek group size are also unlikely from the perspective of maintaining general 
levels of tourism in Rwanda. Given the dependence of total number of visitors to Rwanda on 
gorilla tourism reduction in the trek group size would affects the quota of permits available.  
This in turn would likely reduce the total vitiation level of tourists to Rwanda.   
 
Increasing levels of benefits to local communities as restricted fund derived from permit sales 
also means that there would be less money available to the park authorities to fund other 
management activities. On this particular fact we wish to assess the impact of the community 
benefit attribute on consumer willingness to pay to understand if it would make sense to 
increase permit price to cover increased benefits to local communities. Other cut-off variables 
such as length of trek and possibilities to see other wildlife are dependant on the behaviour of 
the wildlife itself and thus are not directly controllable by the park authorities. Importantly the 
price parameter was highly likely to be violated (in almost 50% of cases, see Table 5.13) 
indicating that some other compensatory decision making was going on between attributes 
contrary to classical assumptions. Thus given the significance of price policy and the level of 
seemingly anomalous behaviour investigating the effects of reclassifying violations according 
to the price attribute cut-off seemed expedient. 
 
As the data to not pass the Hausman Test (χ2=9.24, d.f.=12, p>0.05, not significant) of the IIA 
assumption (Hausman & McFadden 1984) and to allow for preference heterogeneity, random 
parameter logit (RPL) models were estimated.  In this form of estimation it is assumed that all 
the parameters are random and the individual parameters undergo a zero based t-test to 
establish their overall contribution to the model.  
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5.3.9 b) Using all data: no cut-offs versus soft cut-offs 
This comparison follows the analytical approach taken by Swait (2001). Table 5.14 shows the 
no cut-offs results compared to the results with soft cut-offs. Model fitting improves with the 
application of cut-offs (r2) and are significant at 99% but not by much. As an aside, model fit 
improved enormously with the application of RPL over the conditional logit. The price 
attribute has a positive and significant parameter in both cases, however the parameter on the 
upper price cut-off is not significant. This is an odd result in that apparently respondents are 
more likely to choose trekking options that are more expensive. It is conceivable that the price 
attribute was being considered as a proxy for trek quality, which could explain the wrong 
sign. However this is unlikely given the lengthy description of the attribute as well as the 
familiarity of the respondents with the trekking experience having just recently returned from 




Table 5.14 RPL estimates with and without cut-offs31 
 No cut-offs With soft cut-offs 
 Parameter t-stat Parameter t-stat 
Random parameters in utility function 
TGS -0.129 -5.66 -0.133 -5.51 
LOT1 0.200 6.21 0.157 3.55 
LOT2 -0.13 -0.41 -0.139 -3.10 
CB -0.007 -2.62 -0.004 -0.84 
OW1 0.197 6.12 0.192 5.92 
OW2 -0.31 -0.99 -0.023 -0.74 
Non-random parameters in utility function 
Constant 1.237 10.56 1.139 6.87 
Price 0.003 7.87 0.003 4.71 
TG cut-off  0.21 0.56 
CB cut-off -0.002 -0.42 
Price cut-off 0.001 1.55 
LOT cut-off 1 -0.158 -1.41 
LOT cut-off 2 0.437 5.23 
Standard deviations for parameter distributions 
σTGS 0.34 19.30 0.341 19.24 
σLOT1 0.022 0.08 0.116 1.01 
σLOT2 0.172 2.17 0.091 0.62 
σCB 0.000 0.03 0.002 0.11 
σOW1 0.001 0.01 0.000 0.00 
σOW2 0.012 0.15 0.006 0.07 
Log Lik -3524  -3506  
Pseudo r2 0.14 0.15  
N (people, choices) 419, 3771 419, 3771  
5.3.9 c) Reclassifying inconsistent responses for different values of γ  
To test for the impacts of choice inconsistencies choices that violate different values of γ were 
recoded in the analysis as a violation. Thus different estimates shown below retain the original 
number of observations as no observations were dropped, simply reclassified as stay at home. 
Thus model fitting improves (shown by the pseudo r2) due to the reclassification procedure 
and not as a result of biases created by dropping observations from the analysis.  The 
objective of the following analysis (results depicted in tables 5.14 to 5.16) is to assess how 
reclassifying γ influences not just the model fit overall, but also how the influence of cut-offs 
might also improve the model fit from a basic model. Thus the base model changes in each 
pair of comparisons as the values of γ are changed.  Assessing the γ such that any choice that 
                                                 
31 We used 100 replications and Halton draws. 
 
TGS = total group size; LOT1 = length of trek between 1 and 3 hours (the reference is less than 1 hour); LOT2 = length of trek more than 3 
hours; CB = community benefits OW1 = prob. of seeing other wildlife = medium (the reference is low); OW2 = prob. of seeing other 
wildlife : high. 
 
The attributes TGS and price have upper cut-offs; CB has a lower cut-offs; LOT has both lower (LOT1) and Upper (LOT2) cut-offs. 
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violates a person’s stated maximum WTP in terms of its price level by more than 50% is 
reclassified as a stay-at-home choice produced a considerable effect.  Model fitting improved 
substantially both with and without cut-offs (Table 5.15).  
 
Table 5.15 Choices violating upper price cut-off by 50% are re-classified as “stay at home” 
using RPL model 
 No cut-offs With soft cut-offs 
 Parameter T stat Parameter t-stat 
Random parameters in utility function 
TGS -0.611 -13.17 -0.400 -9.20 
LOT1 0.069 1.37 0.172 2.65 
LOT2 0.039 0.80 -0.106 -1.67 
CB 0.005 1.24 0.010 1.23 
OW1 0.088 1.72 0.126 2.42 
OW2 0.087 1.77 0.105 2.04 
Non-random parameters in utility function 
Constant 1.46 8.68 0.856 3.58 
Price -0.009 -12.34 -0.002 -2.86 
TG cut-off  -0.016 -0.31 
CB cut-off -0.006 -0.79 
Price cut-off -0.023 -12.98 
LOT cut-off 1 0.019 0.12 
LOT cut-off 2 0.386 3.34 
Standard deviations for parameter distributions 
σTGS 0.63 16.61 0.417 13.29 
σLOT1 0.228 2.72 0.163 1.56 
σLOT2 0.129 0.77 0.095 0.66 
σCB 0.022 2.70 0.021 2.42 
σOW1 0.281 3.70 0.291 3.83 
σOW2 0.093 1.03 0.113 1.16 
Log Lik -2380  -2266  
Pseudo r2 0.42 0.45  
N (people, choices) 419, 3771 419, 3771  
 
With no cut –offs the parameter on price becomes negative which is concurrent with what was 
expected e.g. marginal disutility for increasing price of a trek. In the cut-offs model both price 
and the price cut-off parameters are significant. Importantly the price cut-off parameter is 10 
times bigger than the price coefficient. This implies a kink in the marginal disutility of higher 
prices above the upper soft cut-off e.g. the utility curve is not smooth. Adding soft cut-offs to 
this edited data set of choices produces, in itself, a significant improvement in the model’s 
explanatory power. For example most of the cut-off t-stat values for the random parameters in 
the utility function have increased in level of significance on the model without cut-offs.    
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When a less strict rule is used for identifying hypothetical market bias (γ = 100%), so that 
only those choices which violate the stated price cut-off by more than 100% are re-classified 
as stay at home, the model fit relative to the “all data” versions does not improve so much as 
with γ = 50%. However, the parameter on the price attribute still becomes negative rather than 
positive in the no cut-offs version of the model, whilst model fit again improves when soft 
cut-offs are included (Table 5.16).  
Table 5.16 Choices violating upper price cut-off by 100% are re-classified as “stay at 
home”unsing RPL model 
 No cut offs With soft cut offs 
 Parameter T stat Parameter t-stat 
Random parameters in utility function 
TGS -0.606 -12..48 -0.458 -10.31 
LOT1 0.113 2.51 0.161 2.765 
LOT2 0.064 1.42 -0.115 -1.96 
CB 0.001 0.27 0.005 0.647 
OW1 0.107 2.33 0.131 2.82 
OW2 0.073 1.66 0.079 1.74 
Non-random parameters in utility function 
Constant 1.38 8.88 0.909 4.01 
Price -0.004 -6.28 0.001 1.29 
TG cut-off  0.062 1.29 
CB cut-off -0.007 -0.87 
Price cut-off -0.013 -10.47 
LOT cut-off 1 -0.082 -0.57 
LOT cut-off 2 0.451 4.19 
Standard deviations for parameter distributions 
σTGS 0.65 17.27 0.512 14.82 
σLOT1 0.178 1.79 0.123 0.81 
σLOT2 0.177 1.61 0.060 0.31 
σCB 0.015 1.88 0.018 2.07 
σOW1 0.194 2.20 0.201 2.30 
σOW2 0.017 0.17 0.027 0.23 
Log Lik -2541  -2469  
Pseudo r2 0.38 0.40  
N (people, choices) 419, 3771 419, 3771  
 
Again, a sharp kink was observed in the marginal disutility of higher prices once the cut-off is 
passed. This seems logical as one might expect there to be a threshold level of tolerance, past 
which the selection rule will become void e.g. it exceeds the boundary of what is an 
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acceptable trade-off, and the fit of the model and significance of the parameters start to 
deteriorate. 
5.3.9 d)  Attribute value and preference heterogeneity in the preferred model 
The best model was observed to be one with soft cut-offs where violations of the price cut-off 
were reclassified as “stay at home” in any case where the choice exceeded the respondents, 
stated price cut off by 50% (Table 5.15). Looking at this models results, it can be seen that 
that visitors prefer smaller tour groups in terms of the number of people in the group; prefer a 
length of trek between 1 and 3 hours to either shorter or longer treks; and prefer to see greater 
numbers of other wildlife as well as gorillas. However, there is no evidence of a significant 
effect for what percentage of park revenues is recycled to development activities in 
communities around the national park, which is surprising. In terms of preference 
heterogeneity, we find significant evidence of this for tour group size, seeing other wildlife, 
and community benefits. Interestingly this is converse to people’s stated cut-offs where 
respondents indicated that they would on average like to see more of the park revenues going 
to communities.  
5.3.9 e) Implicit prices 
Focussing on results in Table 5.15, it is possible to examine the effects on implicit prices 
(marginal willingness to pay amounts) of including cut-offs in the choice model.  There are 
four possible conditions for defining implicit prices with cut-offs: 
(1) No cut-offs are violated. The implicit price for an attribute such as tour group size (Tgs) 
is equal to (- β tgs/ β price). 
(2) The cut-off for any attribute is violated, but not the cut-off for price. In this case, the 
implicit price for tgs = - (β tgs +  β cut-off tgs) /  β price 
(3) The cut-off for price is violated but not the cut-offs for the other attributes. In this 
case, the implicit price for tgs = - ( β tgs)/ (  β price +  β cut-off price) 
(4) Both sets of cut-offs are violated: Implicit price  = - ( β tgs +  β cut-off tgs) / (  β price +  
β cut-offs price) 
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Implicit prices were calculated for each of the attributes evaluated using condition 3 above, 
since the effect of violating the price cut-off turns is perhaps the most important for these 
data, and compare these to implicit prices evaluated assuming that no cut-offs are violated as 
in condition 1 above (Table 5.17). 
Table 5.17    Implicit prices and 95% confidence intervals (US $ per person per trip)32 





























The effects on the implicit prices are significant. For example, looking at tour group size, 
willingness to pay for a one person reduction in the number of people in the tour group falls 
from $63 in the no cut-offs version to $15 in the price cut-offs version. Thus mean WTP falls 
significantly once we take into account the soft cut-off penalty on the price of a trip. 
Importantly the implicit price on the community benefit attribute is never significantly 
different from zero. Surprisingly gorilla visitors in Rwanda do not have a high value for the 
community benefits of nature tourism. 
5.3.9 e) Determinants of cut off violation 
A question also arises regarding if social or economic characteristic might have an effect on 
an individuals choice regarding when cut offs are violated. A Probit model was used to 
determine the effects of several parameters on cut off violation at the 50% level. Only income 




                                                 
32 Model  1 corresponds to the model of table 5.15,  without cut-offs; Model  3 corresponds to the model of table 5.15 with soft cut-offs, 
where the implicit prices are estimated considering cut-offs violations on the trip price attribute alone. 
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Table 5.18 Income as a detriment of cut off violation 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
b/St.Er. P[|Z|>z]  
Constant 
(<25,000 US$)    
0.448 0.180 2.487 0.013 
Income Dummy 1  
(25000-45000 US$) 
0.702 0.249 2.823 0.005 
Income Dummy 2   
(45000-65000 US$) 
0.577 0.268 2.152 0.031 
Income Dummy 3 
(65000-85000 US$) 
0.500 0.309 1.621 0.105 
Income Dummy 4    
(>85000 US$ )        
0.257 0.225 1.140 0.254 
n= 338, χ2 = 10.157, d.f. = 4, p<0.05 
Dummy variables are organised in order of increasing income group. A significant 
relationship between cut off violation and the constant were found. In addition Income 
Dummy’s 1 to 3 also showed a significant positive relationship with cut off violation. The 
highest income group however showed no significant relationship with cut off violation.  
Noticeably there is also a decrease in the marginal effect (coefficient value) of income on cut 
off violation with increasing income. From this it is apparent that higher income group 
individuals are less likely to violate their stated price cut off than lower income group 
individuals. This might be explained by visitors in lower income categories not wishing to 
pay any excess for the trip and having a low cut off value for price, but in reality not wanting 
to stay at home either thus a higher likelihood of violating their price cut off.  
 
Surprisingly no significant difference was observed (F= 1.66, d.f.=5, p=0.142, not significant) 
in mean price cut off between income groups (Table 5.19). 
Table 5.19 Mean price cut off by income class 
 Income group N Mean Std. Error Minimum Maximum 
<25,000 US$ 54 115.41 23.127 0 500 
25000-45000 US$ 91 77.95 11.560 0 500 
45000-65000 US$ 62 71.71 14.045 0 450 
65000-85000 US$ 37 82.19 18.383 0 400 
>85000 US$ 105 107.42 13.188 0 500 
All 419 87.89 6.270 0 500 
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5.4 Conclusion 
5.4.1 Analytical implications 
In this chapter, we have used the cut-offs approach to choice modelling to address two issues. 
Firstly, that respondent choice may not fit a strict compensatory model presumed by most 
economists. In this matter our finding somewhat similar to those of Glenk (2005) regarding 
trade offs between attributes.  Whilst individuals indicated in their cut offs their willingness to 
pay for social benefits, when it came to making choices and prioritising attributes, they were 
unwilling to make a trade off in favour of local community benefits.  
 
Secondly, that of hypothetical market bias, where violations of the stated price cut-off  were 
used as a means of detecting this bias. Swait (2001) indicated that breaks in the utility 
function are person-specific and since the cut-offs approach is one way of dealing with 
heterogeneity in preferences, that “.fit improvements over models without (cut-offs) should be, 
and are, striking” (p914). Echoing Swait’s findings this study also found an improvement in 
model fitting by incorporating cut-offs; although not to the extent found by Swait. Amaya-
Amaya and Ryan (2006) also found, like Swait, that most penalty function parameters were 
significant, and that the size of parameter on the cut-off exceeded that on the associated 
attribute itself. In contrast to the former, we find that only a minority of penalty function 
parameters are significant (Table 5.15); but found for price that the penalty function 
parameter was indeed much bigger than that on the price attribute itself, and that the same 
relationship held for length of trek. 
 
Overall, it would seem that the cut-offs approach is a useful way of modelling choices in a 
world of partially non-compensatory decision-making. We have also suggested that the 
approach could be useful in investigating hypothetical market bias in stated preference data. 
However, there is clearly an issue here of what value of γ to use in doing this, since the values 
we take are arbitrary. Perhaps this could be investigated by using a laboratory experiment to 
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estimate this parameter, by comparing real and hypothetical choices. There is also the issue of 
what to do with these screened choices: we recode them as representing the opt-out option, 
but another idea would be to delete them entirely, or perhaps even calibrate them. The 
consumer sovereignty issues highlighted earlier is also of concern and an obvious approach 
might be to have the respondent reappraise their response in light of the cut-off violation, 
which would be possible in face to face interviews. However a compelling advantage of the 
analyst enforced decision rule is that it represents, in postal or remote surveys, a method of 
screening for irrational responses post exercise. Finally, we note that other approaches to 
modelling the screening of choices (of which cut offs are but one example) include the use of 
fuzzy set theory  (Koutsopoulos & Vythoulkas 2003) and Bayesian approaches  (Gilbride & 
Allenby 2004). 
 
A caveat to this study is that retrospectively gorilla tourism may not have been the ideal good 
for such a methodological test as it represents a unique good that is far from frequently traded. 
Indeed the option to opt out was not a choice that was frequently made. Fundamentally the 
principal reason for many in visiting Rwanda was the trek to see mountain gorillas. So 
contextually this may mean that the ‘opt out’ option was not a rational one for them to make. 
In effect respondents may have felt forced in to making a decision between the option A or B 
and having to choose the ‘lesser of two evils’ thus violating their cut-offs. However we must 
considering that the cost of the actual gorilla permit  at $375 per trip does represents a good 
proportion of the total spend to visit Rwanda e.g. it may be as much as 20 to 30%. Generally 
respondents in this survey were committed nature or eco-tourists and have the options to 
consider other unique and charismatic species to visit such as the giant panda in China, tigers 
in India, or simply going on safari in other parts of Africa. In this broader context they are not 
making a forced choice in the sense that if they don’t visit gorillas they don’t have choices to 
do other things.  
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5.4.2 Conservation implications 
This chapter has employed the choice experiment method to investigate the determinants of 
demand for nature tourism in Rwanda based on mountain gorillas. One of the most cited yet 
poorly quantified benefits of ecotourism is that biodiversity is a main reason why tourists visit 
protected areas, and hence the maintenance of critical biodiversity habitat can provide 
economic returns and corroborates findings by Naidoo et al (2004). As such these results are 
also contrary to a number of recent studies which describe the relationship between 
ecotourism and conservation of biodiversity as uncertain (Bookbinder et al., 1998; Isaacs, 
2000). The results show that tourists are willing to pay for biodiversity conservation, both in 
terms of gorillas and for other wildlife seen during a trip. Tourists prefer to be in smaller tour 
groups in terms of the number of people in the group, and prefer a length of trek between 1 
and 3 hours to either shorter or longer treks. These two findings also show that tourists 
support the eco tourism principles of minimising ecological impact, since more people taking 
longer trips will increase adverse ecological impacts.  
 
In the broader context of tourism and conservation in Rwanda, international tourists that visit 
the mountain gorillas comprise the majority of tourists that visit the two other national parks 
in Rwanda. Tourists’ support for biodiversity conservation provides evidence that 
management practices that promote species density and diversity can have an economic 
return. This is of particular importance in Rwanda where there are acute constraints on land 
due to the unusually high population density. In other sub Saharan African countries with 
lower population densities than Rwanda, much of the nation’s biodiversity assets are found 
out-with of the protected area system, for example Kenya where an estimated 90% of the 
nation’s biodiversity found on land out-with of the national parks system (Mwanjala 2005). In 
contrast, Rwanda shows a concentration of natural flora and fauna within the three national 
parks due to extensive conversion to arable or livestock agricultural systems outside these 
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areas. Protected areas must continue to be at the forefront of conservation efforts and nature-
based tourism is the key means of paying for them. 
 
However, we found no significant effect on tourism demand for what percentage of park 
revenues are recycled to enhance local community developments within the national park. 
Whilst respondents feel that it is right that local communities should benefit more from 
tourism (as shown by their stated cut off- values), they are not willing to pay for it. This is in 
itself no reason to abandon ICDP policies that contribute to improving local social welfare, 
but suggests that promoting ‘revenue sharing’ as a marketing device is unlikely to be effective 
in boosting demand. However nature-based tourism and the revenue sharing policy, remains 
an important tool as part of an ICDP strategy, since in principle it provides a means for local 
people to benefit from the public good of wildlife and habitat conservation. However, we 
have not here investigated how in this specific context local communities can gain the most 
from nature-based tourism, nor what the costs are to people living locally of a conservation 







Chapter 6:  
Application of economic values to protected areas policy 
and management issues; a case study of Queen Elizabeth 
Protected Area Uganda 
6.1 Introduction 
This thesis has focused on developing a quantitative understanding of the values from selected 
protected areas in the central regions of the Albertine Rift.  In chapter 3 a market price 
method (MPM) was used to value financial benefits to local households from protected areas 
in south western and western Uganda. Analysis was carried out at different levels of 
aggregation and according to location, income and other socio-economic factors. In chapter 4 
a contingent valuation (CV) study with a provision point mechanism was used to value local 
peoples economic benefits from protected areas, along side a market price method MPM 
study and a comparison of the valuation methods was made. Chapter 5 examined the use 
values of international tourists for mountain gorilla eco-tourism using a choice experiment. 
 
This chapter seeks to place some of the values derived from the empirical case studies in this 
thesis in a broader context to demonstrate how a better understanding of the values of 
protected areas as the back bone of forest and biodiversity conservation can contribute to the 
optimal design of protected area policies and management. The key objectives of this chapter 
are; 1) estimate the total economic value of a protected area under a social and financial 
accounting framework; 2) evaluate the costs and benefits of maintaining a protected area vs 
alternative land use options; and 3) draw some final conclusions based on the findings from 
this chapter and previous chapters to answer policy and management questions regarding 
socially optimal strategies to conserve biodiversity. 
 
The analysis in this chapter is based on developing a case study using findings from this 
research, and other secondary data, to estimate the total economic value (TEV) of a protected 
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area using benefits transfer techniques. Despite the TEV conceptual model being well 
established few studies to date have really used it as a comprehensive approach to valuation of 
an environmental resource (Pagiola et al. 2004).  
 
Apart from the valuation exercise to estimate direct values presented in chapters 3 and 4 little 
other data exists on which to make estimates of the broader values described in the TEV 
framework for Queen Elizabeth Protected Area (QEPA). In order to do this benefits transfer 
techniques will be used. Benefits transfer is a term adopted in economics to describe the use 
of secondary data on valuation estimates obtained in a particular context to estimate values in 
a different context (Pagiola et al. 2004).  Broadly there are two different types of benefit 
transfer approaches value transfers and function transfers (Rosenberger & Loomis 2003). 
Value transfer is the direct application of original research summary findings to a different 
policy or site context. Function transfer entails the application of a statistical function or 
model from one policy context to another. This study uses a variety of value transfer 
techniques to estimate TEV. 
 
Whilst there are pros and cons to both approaches (Rosenberger & Loomis 2003) it is 
generally accepted that benefits transfer overall can be a useful approach under certain 
conditions. Such conditions include that the commodity or service being valued is very 
similar in nature between sites, and that the populations affected should be similar in 
characteristics. In addition the original estimates being used must be trustworthy in order for 
the transfer to be significant (Barton & Mourato 2003).  
 
Globally there are several notable cases where the TEV framework has been used to draw 
together a range of ecosystem service values (Adger et al. 1995; Bush et al. 2004; Falkenberg 
& Sepp 1999; Hatfield & Mallaret-King 2003; Howard 1995; Kramer et al. 1995; Ruitenbeek 
1992; Ruitenbeek 1989). Several of these studies also include cost benefit analysis of 
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alternative land uses in the analysis. However the challenge for all these studies is that the 
different forest benefits estimated often rely on crude assumptions or secondary data to 
conduct the benefit transfer for some if not all of the estimates. Typically where empirical 
data was collected to make the estimates this was mainly limited to estimates of direct use 
values e.g. (Bush et al. 2004; Hatfield & Mallaret-King 2003; Howard 1995; Kramer et al. 
1995; Ruitenbeek 1992; Ruitenbeek 1989). Whilst secondary data sources on tourism receipts 
from particular national parks or timber off-takes and revenues can be reasonably accurate 
and adapted to site specific conditions, other ecosystem service values can be much more 
prone to error and bias. For example ecological functions such as watershed, in terms of the 
flow of benefits to different stakeholders are not the same between sites often due to 
topography and also the socio-demographic and spatial distribution of people throughout the 
watershed. Thus making realistic adjustments of a benefit transfer a difficult task if little is 
known about the precise site (Bruijnzeel 2004). This aggregating up benefits from a country 
site to the national level is also fraught with the same problems, making national level 
aggregates about the contribution of a forest type to the national economy imprecise in the 
order of magnitudes. Many of the above limitations also apply to this study, however leaning 
form these earlier experiences is it possible to do more rigorous screening for relevance of 
value transfers and omit double counting. Thus the impact of the limitations can be reduced 
limitations to develop a more accurate estimate of TEV. 
 
The valuation exercise is set in the context of international and national polices towards 
biodiversity conservation and contemporary management approaches widely used in Uganda 
and other countries in the Albertine Rift. In this case study every effort has been made to 
screen the values being transferred for relevance, with most coming from cases within 
Uganda.  The purpose of the benefits transfer approach in estimating TEV is not the precision 
of the values estimated, but firstly to contextualise the assessment of the relative scope and 
magnitude of benefits which occur at different levels in the value chain. Secondly it is to 
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apply this information in making rational decisions for managing biodiversity in protected 
areas.   
6.2 Assessing the implications of costs and benefits of biodiversity 
conservation in the Queen Elizabeth Protected Area 
A case study of the Queen Elizabeth Protected Area (QEPA) in Uganda is undertaken here to 
better understand the scope of economic values from protected areas on the design of 
protected area policies in Uganda. QEPA is one of the sites surveyed in chapter 4 of this 
thesis. The nature and scope of local direct economic values are of key interest (Campbell & 
Luckert 2002) in assessing the broader framework of policies aimed at biodiversity 
conservation.  As discussed in chapter 2, ICDP and the community conservation approaches 
are amongst the most prominent tools currently used to redress the inequities faced by local 
communities that live in close proximity to protected areas. In addition there is a well 
developed critique of ICDP’s relative failure to achieve the twin goals of biodiversity 
conservation and human development. Chapter 2 reviews some of this literature and points 
towards the need to fully quantifying the opportunity costs at the local level, which chapters 3 
and 4 subsequently do. The use of QEPA as a case study is a useful example as it is neither a 
particularly high nor low earning protected area in terms of park revenue unlike Bwindi in 
Uganda or Volcanoes National Park in Rwanda, both of which contains the world famous 
mountain gorillas and have high revenues. In addition the problems of managing the QEPA as 
a geographically expansive area that is surrounded by human habitations and bisected by a 
road are features common to many other parks in the Albertine Rift region. How much 
revenue does a protected area such as this need to collect in order to fund its management, as 
well as offset the losses to local communities? Where can it possibly raise the revenue? These 
are key questions for this and perhaps every protected area globally. 
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6.2.1 Location and biological significance 
QEPA is found in the south-western region of Uganda, bordering the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) on its south-western perimeter. It includes Queen Elizabeth National Park (at 
2080 km2, it is Uganda’s largest national park), buffered by the Kyambura (154 km2) and 
Kigezi (265 km2) wildlife reserves on its southern boundary. It boarders Lakes George and 
Edward, and includes the Kazinga channel, a number of crater lakes and a large wetland (the 
250 km2 Ramsar wetland is of international importance).  
 
QEPA is part of a wider trans-boundary ecosystem within the Albertine Rift region of central 
and east Africa. The Albertine Rift includes some of the most important protected areas in the 
world that act to conserve Acacia woodlands, lakeshore, wetlands, grasslands, thickets, 
medium and high altitude afromontane forest as well as afroalpine heath and moor land. It is 
not only an area of high species density, but also an area of high species endemism. Within 
Uganda the ecosystem includes Kibale National Park, Rwenzori Mountains National Park, 
and in the DRC the Park National des Virunga. QEPA was designated a Biosphere reserve in 
1979 and in 1961 the Uganda Institute of Ecology was founded at Mweya; the ecosystem has 
been intensively studied. 
 
QEPA and the contiguous Parc National du Virunga in the DRC constitute the only fully 
protected parts of an ecosystem mosaic that has the world’s highest known carrying capacity 
of large herbivorous mammals. The area has several species of special interest and concern 
including the threatened shoebill stork, chimpanzee and tree-climbing lions. QEPA supports a 
wide range of Uganda’s natural habitats and landforms including grassy plains, distinctive 
savannah woodlands, tropical forest, wetlands, rivers, swamps, lakes and volcanic craters. The 
area has a greater biodiversity than any other protected area in Uganda.   
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6.2.3 Social change and threats to QEPA 
Opened by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II in 1953, from whom the park takes its name, it 
was established by the then colonial administration. Since its establishment there have been 
questions over rights to access by local people who were trans-located out of the area and 
more recently questions by the expanding local population who have a desperate need for 
agricultural land, timber and NTFP products that are in the protected area.  
 
The large mammal populations have suffered severe losses in the turbulent times since 
Uganda’s independence in 1963.  Poaching caused a sharp decline in numbers of elephant, 
buffalo and hippo during the mid-to-late 1970’s, much of which was conducted by militia 
groups and the Ugandan Army of the Amin presidency (Douglas-Hamilton et al. 1980; 
Lamprey et al. 2003). In the early 80’s, local communities increasingly encroached the 
Kyambura and Kigezi areas (Eltringham & Malpas 1983). By the late 80’s, new found 
political stability in Uganda saw renewed emphasis on wildlife conservation and tourism with 
extensive efforts being made to rehabilitate QENP through law enforcement to control 
poaching and illegal uses. In addition fishing communities that were established during the 
periods of poor control were contained and regulated. 
 
Despite these efforts in the late 1990’s wildlife numbers had declined further still (Lamprey et 
al. 2003) and certain species such as elephant, buffalo and topi were particularly threatened. 
Human populations around the park were increasing rapidly and there was an increased 
demand for meat and fuel wood in rural villages as well as Kasese town. In the late 1990’s a 
rebel insurgency in the south west (Allied Democratic Forces) meant that there was a high 
presence of Ugandan Army troops within and around the QEPA, further increasing the local 
demand for meat and fuel wood. There is little doubt that the proliferation of small arms in the 
area had a detrimental effect on wildlife numbers.  
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QEPA is a long narrow protected area with roads both bisecting it and running along the outer 
edges of it. The poaching problem is exacerbated by the high level of illegal access from local 
households to core areas of the protected area, from these public roads.  In the new 
millennium the downward trends in wildlife population numbers seem to have reversed. The 
numbers of large mammals such as elephant, buffalo, hippopotamus and Uganda cob are all 
on the rise, although the populations still remain fragile (Lamprey, 2003). This rise in animal 
numbers can be principally attributed to increase security, protection and monitoring efforts in 
the park over the past two decades.  Tourism has become one of the leading sectors of 
Ugandan Economy. It is the third most important source of foreign exchange earning after 
coffee and tea. The tourism industry is almost exclusively based on wildlife tourism and the 
national parks, therefore healthy populations of wildlife are essential to maintain and fulfil 
consumer interest. 
 
Local communities adjacent to the QEPA are predominantly rural with subsistence peasant 
economies reliant on agriculture and pastoralisim as their main source of income (see chapter 
4). Few jobs in market-based activities are available, although there is some commercial 
fishing based in communities located within QEPA and a salt works.   The major town in the 
area is Kasesse, which is the focus for regional markets and government administration.  
 
The QEPA headquarters is strategically located within the national park at Mweya, over 
looking the Kazinga channel and Lake Edward. Sub stations are located at Kyambura on the 
eastern side of the Kazinga channel and Ishasha in the southeast of the park, close to the 
boarder with the DRC. All of these stations serve as a base for tourism and for the protection 
and monitoring of activities with-in the park. QEPA is the most visited park in Uganda but is 
only the second highest earning park after Bwindi Impenetrable Forest National Park (home 
of the mountain gorillas).  
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Figure 6.1 The Queen Elizabeth Protected Area. Source: UWA QEPA Tourism Brochure 
 
6.3 Estimating the opportunity costs to local households 
Using the results from Chapter 4 on household values, it is possible to make an estimate of the 
total financial value of the protected area to local livelihoods. The calculation was based on 
the mean value per household from the protected area and the total number of households that 
are probable protected area users. Probable protected area users were, for the purpose of this 
study, identified as those households resident within parishes that share the boundary of the 
protected area in question. A weighted least squares regression  in chapter 3 examining 
determinists of forest use showed distance to be an insignificant factor in determining use 
compared to other factors such as household size, income, and other assets in our sample 
population (all probable protected area users). Although QEPA was not amongst the sites 
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used in the analysis in Chapter 3 the general principal should apply.  The aggregation 
presented here is just to the level of the sample population so a distance decay approach was 
no it adopted as the mean value of household forest income is sufficiently representative of 
the entire sample population under consideration. All of the households in the sample 
population were considered to be forest users. Therefore they are in close proximity to the 
protected area in terms of access. The random stratified nature of the sample of households 
within parishes allows us to apply the average values obtained across all households within 
the population of probable protected area users in order to scale up the financial values to a 
protected area level.  
 
Using the 2002 census data (the most recent available), the total number of households in the 
LCII immediately bordering the QEPA was 40,063. This equates to the total population as per 
the sample frame for the market price values derived as part of the survey presented in chapter 
4. The mean annual household’s income from the protected area was calculated as $36.2. 
Therefore the total annual financial value of the entire protected area to local household’s 
income and livelihoods is approximately $1,530,000 (40,064housholds*$36.2).  It is 
important to note that this value is a result of illegal harvesting of resources from the park.   
 
As was discussed in chapter 4 there is a large discrepancy between financial values estimated 
using household income approaches and the economic values estimated using contingent 
valuation approaches. The mean WTA value estimated for QEPA was $468 per households 
per annum. Using the same calculation as above the annual economic welfare is $18,749, 484 
a figure more than 10 times the financial estimate. The classic opportunity cost approach 
provides an estimate of the value of a protected area based on the foregone income of the best 
alternative use of the area. Measuring the opportunity cost of the protected area can give the 
protected area manager an idea of the competitive threats to the area. In the case of potential 
threats from people living adjacent to a protected area, the relevant opportunity costs will be 
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the value of alternative land uses they may prefer, such as farming or ranching. Other interests 
in the area may come from pressures for industrial or urban development, mining or intensely 
modified recreation uses. 
6.3.1 Arable agricultural income foregone from protected area land 
 A key opportunity cost is the benefits forgone from utilising the land in the protected area for 
agriculture as a comparative land use. The total area of land available for arable agriculture is 
comprised of the tropical high forest and woodland areas. This equates to an area of 
72,026Ha. Assuming that only 50% of this land area is actually cultivable leaves 36,013Ha of 
useful land.  50% is a conservative assumption as there will be areas where soil conditions or 
rainfall is too poor to make cultivation viable. In addition those areas that would be cultivable 
are in a semi arid area, which probably means that output may be well below the current 
averages by up to 50 %. 
 
The mean net total household income from agricultural sources (value of own produced 
agricultural goods consumed and sold) was $US1,384 per annum on a mean land holding of 
4.01Ha. Thus the mean net total household income is $US345 per Ha multiplied by 0.5 to 
account for lower productivity. Over the available area, this amounts to approximately 5.8 
million USD.  
6.3.2 Livestock income foregone from protected area land 
Data from the UBOS (2003), cited in Bush and Mwesigwa (2007) on livestock profitability in 
semi-arid grasslands is about $15 per Ha. The traditional livestock farming practices is 
extensive grazing in the grassland and bushland areas. Generally the bushland and grassland 
areas are semi-arid and are unsuitable for arable agriculture, unless irrigation is available. The 
area of bushland and grassland available in the QEPA is 114,496Ha. Thus the total net 
benefits foregone from livestock production are $1,717,440 per annum.  
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The opportunity costs calculated in this way considerably exceeds both gross revenues and 
community use values. Clearly this indicates that conversion to agro-pastoral use would 
financially be preferable than maintaining the status quo. However the calculation relies on 
certain assumptions that are only partially valid. It assumes that much of the land actually has 
a uniform development potential. Many of the high potential areas were occupied before the 
protected area was established so inevitably the protected area occupies land that is in some 
ways marginal. Second, it assumes that land is a limiting factor in the local and national 
economy and that if it were made available for conversion that it could be converted 
immediately to the same levels of productivity as other local areas.  
 
Currently only about 30% of the potentially viable agricultural land out with the protected 
areas in Uganda is cultivated (Drichi 2003). Lack of exploitation of available land may be due 
to low levels of mechanisation e.g. peasant farming systems, climatic variables, livestock 
disease and in recent history the effects of war and insecurity. Current levels of agricultural 
production are perhaps lower than could otherwise be achieved using improved techniques 
(intensification through the use of fertilizers and improved soil management). In addition it 
assumes that conversion could happen without any other associated costs or benefits being 
incurred. There are potential negative impacts from changing the ecosystem functions of the 
protected area and their resulting downstream positive impacts on soil and water relations 
6.3.3 National Level Values 
6.3.3.1 Domestic Water Conservation 
QEPA is an important source of water for local communities and its integrity directly affects 
the quality and quantity of the water available. Almost 60% of all respondents indicated that 




It is possible to estimate the value of the provision of clean water by natural ecosystems to 
local communities by considering the cost of providing an alternative source of water should 
current supplies be made unavailable through the loss or degradation of the forests that 
sustains them. One option is to provide clean water by sinking a borehole, which obviously 
has a market cost.  Whilst a borehole may not be appropriate in all cases, boreholes are 
perhaps one of the most common methods seen in Uganda for rural people to obtain a regular 
supply of clean domestic water. 
 
Using figures from the IUCN (2002) study on Sango Bay, a borehole should sustain 300 
people and 276 head of livestock (cow equivalents).  Based on the cost of installing a 
borehole depreciating it over 5 years and including the costs of maintenance the average 
annual cost of providing a borehole was calculated to be $US293 per annum (IUCN 2002). 
The stages in the calculation to scale up the economic value of water services to the park 
adjacent communities are set out below. 
 
Stage 1 Borehole costs for human population 
Total number of individuals living adjacent to the QEPA=198,232 
Number of bore holes required=661 
Total cost of bore hole provision= 661*293= $193,673 
 
Stage 2 Borehole costs for livestock 
Mean number of livestock per household= 0.24 
Total number of households adjacent to the QEPA= 40,063 
Total livestock equivalent units= 9,615 
Number of boreholes required= 9615/276 = 35 
Total cost of borehole provision= 35*293= $US1025 
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Stage 3 Total annual value of replacement cost 
Total=$203,928*60% = $US122,355 per annum 
Mean per person = $US 0.62 per person per annum 
Mean per household = $US 3.05 per household per annum 
 
The total value of local level water services was calculated as $US122,355 per annum. The 
mean value of water provision per household in this scenario is $US0.62. This is based on 
60% of the population needs. It is likely that ground water levels in the local area of the 
protected area would also drop for two reasons; first, the forest cover plays a role in 
maintaining the height of the water table and secondly, additional users of local aquifers will 
result in the level of the aquifer dropping to a new equilibrium level, assuming that 
consumption does not outweigh replenishment. Therefore existing boreholes may have to be 
re-sunk meaning the cost of water provision may increase. An additional assumption is that 
water demand will remain the same on a per household basis.  The values derived in the 
above calculation only take in to account households in the sample frame immediately around 
the QEPA.  
6.3.3.2 Soil fertility 
The economic effects from forest loss on agriculture through soil erosion and loss of fertility 
are difficult to quantify as the magnitude of effects are highly variable and situation specific. 
This is due to a variety of environmental factors such as soil type, topography, rainfall, and 
human agro-ecological and demographic factors such as the type and extent of crops grown, 
farming practice (extensive or intensive) and population density. Calculating the economic 
effects is complicated by factors such as the impacts of soil loss being spread over time. None 
the less the impacts of declining soil fertility are real and should be factored into an estimation 
of the total economic value or the protected area will be undervalued. 
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As was established in the livelihoods survey (Chapter 3), households rely heavily on the 
natural forests for fuel wood. All households interviewed obtained some or all of their fuel 
wood from the forest. Uncontrolled over exploitation of the natural forest will result in the 
resource being mined, in that consumption exceeds regeneration, resulting in a decrease in the 
capital stock of wood. As fuel wood becomes scarce households will turn to crop residues or 
grass for fuel (as has already happened in Rakai District, Northern Uganda and some other 
parts of Uganda). The result will be a loss of crop residues and nutrients to the agricultural 
system. Further degradation of the soil and declining crop residues will result in the use of 
animal manure as fuel, should there be no other options for extensification of agriculture, the 
result being further decline in soil fertility. 
 
The damage cost of the diversionary use of farm yard manure (FYM), from organic fertiliser 
to fuel, can be calculated by the replacement cost approach, e.g. the cost of replacing the 
nutrients in farm yard manure with chemical fertiliser which is available in local markets. 
Bush, et al (2004) calculated the replacement cost of FYM in the agricultural system at just 
over $157 per household per year. The average value of woodland to soil nutrient 
conservation is just over $160 per household per annum. This figure is comparable to other 
estimates for Uganda by (Nkonya et al. 2003) who calculated that 95% of farmers in their 
survey were taking out more nutrients from the soil than they (and nature) were putting back.  
By measuring how much nitrogen (N), potassium (P) and phosphorus (K) was being mined, 
the study team calculated that if the loss in soil fertility was to be fixed by adding chemical 
fertilizer it would cost an average of 21% of the total current value of maize production 
(US$153 per household per annum).  Taking the Bush et al (2004) price, the total economic 




Reported tourism revenues for QEPA were $769,420, yielding a profit of $75,899 for the 
financial year 2005-06. However in addition to the direct revenues generated by the national 
park, significant external impacts may also be felt in the wider economy (multiplier effects). 
Expenditures of US$$769,420 by international visitors (specifically park entry fees) is the 
direct contribution of the protected area to the national economy. Other factors, however, will 
modify the actual net contribution. Firstly, a portion of revenue spent and received in-country 
will be expatriated to other countries. Secondly, the contribution of any economic activity to 
the national economy should be assessed by considering direct effects vs. secondary effects. 
Direct effects refer to the effects of the ‘first round’ of spending e.g. immediate revenue, 
whilst ‘secondary effects’ refer to revenue generated by the re-spending of those dollars e.g. 
second and third round spending. These are also referred to as ‘indirect’ or ‘induced’ effects. 
These are important figures to consider in the valuation of tourism benefits as gate receipts 
alone only account for part of the economic effect at the national level. Secondary effects 
impact on the following components of the economy: 
 
(i) income derived from indirect and induced sales 
(ii) government revenue through sales and income tax 
(iii) number of jobs created by indirect and induced effect 
 
Assessment of secondary effects is done through estimation of a multiplier for each 
component, which indicates the “knock on” effect of the original revenue on that component. 
For example, a sales multiplier of ‘2.0’ indicates indirect and induced sales will be 200% of 
the original revenue. An estimate of an appropriate multiplier (2.91) was made by (Hatfield & 
Mallaret-King 2003). A comparison of foreign exchange earnings ($3.72 million) indicates 
that benefits from gorilla tourism to the Ugandan economy in terms of income and 
government revenue gains and income effects are US$ 10.86 million. Using the same factor 
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of 2.91 to multiply the gate receipts for QEPA ($769,413) gives a total of $2,238,991. This 
can be allocated as $1,544,904 to government taxes and $694,087 to income effects. 
6.3.3.5 Biodiversity Option Values 
Option values are perhaps the least tangible benefits from Uganda's forests. However an 
aspect that promises real returns is the development of plant based pharmaceuticals.  
(Ruitenbeek 1989) was one of the first to use the valuation methodology of patent rights to 
estimate the potential value of undiscovered plant-based drugs for the pharmaceutical 
industry.  He estimated values for the Korup Park, Cameroon and surrounding management 
area as $0.10/ha per annum.  Pearce and Moran (1994) estimate a range of values for tropical 
forest, which are generally larger than that produced by Ruitenbeek, ranging from US$0.10/ha 
to US$21/ha.  Work on this issue, by Mendlesohn and Balik (1997), produced a value for 
undiscovered plant-based drugs in tropical forest with average plant endemism of US$3/ha. 
 
The number of endemic plant species per hectare is very important as a predictor of potential 
drugs according to Mendlesohn and Balik (1997).   If an area of tropical forest had ten times 
more endemic species per hectare than average, their model predicts a per hectare future drug 
value of US$30/hectare. Howard (1995) indicated that Uganda's forests are not as species rich 
as the Korup Park and that many species present are widespread over many parts of Africa, so 
that developing plant based pharmaceuticals markets for such species would be competitive, 
in which Uganda' would have little competitive advantage.  An example of such a plant is 
Prunus africana, which grows naturally in Uganda in Afromontane areas. However 
commercial exploitation of Prunus africana is usually based on the establishment of 
plantations, which are originally sourced from wild genetic material. Using the Mendlesohn 
and Balik (1997) estimate, but reducing the lower figure by 50% as a conservative estimate, 
gives an average of US$1.5 per ha. Over an area of 198,969 hectares this equates to 
US$298,453. 
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6.3.4 International/Global Level Values 
6.3.4.1 Carbon Storage 
At the global level, the forestry sub-sector is an important carbon sink, helping to reduce 
accumulation of greenhouse gases and hence global warming which will lead to adverse 
changes in climate. According to Howard (1995), the service rendered by Uganda’s forestry 
sub-sector to the economy through its impact on carbon sequestration is estimated at US$ 
17.4 million/year based on current levels of carbon stocks depreciated over 25 years. Table 
6.1 depicts the size of different protected area zones and their different vegetative zones. 





Woodland Bushland Grassland Wetland 
 Area ( ha) 
QENP 4,524 62,048 25,593 69,598 10,913 
Kigezi Game 
Reserve 
223 1,626 6,611 4,718 540 
Kyambura Game 
Resreve 
1,861 2,738 511 7,465 0 
TOTAL 6,608 66,412 32,715 81,781 11,453 
(National Forest Authority Biomass Study, 2003) 



















6,608 210 1,387,680 13,321,728 50 266,435 
Woodland, 66,412 10 664,120 6,375,552 25 255,022 
Bushland, 32,715 10 327,150 3,140,640 25 125,626 
Grassland 81,781 10 817,810 7,850,976 5 1,570,195 
Wetland 11,453 100 1,145,300 10,994,880 10 1,099,488 
TOTAL 198,969 340 4,342,060 41,683,776   3,316,765 
 
Table 6.2 shows the areas of different vegetative types and the amounts of carbon 
sequestered, stock value and rotation periods. The annual carbon value of QEPA is estimated 
as the value of the stock of sequestered carbon divided by the rotation period of each 
vegetation type. The annual carbon quantity is then multiplied by the average market price for 
a tonne of carbon. The world market price for a tonne of carbon (2005-2006) is taken as 
$10.50 (World Bank 2008). Estimates of carbon sequestration ranges between 10 tonnes of 
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carbon per hectare of bushland or grassland to 210 tonnes of carbon per hectare of closed 
canopy primary forest. Uganda’s natural vegetation is estimated to cover a surface area of 
almost 11.5 million ha (Emerton & Muramira 1999). QEPA may provide economic benefits 
through mitigating the effects of global warming at a carbon market value of $3,316,765 per 
annum.  
6.3.4.2 International social value (consumer surplus) 
In the case of QEPA original data was not collected to calculate tourist’s consumer surplus. 
The approach to estimating consumer surplus will be through utilizing secondary data of 
international tourists consumer surplus values from a similar type of protected area in Africa, 
Lake Nakuru National Park in Kenya (Navrud & Mungatana 1994). A travel cost model was 
developed and estimated that the consumer surplus for each foreign national visiting the park 
ranged from $114 to $120 per person. Taking the mid point ($117) and applying this to the 
number of international tourists coming to QEPA (average of 3500 per annum) the total 
international consumer surplus for wildlife viewing in QEPA is approximately $409,500.  
6.3.5 Distribution of benefits in conserving the QEPA  
Developing a picture of the distribution of benefits between different aggregations of society, 
allow the quantitative examination of externalities. An additional issue is the choice of 
valuation method used to estimate values and how divergences in valuation approaches can 
create significantly different results (see also Chapter 4). Table 6.3 sets out the benefits valued 
in this case study and where they accrue in the value chain (local to global). Focusing on the 
divergence in value measures and the aggregation of values the table presents two different 
pictures of  benefits,  in the first setting the local financial value (MPM value) of benefits 





Table 6.3 QEPA Economic benefits local to global 
Economic Benefit Value $ per annum 
Local Local Financial Local Economic 
Local Direct Use 1,530,000 18,749,484 
Sub total 1,530,000 18,749,484 
National   
Domestic water services 128,000  
Soil fertility 6,410,000 6,410,000 
Park Tourism Revenue 769,420 769,420 
Biodiversity option 298,453 298,453 
Sub total 7,605,873 7,477,873 
Global   
Carbon 3,316,765 3,316,765 
International tourists consumer 
surplus 
409, 500 409, 500 
Sub total 3,316,765 3,316,765 
Total 12,452,638 29,544,122 
 
 
The scope of values estimated in table 6.3 above do not take in to account existence values by 
the international community. Estimating existence values for any protected area is a 
challenging endeavour, indeed few exercises have been undertaken globally (Pagiola et al. 
2004). Furthermore it   is difficult to separate these values from other non use values such as 
bequest values or isolate a particular forest or ecosystem at a site level from all of the other 
similar sites globally. For example two studies (Kramer et al. 1995; Walsh et al. 1990) 
estimate that the non use values for tropical forest range from $24 to $47 per capita per 
annum, but the problem is what proportion of that value can really attributed to QEPA? 
Existence values are there fore not included in this estimate as their computation are fraught 
with too much bias with currently available information.  As such the estimate in Table 6.3 
does represent an underestimate of the social values towards QEPA. However this does not 
completely undermine the purpose of the exercise, it merely narrows the scope of analysis to 
the evaluation of a relative set of benefits for which reasonable estimates can be made.  
 
Additionally there is the issue of double counting benefits between different value estimates. 
For example in Table 6.3 under the financial estimates there are entries for domestic water 
services calculated  for the sample population around the national park entered at the national 
level.  In the household finical valuation no appreciation of this value was made, thus it is 
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justified to include a value at the national level. However in the economic estimate, the value 
of such direct benefits from the protected area is implicit in the valuation so the financial 
estimate for water services is omitted. This would cause double counting and an over estimate 
of the total economic value. The double counting issue has been controlled for in the 
estimation process so is not a serious issue affecting the principal findings from these results. 
 
When comparing the benefits at different policy levels we immediately confront the problem 
of which local values to consider - the financial or the economic? Which values are adopted 
has a profound impact on the balance of benefits at the different levels. To take the financial 
values alone would be remiss, as we have developed during the course of this study a picture 
of the complex nature of interactions of local people with protected area resources and the 
role that these resources play in mitigating risk in livelihoods and thus social values. Evidence 
from chapter 3 showed that distribution of those costs at a local level is mainly amongst the 
higher income households in absolute terms.  However which value to consider depends 
largely on the questions to be answered. If we consider losses to individual parties then 
financial values may be more appropriate. Alternatively when considering overall economic 
efficiency then economic values would be appropriate. 
 
In addition low income households used more of their protected area income for subsistence 
purposes than high income households, which presents a picture of dependence on the 
protected area by poorer households, despite it being an illegal source of revenue. If the 
protected area regulations were to be enforced to the letter of the law then many poor 
households would be adversely affected. In both scenarios local communities face significant 
losses should the regulations of complete exclusion be effectively enforced. This would then 
mean a cost at the local level, but a benefit at the national and international level. 
 
Reported revenues for QEPA were $769,420, yielding a profit of $75,899 for the financial 
year 2005-06. The profit from the park falls considerably short of the estimated $1.5 million 
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financial value, the $8.2 million in benefits foregone from agricultural and livestock 
production, the $18.7 million in welfare values currently enjoyed by the local population. All 
are different estimates of various types of opportunity cost borne by the local population. 
Clearly tourism revenues alone are not able to adequately finance compensations schemes for 
the reduction in local household’s welfare that would result from loss of access to the 
protected area.  Findings from the study in chapter 5 on eco-tourists values shows that whilst 
the visitors were willing to pay for biodiversity conservation in itself they were less willing to 
pay for benefits to local communities as an outcome of the fees that they pay for experiencing 
biodiversity. However if we consider the multiplier estimate (section 6.3.3.4) and look at the 
component that is tax revenue, an additional $1,544,904 was available. This amount is at least 
enough to cover compensatory schemes up to the value of the financial losses incurred by 
local communities. However in a poor country like Uganda, the government has few sources 
of endogenously earned revenue, almost 55% of the national budget comes from the 
international donor community (GOU 2004). Thus there are many competing national 
priorities for such financial resources and the government is unlikely to directly allocate all of 
it back to local communities.  
 
Looking more broadly at the benefits from protected area, it is the national and international 
communities that benefit more than the local communities. Thus there is strong argument to 
support public financing of the park from the national and international communities. The 
distribution of benefits between the local and national level leaves some room for debate 
because some factors such as the national social values related to biodiversity conservation 
have not been incorporated, which is likely to skew the distribution further towards the 
national and international community. It may also change the balance of distributions between 
the national and international levels. Importantly the analyses conducted here helps to make 
the economic case in national and international political processes of the importance of 
protected areas as a policy approach for biodiversity conservation.  
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6.3.6 Comparison of land use options 
It is worth considering these values in the context of conversions of the national park to 
agriculture under different scenarios. The most pressing issues regarding protected areas is 
justification for their retention under increasing population pressure or the drive for 
investment and production of cash crops, involving their conversion to alternative land uses, 
particularly for the extensification of local agricultural systems; local population expansion is 
one of the key pressures facing QEPA. Recent influx of repatriated Basongora nomadic cattle 
herders from DRC in 2006 saw nearly 10,000 people and more than 30,000 cattle put a very 
real political pressure on the park,  through calls for degazettement33 for resettlement (Among 
2008).  
 
Table 6.4 makes a comparison of the benefits from QEPA as they accrue at different policy 
levels from local to global. The comparisons are made on the basis of maintaining QEPA in 
its current status versus conversion of suitable areas of the protected area into the local 
agricultural production systems. In terms of maintaining QEPA as it currently exists there are 
two accounting frame works used, a financial one and an economic one which take into 
account the current direct local social as well as financial values. Values used in table 6.3 are 
those derived from the calculations earlier in this chapter. They are presented to show the 
economic impacts of conversion of QEPA form the base line scenario of conservation.  
 
Under the conversion scenario the ecological and social values would be lost, all of the 
national level benefits would become negative reflecting their opportunity cost and the carbon 
storage value would be also be entered as a negative (such land would not qualify for offset 
schemes). In terms of converting QEPA, the economic NPV cost per ha is just over double 
that of the financial accounting framework. 
                                                 
33 Degazettment – the change in legal classification of land form a national park to some other legal category 
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Table 6.4 Conservation vs conversion a comparison of values 
Economic Cost/Benefit Financial Values under different land 
management options  
($US per annum) 
(Costs entered as negative values) Conversion to local subsistence agriculture 
 A B  
Local financial value Local economic value 
Local   
Local Direct Use -1,530,000 -18,749,484
Arable production 5,800,000 5,800,000
Livestock production 1,717,440 1,717,440
Sub total 5,987,440 -11,232,044
National 
Park management costs 693,243 693,243
Domestic water services -128,000 -128,000
Soil fertility -6,410,000 -6,410,000
Park Tourism Revenue -769,420 -769,420
Tourism multiplier effect -2,238,991 -2,238,991
Biodiversity option -298,453 -298,453
Sub total -9,151,621 -9,151,621
Global 
Carbon -3,316,765 -3,316,765
International tourists consumer 
surplus 
-409,500 -409,500
Sub total -3,726,265 -3,726,265
Total -6,890,446 -24,109,930
NPV per Ha.34 -32 -118
 
The international consumer surplus would also be lost as the dynamics of the interlinked 
ecosystem would be disrupted and biodiversity and ecological potential of the park would be 
lost. Under conversion financial accounting framework the per. hectare value of the park is 
approximately 50% of the per hectare value under the economic framework, with the values 
becoming correspondingly negative under the conversion scenario. An assumption in this 
model is that prices remain static; however food prices may go up, tourism may increase or 
the international value of carbon sequestered may change. Such factors can have a profound 
impact on the level of benefits, and where they accrue, as well as impacting the relative levels 
                                                 
34 NPV was calculated as the sum of the present benefits detailed in the table divided by the land area of QEPA 
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of performance of the different land use options. It is important to assess how sensitive these 
results are to changes in key variables. The impacts of changes in the tourism and food sectors 
are examined below. 
 
The tourism sector is one of Uganda leading foreign exchange earners and is a high priority 
for development financing. Uganda is working hard to develop its tourism industry and QEPA 
is one of the central foci of any international tourists visit to the country. For example if 
tourism visits increased by 10% an additional $77,000 in direct revenues and $220,000 in 
spending from the multiplier effect would be generated. 
 
Seasonal shocks such as flooding and drought have a profound impact on the availability and 
price of food. Recently Uganda has suffered from the impacts of extreme weather events. In 
2007 the eastern parts of Uganda (the main cereal production region) suffered sever flooding 
destroying crops while the south-western parts (a principal cavendish banana producing 
region) suffered severe hail storms thus destroying many banana plantations. These are 
contributing factors to the sharp rises in food prices in many urban centres of Uganda in early 
2008 (Biryabarema & Bagala 2008), in some instances retail values for basic food items 
doubled. If there were a 100% increase in wholesale food prices and this translated in to the 
same increase at the farm gate then potentially the financial value of arable and livestock 
production would also double, giving an NPV per ha under conversion of $74, or only $1 per 
ha more than the status quo scenario. Such exogenous shocks are often short term in nature 
and in Uganda by mid-2008 food prices had returned to normal levels. As such the model is 
fairly robust to agricultural price rises. In purely financial terms the maintaining of QEPA is a 
financially competitive option compared to conversion. 
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The question remains how to capture the benefits illustrated to pay for the desired 
conservation and development outcomes e.g. how to generate real funds to cover management 
costs (this is as a pose to how best to ensure beneficiaries receive the payment)? Essentially 
conservation financing has to firstly secure adequate resources at any given time to cover the 
costs of conservation and sustain this in the future. Whilst many of the benefits detailed are 
public in nature, most governments especially those of less developed nations with acute 
budget constraint are reluctant or unable to finance conservation activities to the level 
necessary, even if the benefits are clear.  
 
An useful approach is to understand which services are providing what benefits to which 
beneficiary (Pagiola et al. 2004). The challenge then is to motivate the beneficiaries of the 
services to pay for them through taxes or logging concession fees or tourism gate receipts. Of 
course there may well be a gap between what consumers are willing and able to pay versus 
the real cost of management of the resource e.g. high logging fees that make the unit cost of 
products cost more than the current world market price would result in no revenue being 
produced to cover management costs, similarly overpricing of entry fees for tourists. This is 
another area where economic valuation can also provide valuable information e.g. optimal 
pricing, see chapter 5.  More challenging is to get service users to pay for services that they 
might have been obtaining freely e.g. watershed protection or climate change mitigation 
through carbon sequestration. For local watershed services it might be possible to include a 
small incremental fee on water consumers that is restricted towards paying for watershed 
management.  
 
In the case of global public goods issues such as climate change the role that forests play in 
carbon sequestration major initiatives are under discussion to look at a global mechanism to 
pay for this service such as the reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation program being developed by the United Nations Framework Convention on 
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Climate Change. Such programs also have obvious positive externalities such as carbon 
financed forest conservation having a benefit for both watershed management and 
biodiversity conservation.  
6.4 Conclusion: forest valuation and the implications for policy 
and management 
6.4.2 Compensation of local costs 
What are the implications for local level compensation of costs through ICDP and other 
initiatives? Clearly there is a major challenge in assessing which opportunity costs need to be 
considered, the purely financial or the economic (social plus financial), as illustrated by the 
different values obtained between the MPM and CV estimates in chapter 4.  In terms of the 
financial opportunity costs, what are we trying to achieve with ICDP or direct payments 
approaches; compensation of like for like? In chapter 4 we discussed issues to do with 
substitutability of goods; trying to achieve a comparable level of income through ICDP 
activities or direct payments assumes that alternative goods are available. If we consider fuel 
wood for example (a significant component of the financial off take for these households) in 
the QEPA, and perhaps most of the other protected area in the Albertine Rift, alternative 
sources of wood are simply not available. Therefore the investment costs in compensation 
need to reflect the cost of sourcing wood from elsewhere. This social cost is reflected, at least 
in part of the CV-WTA value and may also contribute to the large difference in value 
measures. 
 
Communities are not homogeneous in socio-economic composition and there are often 
discrepancies in the way that different socio-economic sub-groups are distributed throughout 
a community landscape. For example, poor households may be on the periphery of the 
community located on marginal lands, often in areas closer to the national park boundary. 
Centralised community water points may be further from their dwellings thus any benefit to 
the community will have lower marginal benefits for poorer households further away. Poor 
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households are also those who are less able to afford medical treatment and less likely to send 
their children to school due to labour constraints in the home. Assessing the household 
dependency issues on forest resources is critical to identify entry points to change behaviour 
with the highest probability of success. Another concern from conservation perspective is the 
need to target ICDP projects towards those households most likely to use the protected area 
resources and those with the highest level of use. It seems that in many cases higher income 
households in fact expropriated more (in terms of adjusted financial value) from protected 
area (see results from Chapter 3). Clearly, improving protected area adjacent households 
living standards may in fact (ceteris paribus) mean that the protected area will be under 
greater threat. 
 
Other social and economic factors also influence the ability of an ICDP to change behaviour 
and investment in community infrastructure is a very imprecise way of delivering welfare 
benefits to local households. People living in isolated areas with limited access to external 
markets and infrastructure facilities are likely to remain poor and will continue to depend on 
nearby forest resources. On the other hand, communities closer to town may have a wide 
range of opportunities such as employment in tea plantations and small businesses. Plumptre 
et al (2004) also shows that younger households are more dependent on forest resources. This 
may be due to the fact that forest dependent activities in the NFR are illegal and it is risky to 
undertake them. Youth generally take greater risks relative to older people in the community. 
Furthermore, with limited off farm economic opportunities, younger households rely more on 
forest resources to meet their basic needs. Thus ICDP and community conservation 
approaches need to focus on addressing equity issues amongst those households most 
negatively impacted. 
  
The Bush et al (2004) study on protected and private forests in Uganda points towards their 
significant role in livelihoods security. Here the concept of the 'hungry gap' (Ellis 1993) is 
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important. The hungry gap is the period when reserves of home produce and cash are low or 
exhausted prior to the collection of the next harvest. It is a time when households may have to 
sell capital assets such as livestock to make ends meet. Thus having a forest on hand to 
provide alternative options such as wild foods to cover the hungry gap is very important. In 
addition there was a significant positive correlation between the time of year when household 
used the forest most and when cash and food is needed most. 
 
Evidence from Bwindi Impenetrable Forest and Mgahinga National Park, Uganda (Plumptre 
et al, 2004) reveals that despite the numerous ICDP interventions being implemented among 
local communities, law enforcement, perhaps combined with education, remains the major 
reason for reducing illegal access to park resources. Several million dollars have been put into 
ICDP efforts in Bwindi, a trust fund and other activities to improve community relations 
around Bwindi and Mgahinga forests and yet the percentage of people admitting to accessing 
the forest illegally (13-19%) in these two areas was not very different (14-22%) to other areas 
(Nyungwe, PNV and Virunga) where mainly law enforcement has been used (Plumptre et al, 
2004).  Since many people would not admit to collecting resources illegally from parks, this 
may be an underestimation of the real numbers that do collect these resources. Illegal access 
to forest wood resources for fuel, poles, stakes and timber remain among the major illegal 
activities in the two Ugandan parks. Some households cite lack of land and the fact that they 
would have to reduce the amount of food crops they plant as a reason not to practice on-farm 
substitution of tree products (Plumptre et al. 2004). 
 
Working with communities bordering the forest may not completely reduce the levels of 
illegal activities but is expected to lead to better relationships with the protected area 
authorities, which allows less aggressive tactics in dealing with illegal activities.  Drawing 
again on regional experience, it could be expected that Mgahinga and Bwindi NP (Uganda) 
would have more respondents claiming that relations between themselves and the protected 
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area authorities have improved. This is found to be the case. However, there were also more 
people around these two protected areas who believed that relationships had deteriorated than 
around the other protected areas where they believed the relationships to be stable.   
 
Despite the rather disappointing evidence on the performance of ICDP (discussed in chapter 
2) the importance of actually buying good will in the community from ICDP efforts should 
not be undervalued. Anecdotal evidence from park staff at Bwindi NP shows that the years of 
ICDP have significantly changed the formerly adversarial relationship with park rangers; only 
a little over a decade a go they were often subject to aggressive altercations with local 
communities, including physical assaults when purchasing provisions in local villages. At 
least there is now a constructive environment from which to develop better and more effective 
ways of collaborating with communities in biodiversity conservation.  
 
The evidence from national cases of ICDP clearly illustrates the concerns of Ferraro (2001). 
Understanding the financial, economic and institutional opportunities and constraints that 
dictate local use of protected area are critical in identifying how ICDP actions can address 
them. The bottom line consideration is that if a proposed scheme does not compensate a 
household’s opportunity cost (in welfare terms) from loss of access to protected area 
resources, it cannot hope to change behaviour. Importantly these issues are felt at the 
household level not at the community level. So if ICDP are to be effective at changing 
household or individual behaviour then they must deal where ever possible with households 
and individuals directly.  
6.4.3 Direct approaches to community conservation 
Paying people not to do something that society thinks is bad does require us to make some 
moral and ethical leaps of faith in the conservation community; after all we don’t usually 
protect banks by paying bank robbers to give up their criminal activities. It is however a 
question of proving the right incentives for socially desirable behaviour and disincentives for 
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socially aberrant behaviour. For example, the European Union has from 1988 to 2007 paid 
farmers in Europe to produce less food through the Common Agricultural Policy’s ‘set aside 
scheme’35, effectively paying farmers not to farm (USDA 2008). Similar agricultural policies 
have also periodically been in force in the USA since the 1960’s (Green 1990). To 
conservationists, and much of conservation concerned society, biodiversity loss is a socially 
undesirable externality; in rectification of this externality there are many laws and regulations 
with associated fines and other penalties. However to encourage socially desirable behaviour 
why not give an incentive, more ‘carrot’ and less ‘stick’? This is also appealing in terms of 
addressing the distributional issues regarding the benefits and costs of conservation.   
 
A concern that arises is that once payments are in place what checks and balances will be 
needed to avoid local households holding biodiversity or protected area ‘hostage’, e.g. “pay us 
more money or else we will chop the forests down”. Ultimately such a demand will only be 
driven by property rights that are not fully established and where such a high risk strategy 
might be the only sort of pay off an individual might expect to receive. Intuitively, if a 
resource right is properly established and an individual or household can realise a guaranteed 
future stream of benefits, in all likelihood they will pursue a rational course of action. As long 
as the payment meets or exceeds the opportunity cost of using resources in some alternative 
manner then an individual will probably pursue the highest return for the least effort. Cutting 
down forests or cultivating land still requires up front investment in terms of labour and 
capital.  Few subsistence-farming households probably have the time and energy to pursue 
additional labour intensive schemes, or else more land would have been cleared already. 
However a thorough examination of the institutional framework, contractual obligations and 
arbitration procedures will need to be made in any given situation to address the credibility of 
such concerns. 
                                                 
35 Set aside – where the EU makes payments to farmers to keep 10% of their arable land out of production in an 




There is also the question of sustainability to contend with; who will provide the finances for 
a payment scheme? An intention of many ICDP and development projects generally is 
‘sustainability’. This much misunderstood term has proved elusive to achieve and many 
indirect approaches need continued finance from some source to make them work, a term for 
this approach is ‘sustainable financing’. Ultimately the concept of sustainability needs to be 
examined in terms of scale. Although many ICDP schemes may not be locally sustainable, 
however in a global sense and with global financing they can be, if not sustainable, at lest 
financed in the longer term. The same goes for the PES or PCS approach, for example, global 
carbon financing could pay for the conservation of biodiversity through the preservation of 
habitats. This is appropriate as was highlighted earlier; biodiversity is global public good 
therefore global sources of finance should be sourced to address the global externality.  
 
Direct payments have the capacity to address more efficiently and effectively conservation 
targets with local welfare benefits. This is no guarantee that they will work, at least not any 
better than ICDP traditional approaches such as developing social infrastructure or income 
generating projects. Unlike ICDP, direct payment schemes do address fundamental 
constraints in community conservation approaches and conform to the theories regarding 
property rights, political economy and the basic rules of economic policy formulation. All 
lessons which need to be thoroughly learned for ICDP development in the future. 
6.4.4 Integrating protected area values into policy 
From the evidence presented in the preceding chapters it is clear that the broader development 
context in which biodiversity conservation operates is a complex and dynamic environment. 
Developing an economic and political economic understanding of the context of biodiversity 
conservation is a key step in being able to manage these resources more sustainably. A 
number of critical issues and challenges need to be addressed in order to give biodiversity in 
protected areas the prioritisation needed in national budget and planning processes.  Similarly, 
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much improvement in the efficiency and effectiveness of approaches to reconcile human 
development needs and conservation at the local level needs to be made and a thorough 
economic understanding of the local social dynamics and political situation is essential. 
 
The integration of protected area values into policy at the national level is a crucial step. 
protected area managers are often reluctant to modify their management/use practices even 
when the importance of environmental factors is acknowledged.  This may be in part due to a 
relentless pressure to reduce costs and increase revenue. Careful design of protected area 
regulations to create the right regulatory framework can encourage protected area users and 
managers to account for non-market benefits in their own interests. This can in turn reduce the 
need for costly supervision by regulatory agencies, whilst achieving a more efficient mix of 
market and non-market benefits. 
 
Values can be applied at different geographical and policy levels, for example in deciding 
about land use planning policy, or about how individual protected area should be managed. In 
both cases the scope for improving policies runs from zoning and property rights to national 
regulation and incentive schemes for protected area protection. However bringing the type of 
values presented in this thesis to bear on policy at the national level still presents some 
significant challenges that must be addressed as a priority. The Ministry of Finance (MoF) for 
example does not listen directly to sub-sector issues. The MoF requires the presentation of 
sub-sector issues as part of a coordinated and unified sector plan. In order to take the evidence 
and recommendations of parks and forest sub-sector values forward the responsible line 
ministry must compile a Sector Investment Plan as the basis of further discussion with the 
MoF. This requires strong lobbying and representation from the parks departments and other 
agencies responsible for biodiversity conservation to provide such evidence with in the 
national policy and budget processes. 
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Developing an integrated approach to land use planning has interesting implications in terms 
of coordination between ministries. Agriculture has it own line ministry and this represents its 
economic and political importance over other environment and natural resource (ENR) 
sectors. Agricultural policy will therefore have a profound impact on the viability of other 
ENR sectors, but ultimately it is the integrity of the environment and the important role of 
protected area in maintaining healthy agro-ecosystems that will underpin the success or 
failure of agriculture in locales around protected area in the future, particularly in 
mountainous regions that typify most of the Albertine Rift.  
 
Although this chapter has focused mainly on protected areas as the back bone of biodiversity 
conservation, the front line for defence continues to be land use practices on private land, 
especially that land adjacent to protected area. Particularly we need to consider policies in the 
agriculture and forest sectors that halt the clearance of natural forest and also promote the 
establishment of plantations. Better still for biodiversity conservation will be policies that 
promote the re-establishment of natural forest.  A key area of research and analysis must be 
household decision making related to environmental resource use. Valuation approaches must 
go further to examine both input and investment aspects of land use practices are essential in 
understanding the drivers of resource use and identifying efforts to mitigate the problem 
(Takasaki 2007). Fundamentally land reform is also needed to allow individual basic private 
owner ship and control of land resources to raise capital to make investments in livelihoods 
(Barbier 2004). In addition policies that promote non-land based activities among rural 
protected area communities are needed (Bush 2004; Plumptre et al. 2004; Takasaki 2007). 
 
Earlier the concept of externalities was introduced. In addressing the above questions we are 
attempting to mitigate or 'internalise' the market externalities. Virtually all protected area have 
some sort of positive non-market value (e.g. soil conservation, biodiversity). This implies that 
the economic value of keeping land in a natural state (especially natural forest) is greater than 
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the financial values that can be derived by a private actor producing for the market. Therefore 
knowing the values of the externalities produced and where they accrue is essential in 
identifying who pays and how much to achieve the optimal outcome. For example the 
valuation study in chapter 5 on gorilla tourism shows that tourists value protected area where 
they have a higher chance of seeing a variety of biodiversity, showing that conservation can 
have an economic return. Also these people are willing to pay for not only gorilla, but also 
biodiversity conservation.   A key assessment that still needs to be made is of the ability of 
international tourists to pay for the local social cost of loss of protected area access.  Even if 
tourists are able to pay, the evidence in chapter 5 showed that they were not willing to pay for 
the local social costs as part of the permit price for gorilla trekking. By extension this means 
that other protected areas might face similar constraints, this leaves some perplexing 
challenges in finding ways to resolve the externality. 
 
In order to understand how to mitigate externalities, property rights were discussed as a 
conceptual framework. Economists often argue that a fundamental undersupply of non-market 
benefits is the result of lack of exclusive property or user rights. The notion is that private 
property where it is enforceable creates an opportunity for profitable exchange and is thus an 
incentive for sustainable management. Generally economists tend to advocate for the 
provision of property rights over regulation or price policy. An advantage of such an approach 
is that government agencies need not concern themselves with the difficulties of setting prices 
or taxes but can devote its efforts to enforcing property rights and contracts. This is clearly 
one of the challenges currently facing conservation in that the proerty right of the state over 
the protected areas are not adequately enforced leading to the high levels of illegal use or 
unregulated exploitation (quite apart from the moral and ethical issues regarding) 
 
However as a sole approach to managing protected area this is difficult to envisage that either 
market based approaches, e.g. PES/PCS, or establishing property rights alone can really 
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deliver on effective protected area conservation with their multitude of public goods and local 
to global externalities. To this end ICDP are an appropriate (if somewhat economically 
inefficient) vehicle to deliver public and private goods at the level of the protected area where 
they concentrate on utilising a combination of market based and public service approaches.  
Understanding precisely, not only the relative costs and benefits of different project 
approaches, but also the transaction costs of implementation is essential in deciding upon the 
most effective mix of activities with the available resources. Economic research on 
community based conservation approaches and economic values of forest biomes  and may 
provide the wisdom and confidence for conservationists to try new approaches and refine old 
ones, as well as reconciling the concerns of the development community about the worth and 
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Appendix 1 Market price household survey 
 
Interviewer: Date:                             Time: 
Checked by: Check Date: 
Village (LC1):  
Parish (LC2): Respondent Age: 
Sub-county Respondent Sex: 
Forest: Wealth Group: 
 
Introduction and explanation of survey 
 
1.Household Composition 
How many people are in the household? 
Status Description Age Sex Education level Occupation 
Head of 
Household 
     
Spouse      
Member 1      
Member 2      
Member 3      
Member 4      
Member 5      
Member 6  
Member 7      
Member 8       
Member 9      
Member 10      
Description – 1)husband, 2)Wife, 3)Child 4)Relative 5)Orphan 6) Visiting worker 7)Dependent 8) Female head 
Education Level – 0) no formal education, 2 )Primary, 3) , secondary )4) College/University education 
Occupation – 0) no work 1)Farming-including subsistence 2)student 3)Own business 4) wage labour 6)Salaried employee 
7)Infant 8) Other – specify 
 
How many years has your family been in this village/location?……… 
1)Less than 1 year  2) 1-5 years 3)5-10years 4)10years or more 
 
2. Assets  
House Materials for Main Dwelling (try to make discreet observations on approach) 
Walls     
1)Timber/poles  2)Brick 3)Mud  4)Iron  5)Plastic Sheeting 
Door/Window Frame 
1)Timber/poles 2)Brick 3)Other-specify 
Floor    
1)Timber/poles 2)Mud  3)Cement 4)Tiles/bricks 
Roof    
1)Thatch 2)Tiles  3)Iron Sheets 4)Plastic Sheeting 
 
  
Do you own a Bicycle? How many? How about any of the other things below?  
1)Radio  2)Television 
3)Bicycle  4Motorcycle  5)Pickup truck or car  6)None 
 
Livestock Assets 
Do you have any animals amongst your household assets? 









3. Land Resources  - How much land do you have? What do you use it for? 
Land Type Area (Local 
Unit) 
What % is this of your total land holding? 
   
   
   
 281
   
   
   
   
Land Type – 1)Natural forest/woodland,  2)Woodlot, 3)Arable, 4)Wetland, 5) Grassland Pasture 6)Woodland/forest pasture 
7)Cash crop plantation 
 
4. Do you own a woodlot? If woodlot is owned:  
Species of tree Area (Ha) Purpose 
   
   
   
 
 









7. Do people use the forest?   
 
8. How far is it to the forest in Km 
 
9.How long does it take to walk there? 
 


















1. Which fuels do you  use each week and how much? 
 
Source Use Volume (unit) 
Wood   
Charcoal   
Paraffin   
Gas   
Electricity   
Other?   
Use- 1)Cooking 2)Lighting 3)Heating 
 
13.What trends have you noticed regarding the following resources from your local forests or market in the last year? 
Charcoal  Fuel wood  Timber  
Supply  Supply  Supply  
Quality  Quality  Quality  
Price  Price  Price  
      
      
0) Decrease, 1)Increase 2) No change 3) Don't know 
12. How far on average do you travel each day to collect firewood? Is it from the forest reserve? 
 
14. How has this changed in the last 5 years? 1) No change (go to 15) 2) travel further 3)travel shorter 
15. What is the reason for the change (if any)? 
 282
16. Where do you get your water? 
Bore hole/well  
Stream/river  
Spring Protected  
Spring Unprotected  
Pond/Dam  
Lake   
Other  Specify  
 
16 b Does your water come  from the forest? Yes/No 
 
17. How far is it from your home (one way) to the water source? 
 
18. Who collects water in the household? (If hired labour skip to 19) 
 
 
19. How many 20l jerry cans do you use each day? 
 
20. What type of treatment do you use to purify water for drinking? 
 
 21Does the quantity of drinking water change during the year? Why? 
22. What is the quality of your drinking water? 
1.Excellent  2.Good  3.Fair   4.Poor 
23. How has the quality of water from your domestic source changed over time? I f (no change go to 24) 
 
Time Quality 
5 years ago  
1 year ago  
Score - 1.Excellent 2.Good 3.Fair 4.Poor 
 
24. How do you expect water quality to change in the future?  
1.Improve   2.Deteriorate  3.No Change 4. Don’t know (go to 25) 
 
25.Why would you expect the above? 
 
 
26. Do you collect medicinal plants from the forest? 1) Yes 2)No (go to 31) 
 
27. What is the main reason you collect medicinal plants?  
1) Own Consumption  2) Sale 
 
28. Can you tell me about some of the most important medicinal plants you collect from the forest?  
 
Local Name of Plant Part Used 
(bark, root etc.) 
To treat which illness? Where is it sold? Price per Unit 
1     
2     
3     
4     
5     
6   
7     
8     
9     








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
10      X
9         X X 
8        X X X 




Boiling and Filtering  
Chemicals  
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6    X X X X X
5     X X X X X X 
4    X X X X X X X 
3   X X X X X X X X 
2  X X X X X X X X X 
1 X X X X X X X X X X 
 
Rank: 1.  2.  3.  4.  5. 
 
 
30. What is the most significant factor for you about the top 5 plants (you can tick more than one? 
Factor           Plant Number=> 1 2 3 4 5 
Income generating potential      
Use in the household      
Cultural belief      
Other      
Other      
 
31. Do you cultivate any medicinal plants (specify)? 
 
 
32. Why do you cultivate these plants? 
 Reason  
1 Income generation  
2 Home use  




The following questions on household income and consumption should concentrate on recalling events from the past 
12 months.
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33a. Household Income/Consumption (Non forest based)  
Item   Annual income from 
own produce/labour 
Weekly 
consumption  of 
own produce 
 










Crop Income      
Coffee Tin     
Tea Kg     
Cocoa kg     
Tobacco      
Processing Cane tonne  
Beans (dry) kg     
Staple Food (starches, maize 
matooke etc): 
     
1      
2      
Vegetables:      
1      
2   
Fruits:      
1      
2      
Tree Crop Income      
Woodlot Timber:      
1      
2   
Woodlot poles:      
1      
Charcoal Sac     
Moringa Kg     
Neem Kg     
Seedlings Piece     
 
Livestock  
   
Large animal       
Small animal       
Animal products      
Renting out of livestock      
Wage Labour       
Unskilled Agricultural/seasonal 
labour 
     
Other employment      
Skilled/regular employment      
Crafts and small scale 
enterprise 
     
Beer Jerry can     
Waragi litre     
Sale of crafts item     
Trading goods      
Renting out goods      
Miscellaneous cash income      
Total Cash Income ( 
excluding environmental cash 
income) 
     
Private Cash gifts/donations 
received 
     
Private non cash gifts received      
Total gifts received      
 
33.b Please indicate the quantities and values of inputs used in crop production over the last 12 months (this refers to 
agricultural cash expenditures).  
Inputs Unit Amounts Total costs 
Seeds    
Fertilizers    
Pesticides    
Manure/crop residues  
Hired labour    
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Extension services  
Other    
Note: The key is to get total costs.  
 
34. Household Income/Consumption (Natural Forest based goods) 
 
Do you have any problems with crop raiding animals from the forest? 1)Yes 2)No 
 
Which Species? 
1)Buffalo  2)Antelopes 3) Chimpanzee  4)Monkeys 5)Baboons  6)Porcupines  7)Wild pigs  
 
8)Other ( Specify)………………… 
 
Which species is most problematic? 
 
Do you ever trap some of these problem animals? 
 
Do you eat them? 1)Yes 2)No 
 
Do you harvest or sell anything from the forest? 
 
     
Item Local Unit Own harvested units 
Sold Annually




Sale of forest goods     
Yams Heap    
Bamboo shoot Bundle    
Mushrooms Basket    
Wild honey Litre    
Afromamum Heap
Passion fruit Heap ”.   
Guava Heap    
Mango Heap    
Jackfruit Head    
Pawpaw Head    
Palm nut (oil) Basket    
Wild Coffee Kg    
Tamarind Bundle    
Small wild animals:     
Rats Piece    
Rabbits Piece    
Duiker Piece    
Primates Piece
Snakes Piece    
Porcupine Piece    
Guinea fowl Piece    
Francolin Piece    
other     
Large wild animals:     
Big Antelope Piece    
Hippo Piece    
Buffalo Piece    
Other products: 
Building Poles from forest Piece    
Timber from forest     
Grass for thatching Bundle    
Rattan Bundle    
Bamboo Bundle    
Sand Heap    
Clay Heap    
Stones Heap    
Other     
Large carpentry items Item
Small carpentry items item    
Medicinal plants Kg    
Mats/woven goods Item    
Handicrafts Item    
Firewood Bundle    
Charcoal Sac    
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Appendix 2Household questionnaire survey with the 
CVM-PPM  





1.1  Name of Village      
1.2  Distance of house to the PA boundary36 or GPS reading     


























1  Household head       
2         
3         
4         
5         
6         
7         
8         
9         
10         
         
         
         
         
         
         
Relation to hh head codes: 1: Spouse; 2: Son/daughter; 3: Son/daughter in law; 4: Grandchild; 5: Mother/father; 6: Mother/father in law; 7: 
Brother or sister; 8: Brother/sister in law; 9: Uncle/aunt; 10: Nephew/niece; 11: Step/foster child; 12:Other/Not related. 
                                                 
36 If within the PA then “0”, otherwise estimate distance in kilometers to the nearest 0.1km 
37 Under 18 years. 
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1. Car     
2. Tractor     
3. Motorcycle     
4. Bicycle     
5. Handphone/phone     
6. TV     
7. Radio/cassette     
8. Stove for cooking     
9. Fishing boat and boat engine     
10. Chainsaw     
11. Plough     
12. Hand cart     
13. Shotgun      
14. Others (worth more than approx. 50 USD)      
15.      
 
















































































































4.  Risk 
1. Has the household faced any major income shortfalls or large expenditures during the last year?  
Event   Code 1)  Estimated income loss or costs 




iii. Death of adult member     
iv. Weeding     
v. Land loss (expropriation, etc.)      
vi. Livestock loss (theft, drought, etc.)     
vii. Other asset loss (fire, theft, etc.)     
viii. Lost job     



























5 PA services 
5.1  Has the household over the past 12 months received any cash payments related to the following forest services?  
  Code: 0‐1  If yes, indicate amounts received 
i. Tourism        
ii. Carbon projects     
iii. Water catchments projects     
iv. Biodiversity conservation     
v. Others, specify:        
 





































             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             





Inputs  Unit  Amounts  Total costs 
Seeds       
Fertilizers       
Pesticides       
Manure/crop residues       
Hired labour       
Extension services       
Other       
Note: The key is to get total costs.  




















































































Cattle                    
Goats                   
Sheep                   
Pigs                   
Ducks                   
Chicken                   








Meat           
Milk            
Cheese           
Ghee           
Eggs           
Skin           
Manure           
           
 
8.3 Please indicate the quantities and values of inputs used in livestock production over the last 12 months (cash expenditures).  
Inputs  Amounts  Unit  Price per unit  Total costs 
Feed and fodder         










       
Hired labour         
         
         
         
Note: the key is to get total costs.  






  Per month  Last year  Comments 
Gross income (net sales)       
Costs:   




c) Hired labour       
d) Transport and marketing cost       
e) Capital costs (repair, maintenance, etc.)       





















Fuelwood             
Timber             
             
Wild animals             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             




























protected area may run out entirely. This means  that  life will be much more difficult  for your  families or your 
children’s families in the future.  
 
3.  As  the  PA  authorities  become  more  aware  of  the  impact  that  the  local  community  has  on  the  loss  of 
biodiversity  they  are  looking  for  more  effective  or  new ways  of  enforcing  the  necessary  management  rules.  





park and  local people. One option would be  to  implement a collaborative management  scheme  in partnership 
with in the PA authority focusing on regulated community use of the PA. 
 
5. Responsibilities/Benefits‐ Under  such  a  scheme members  of  your  community would  be  asked  to  protect  a 





in protection activities. Each household  in  the community would  then receive a direct payment  to compensate 




representative of  the national park and  local government.     The committee would be responsible  for managing 
and monitoring  the activities of  the CPA rangers  in collaboration with  the PA authority. The committee would 
also conduct impact monitoring on the state of the community managed zone in order to verify indicators.  
 





level of  compensation.   Only a  limited amount of  funds are available  for  such a  scheme.  If  the  sum of all  the 
compensation  amounts  is  less  than  or  equal  to  the  money  available  then  the  scheme  would  go  ahead  as 
described,  and  a  share  of  any  surplus  funds between  the  community  bid  and  the  compensation  fund will be 








Have a think about how much  the protected area contributes  to your current  livelihood. What  is the minimum 





Appendix 3 Treatment sets, choice cards and example 
NLOGIT RPL code 
Treatment sets and choice cards. 
Treatments used in the experiment 
Profile Group Size Length of Trek Community Benefits Other Wildlife Price
1 6 More than 3 hours 10% Increase High $75
2 8 Less than 1 hour No change Low $75
3 4 Between 1-3  hours 20% Increase Medium $75
4 6 Less than 1 hour 20% Increase Low $100
5 8 Between 1-3  hours 10% Increase Medium $100
6 4 More than 3 hours No change High $100
7 6 Between 1-3  hours No change Low $150
8 8 More than 3 hours 20% Increase Medium $150
9 4 Less than 1 hour 10% Increase High $150
10 6 Between 1-3  hours 20% Increase High $200
11 8 More than 3 hours 10% Increase Low $200
12 4 Less than 1 hour No change Medium $200
13 6 More than 3 hours No change Medium $25
14 8 Less than 1 hour 20% Increase High $25
15 4 Between 1-3  hours 10% Increase Low $25
16 6 Less than 1 hour 10% Increase Medium $50
17 8 Between 1-3  hours No change High $50
18 4 More than 3 hours 20% Increase Low $50
19 8 Less than 1 hour 20% Increase Low $50
20 4 Between 1-3  hours 10% Increase Medium $50
21 6 More than 3 hours No change High $50
22 8 Between 1-3  hours No change Medium $200
23 4 More than 3 hours 20% Increase High $200
24 6 Less than 1 hour 10% Increase Low $200
25 8 More than 3 hours 10% Increase Medium $75
26 4 Less than 1 hour No change High $75
27 6 Between 1-3  hours 20% Increase Low $75
28 8 More than 3 hours No change Low $150
29 4 Less than 1 hour 20% Increase Medium $150
30 6 Between 1-3  hours 10% Increase High $150
31 8 Less than 1 hour 10% Increase High $100
32 4 Between 1-3  hours No change Low $100
33 6 More than 3 hours 20% Increase Medium $100
34 8 Between 1-3  hours 20% Increase High $25
35 4 More than 3 hours 10% Increase Low $25
36 6 Less than 1 hour No change Medium $25  
This resulted in 18 different choice cards grouped in to blocks of 9.  
NLOGIT code for model estimation 
To evaluate the differences between proportional levels of cut-off violation, the proportion of 
cut-off violation for each response was estimated in a column in EXCEL. The level of 
violation i.e. >1%, >10% etc was then selected using a separate column (x%) coded as a 1 or 
a 0 to accept or reject the response to be used in the model.  
Nlogit ; reject, x %= 0$ 
 lhs=y 





Appendix 4 Choice modelling survey 
Tourism Demand Survey Questionnaire-Introduction 
Tourism is an essential source of revenue to conserve the mountain gorilla and their habitat. However tourist visits to the gorilla 
groups is not without impacts to the environment and local society. ORTPN is working to manage tourism in the most 
environmental and socially responsible way.  The money generated through park fees goes directly towards the costs of running 
and managing the three national parks in Rwanda as well as providing finance to neighboring communities for conservation and 
development projects. 
 
This survey is a piece of independent research by the University of Stirling, United Kingdom, on your attitudes and values 
towards wildlife and their conservation in the Volcanoes National Park, Rwanda. In addition we would like to find out about your 
visit to the Parc National des Volcans today. The information that you provide us with will help to guide policies and practices to 





1. What first interested you in visiting the mountain gorillas? Please   one only 
 Magazine Article   Tourism/travel marketing  
 Natural history program   Knowledge of Dian Fossey’s life and work  
 Internet based article   Other Please specify  
 Radio program     
 
2. What is the main purpose of your trip to Rwanda? Please   one only 
 Gorillas   Business – workshop/conference  
 Cultural   Study/Research  
 Tourism Other    Resident expatriate  
 Visiting friends or relatives   Other please specify  
 Business – commercial     
 
3. What other tourism activities will you do/have you done in Rwanda? Please   all that apply  
 Visit Nyungwe Forest National Park   Visit Karisoke and Dian Fossey’s Tomb- PNV  
 Visit Akagera National Park   Visit to Golden Monkeys – PNV  
 Kigali City Tour   Nature Walk – PNV  
 Rwandan Genocide Memorial, Kigali   Other please specify  
 Mountain Climbing – PNV     
 
4.  Which countries have you visited/will you visit on this trip? 
 Kenya   Tanzania  
 Uganda   Other please list  
          
5. What are the main activities you will do/intend to do in the other countries on your trip? Please   all that apply 
 Safari – Savannah Parks   Diving/snorkeling – in the ocean  
 Gorilla trekking in Uganda   Water sports – ocean or fresh water  
 Other nature treks   Fishing – sea and freshwater  
 Bird watching   Other specify  
 Trekking/climbing mountains     
 
6. How would you describe your trip? 
 Overlanding   Independent Travel  
 Backpacking   Organized Tour  
 
7. How many nights will your stay in Rwanda be? 
 1 night only   3 nights   5 nights  
 2 nights   4 nights   6 nights or more  
 
 
8. If on an organized tour or overlanding which tour operator did you use? 
Name of operator_______________________________________________ 
 
9 How would you rate the quality of information given by park staff on the following issues?  
(1, Poor; 2, Satisfactory; 3, Excellent; 4, None given) 
  1 2 3 4 
 Park in general     
 Gorilla behavior and conservation     
 Birds in the park     
 Conservation issues     
 Plants in the park     
 
10. Would you like more detailed information on any of the following topics? 
Park in general  Conservation issues   
Gorilla behavior and conservation  Plants in the park   






  YES NO NOT SURE
11. Did anyone in your group use a camera flash when taking pictures of the 
gorillas? 
   
12. Did you think any one in your group got within 7m of the gorillas during 
the trek? 
   
13. Were any of your tour group physically touched by gorillas?    
14. Did you see any park staff cut vegetation with a machete near the gorillas?    
 
15. Is this your first trip to the Parc National des Volcans? 




To help us understand our visitors more, we would like to ask a few questions about you: 
 
16. Nationality:__________________________17. Country of residence: ___________________________ 
 
18. Age Group Please circle one 
 15-19   35-39   55-59  
 20-24   40-44   60 or over  
 25-29   45-49     
 30-34   50-54     
   
19. Are you Male  or Female   
 
20. Household Income group: Please  one category 
USD $ per 
year 
Less than 25, 
000       
25,000 to 
45,000     
45,000 to 
65,000     
65,000 to 
85,000     
More than 
85,000     




15,000 to 35, 
000    
35,000 to 
55,000     
55,000 to 
75,000     
More than 
75,000     
Euro € per 
year 
Less than 25, 
000       
25,000 to 
45,000     
45,000 to 
65,000     
65,000 to 
85,000     
More than 
85,000     
 
21. Which category best describes your education level: please   one box  
 
 
22. Do you have children?  (Please   one)  No  Yes (If yes how many____) 
 






This part of the survey attempts to explore your preferences for nature conservation and some hypothetical impacts or 
outcomes from gorilla tourism. Below you will find 9 choice cards from which you will select one response regarding your 
preference for different combinations of features of a trek to the gorillas. These features are: 
 
Size of tour group: This attribute relates to the number of tourists in a trekking group to visit the gorillas. This is limited to a 
maximum of 8 for conservation reasons, however smaller groups are sometimes preferred by some visitors. 
 
Length of trek: The amount of time taken to reach the gorillas. Some visitors feel a bit dissatisfied if they reach the gorilla group 
quickly as experiencing the forest is an important part of the experience. For others the trek is not a very important part of the 
experience and they are keen to get to the gorillas as quickly as possible to enjoy their allocated hour with them. 
 
Community Benefit: Currently 5% of gross park tourism revenues (permit prices) are targeted towards financing development 
activities in communities adjacent to the national park.  To some visitors it is important that local communities receive some 
benefits from the tourism activities, to others this is not an important aspect of their gorilla trekking experience 
 
Possibility of seeing other wildlife: The ability to see other flora and fauna in the park can contribute to the richness of the 
experience. For some visitors this is not so important but for others it can be almost as important as seeing the gorillas 
themselves. 
 
Increase in permit price: Whilst the price of the trekking permit is US $375 the management of the park and conserving the 
gorillas is a costly business. Many visitors are willing to pay an additional premium to ensure the conservation of the mountain 













 Secondary School   University   Postgraduate  
1. YES  2. NO  
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We now wish you to review the choice cards below, there is no right or wrong answer we are simply interested in your opinion. 
For each of the 9 select which option would be most preferable to you: 
1. 
 Option A Option B Neither 
Gorilla Trip Features    
Tour group size 4 6 I would not choose 
either option to visit 
the gorillas 
and would 
conduct some other 
activity instead  
Length of trek Between 1-3  hours More than 3 hours 
Community benefit 20% of permit price No change 
Possibility of seeing other wildlife Medium High 
Increase in permit price $75 $50 
Which option do you choose  
( one only) 





 Option A Option B Neither 
Gorilla Trip Features    
Tour group size 4 6 I would not choose 
either option to visit 
the gorillas 
and would 
conduct some other 
activity instead  
Length of trek More than 3 hours Less than 1 hour 
Community benefit No change 10% of permit price 
Possibility of seeing other wildlife High Low 
Increase in permit price $100 $200 
Which option do you choose  
( one only) 
   
3. 
 
 Option A Option B Neither 
Gorilla Trip Features    
Tour group size 6 8 I would not choose 
either option to visit 
the gorillas 
and would 
conduct some other 
activity instead  
Length of trek More than 3 hours Less than 1 hour 
Community benefit No change 10% of permit price 
Possibility of seeing other wildlife Medium High 
Increase in permit price $25 $100 
Which option do you choose  
( one only) 
   
 
4.  
 Option A Option B Neither 
Gorilla Trip Features    
Tour group size 8 4 I would not choose 
either option to visit 
the gorillas 
and would 
conduct some other 
activity instead  
Length of trek More than 3 hours Less than 1 hour 
Community benefit 20% of permit price No change 
Possibility of seeing other wildlife Medium High 
Increase in permit price $150 $75 
Which option do you choose  
( one only) 




 Option A Option B Neither 
Gorilla Trip Features    
Tour group size 4 6 I would not choose 
either option to visit 
the gorillas 
and would 
conduct some other 
activity instead  
Length of trek More than 3 hours Less than 1 hour 
Community benefit 20% of permit price No change 
Possibility of seeing other wildlife Low Medium 
Increase in permit price $50 $25 
Which option do you choose  
( one only) 
   
6.  
 
 Option A Option B Neither 
Gorilla Trip Features    
Tour group size 6 8 I would not choose 
either option to visit 
the gorillas 
and would 
conduct some other 
activity instead  
Length of trek Less than 1 hour Between 1-3  hours 
Community benefit 20% of permit price No change 
Possibility of seeing other wildlife Low Medium 
Increase in permit price $100 $200 
Which option do you choose  
( one only) 





 Option A Option B Neither 
Gorilla Trip Features    
Tour group size 4 6 I would not choose 
either option to visit 
the gorillas 
and would 
conduct some other 
activity instead  
Length of trek Less than 1 hour Between 1-3  hours 
Community benefit No change 10% of permit price 
Possibility of seeing other wildlife Medium High 
Increase in permit price $200 $150 
Which option do you choose  
( one only) 




 Option A Option B Neither 
Gorilla Trip Features    
Tour group size 4 6 I would not choose 
either option to visit 
the gorillas 
and would 
conduct some other 
activity instead  
Length of trek Between 1-3  hours More than 3 hours 
Community benefit 10% of permit price 20% of permit price 
Possibility of seeing other wildlife Low Medium 
Increase in permit price $25 $100 
Which option do you choose  
( one only) 




 Option A Option B Neither 
Gorilla Trip Features    
Tour group size 4 6 I would not choose 
either option to visit 
the gorillas 
and would 
conduct some other 
activity instead  
Length of trek Less than 1 hour Between 1-3  hours 
Community benefit 10% of permit price 20% of permit price 
Possibility of seeing other wildlife High Low 
Increase in permit price $150 $75 
Which option do you choose  
( one only) 
   
 
Finally can you please answer the following questions about your own preferences: 
 What is the maximum number of tourists you would tolerate on your trek (bearing in mind the maximum of 8)?  
( one only)  1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8 
 
 What is the minimum number of hours (round trip) would you be willing to trek to view the gorillas? ( one only) 
No less than ½ an hour ; 1 hour ; 2 hours ; 3 hours ; more than 3 hours  
 
 What is the maximum number of hours (round trip) would you be willing to trek to view the gorillas? ( one only) 
Up to 1 hour ; 1 hour ; 2 hours ; 3 hours ; 4 hours or more  
 
 What is the maximum additional amount above the current permit price that you would be willing to pay?  
   ____________$US 
 
 What is the lowest percentage of tourism permit revenue would you wish go to local communities who live around the 
park? ( one only) 
2%; 5%;10%;20%;30%; other please specify_____ 
 
 
